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of this study is to present a comparative analysis of 
of problem-solving workshops and associated conflict 
techniques exemplified in the work of John W Burton 
Doob and their associates. 
The approach has been to structure the research as a 
methodological critique of the Burton and Doob models, with 
special consideration given to their respective domain 
assumptions, internal logic, methodology, process and 
prescriptive dimensions. 
Informed by the assumption of the universality of conflict, the 
study begins by examining the particular strengths and 
weaknesses associated with Burton and Doob's work. The approach 
is descriptive-analytical and sets out to isolate, identify and 
describe the salient features of the problem-solving approach 
followed by the two authors. Specific case studies used by them 
have been subjected to critical analysis. The basic notion of 
problem-solving and its relevance to conflict analysis and 
resolution is also explored in some detail. 
In arriving at a conclusion, the study suggests that 
problem-solving workshops have specific strengths, notably in 
the area of conflict analysis as well as in influencing 
individual perceptions and competing value positions. Certain 
shortcomings in the theoretical and practical utility of this 
approach, however, could be overcome, in the author's opinion, 
by giving attention to the area of third party intervention, 
notably in assessing the variables affecting the process, such 
as the time sequence, the structure of the discussion format, 
and the application of specific techniques. 
In the final analysis, it is agreed that these problem-solving 
workshops can serve as a useful analytical tool in contemplating 
the dynamic of conflict relationships and behaviour. Their 
theoretical and practical utility, but remain inherently limited 
unless they are integrated with a broader body of literature on 
bargaining and third party intervention. 
The study concludes with the observation that despite an 
extensive and growing body of literature on conflict, the 
practice of third party intervention - especially within the 
workshop setting - has only recently been studied in depth. It 
is in this respect that this study hopes to be of some practical 
value especially in the case of a deeply divided society such 
as South Africa. 
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... -.-- .·._,' 
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the basic problem that 
underlies this research. In addition, to explain the mode of 
enquiry and approach to the subject matter. Finally, to locate the 
material presented here within the broader field of international 
relations scholarship. 
1.1 Stating the problem 
In recent years, researchers analysing conflict resolution 
processes have conducted and proposed various problem-solving 
workshops. These workshops attempt to apply concepts originally 
developed in social-psychological literature and analyses of small 
group dynamics and interaction and insights derived from industrial 
disputes, to the structure and,dynamic of international conflict. 
This study attempts a comparative analysis ·of some of the 
better known problem-solving workshops and associated conflict 
resolution techniques, developed by John W. Burton and Leonard Doob 
and their associates, and to suggest tentatively how one might 
progress from pre-theories to more empirically-based theories of 
conflict termination or resolution. 
The research will be structured along a methodological 
critique of the above models of conflict resolution. Special 
emphasis will be placed upon their respective domain assumptions, 
internal logic, methodology, process, and prescriptive dimensions. 
Thus the basic approach is comparative and descriptive-analytical. 
Exponents from both European and North American theoretical 
traditions have been selected for comparative analysis with a view 
.. ~· •' ··~ .. · 
2 
to highlight both the differences and similarity between these 
respective contributions. The emphasis will be on the actual 
techniques and procedures proposed to resolve conflict, rather than 
on the more general phases of the conflict process. 
This study rests on the assumption of the universality of 
conflict. W~ile conflict is seen to arise from the very nature of 
man himself by some scholars, others emphasise the relevance of 
environmental factors for an understanding of the origin and 
dynamic of conflict. Politics invariably involves the generation 
and resolution of conflict in one form or another. Thus, conflict 
is not necessarily destructive - it can perform constructive 
individual and social functions. Conflict is an important 
accelerator of social change and individual psychological 
development. The question is not how to avoid or suppress conflict; 
doing so can even have harmful or stagnating consequences. Rather, 
the challenge is how to create the conditions that encourage 
constructive problem-solving, in other words, how conflict can be 
used constructively. 
The research associated with John W Burton and Leonard Doob 
and their respective colleagues has been selected for analysis on 
both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, it lends 
itself to comparison at various levels. First, at the level of 
assumptions. Secon~ at the lev~l of process dimensions and 
methodology, and .finally, at a prescriptive level. While the work 
of Burton and Doob differs in the application of specific 
techniques for conflict resolution, they share some common domain 
assumptions about the nature of conflict and its termination. 
Moreover, both Burton and Doob have applied their respective 
3 
problem-solving workshops to communal conflicts, which although not 
similar, shared some common properties. In addition, Doob and his 
associates also applied their model in the African context. 
A final theoretical consideration relates to the standing of these 
two scholars in this specific field of scholarship. References to 
the works of both Burton and Doob are to be found in most of the 
definitive textbooks on international conflict. [1] Moreover, 
these two scholars are widely regarded as the originators of the 
notion of "creative problem-solving", associated with the workshop 
approach. 
From a practical point of view, two considerations have 
informed their selection. First, the fact that there is a 
considerable body of critical literature available on their work, 
and secondly, that both scholars have over the years, undergone a 
discernable progression in their basic thinking about conflict and 
its termination. This not only makes them interesting, but enhances 
their usefulness and appeal for comparative analysis. Burton, in 
particular has shifted his emphasis on 'perception' in the late 
1960s and early 1970s to an emphasis on 'human needs'. Doob too, 
has moved away from an over concern with.methodology and techniques 
to a wider and more humane approach to conflict resolution. 
1.2 Locus within the discipline of international relations 
In the analysis of interstate conflict, processes is central to 
much of international relations writing. Predominantly, the 
emphasis of prominent international relations scholars has been on 
the first two phases of the conflict process - the causes of 
conflict and the conflict behaviour of states and nations. 
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Relatively little attention has been directed toward models for the 
termination or resolution of conflict. This is somewhat surprising 
since, even if one leaves aside the normative questions regarding 
the desirability of achieving an absence of conflict, it is highly 
unlikely that such a state of affairs will ever be achieved. 
Therefore, a strong case can be made for the scientific study of 
conflict, and especially for the processes by which conflicts can 
be managed and terminated. 
Much of the literature on conflict resolution in general and 
the role of third party intervention in conflict processes in 
particular, to bring about such a resolution, has been from a 
historical or legalistic perspective, providing descriptions of 
particular conflicts, often overemphasising their unique 
attributes. Other more traditional methods of third-party 
intervention such as arbitration would for instance focus on the 
International Court of Justice, negotiation and arbitration by the 
League of Nations, and the use of "neutral" intermediaries to 
mediate dispute between conflicting parties. [2] 
In the latter part of the 1960s, however, a new approach to 
an analysis of conflict processes and the resolution of conflict 
evolved: the problem-solving workshop. Burton, 1969:3 comments: 
"The development of this approach arose from a belief that more 
conventional methods and techniques of third-party intervention, 
based on legal intervention and diplomacy, were not particularly 
successful in resolving conflict". More specifically, it was argued 
that conventional techniques relied upon coercive and omnipotent 
methods, resulting in "solutions" based on compromise and often 
superimposed by some extraneous authority. 
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Traditional approaches treated conflicts as "contests to be 
won" - the new approach was to examine conflicts as "problems to be 
solved". To paraphrase Burton. Within this new approach a conscious 
effort was made to apply concepts and techniques developed in 
social-psychological literature and analyses of small group beha-
viour and insights gained from industrial disputes to interstate 
conflict. 
John Burton and his associates at the Centre for the 
Analysis of Conflict in London are widely seen as the originators 
of this technique. Burton termed their initial efforts "exercises 
in controlled communicatiqn". After a pilot workshop held in London 
in December 1965, a follow-up second project which involved three 
American scholars C.F. Alger, H.C. Kelman and R.C. North - and 
directed at the Cyprus conflict - was held. In the same year, 
Leonard Doob and William Foltz of Yale University independently 
began to explore the need for an alternative to traditional 
approaches to border disputes. Their first workshop, entitled 
Fermeda, which dealt with border conflict involving Somalia, 
Ethiopia, and Kenya, took place in August 1969. Soon after this, 
Doob and Foltz were to apply their basic model to the conflict in 
Northern Ireland. Subsequently, Herbert C K~lman and Stephen Cohen 
developed an approach that is essentially a synthesis of Burton's 
and Doob's techniques. More recently, some other scholars, notably 
Levi and Benjamin, have amplified the technique further. [3] 
Development of the problem~solving approach to conflict 
resolution went hand in hand with, and was influenced by, John 
Burton's theoretical efforts to 11 reconceptualise" the international 
system and the study of international relations, making use of 
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systems analysis [4] and culminating in his notion of 'world 
society'. [S] Central to John Burton's approach is the 
introduction of theoretical ideas and insights and empirical 
.findings by the third party or intermediary, which the conflicting 
parties can use as analytical tools in. the analysis of their own. 
conflict and in the search for "creative solutions". Beyond such 
instrumental uses of theory in the course of practice (i.e. in 
conflict analysis and resolution), there is "an organic connection 
between theory and practice" in Burton's approach. Kelman 
(1984::x:ix), comments succinctly: 
" ••• Interactive problem solving for him is not just a 
technique, but an alternative diplomacy appropriate to his 
alternative conception of the international system as a 
world society." 
Throughout his writings, Burton has attempted to provide a 
~cientific basis' to the formulation of foreign policy. Informed by 
the assumption that "a theory of international relations must be 
consistent with what we know about human behaviour and social 
organisation at all.levels", he has drawn widely on the behayioural 
sciences in the development of an interdisciplinary approach. Thus, 
his conception of world society utilises general systems theory to 
p..Fo-vide an overarching, analytical framework, sociological writings 
and ideas about society to capture some of the salient 
relationships that characterise the global system, and the 
psychology of perception to explain the ways in which these 
relationships are observed and interpreted by a variety of 
international actors. 
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In psychological preference, Burton has shifted from an emphasis on 
1 perception
1
in the late 1960s and early 1970s to an emphasis on 
'human needs' in his more recent works. [6] The concept of 
"universal human needs" is central to a 'paradigm shift' [7] that 
Burton claims characterises much of recent social science 
scholarship. 
As a social psychologist, Doob's particular interest was in 
analysing and understanding the points at which psychological 
factors - notably in the form of images, stereotypes and 
interaction processes - impact upon international relations. By his 
own admission, althQugh the methodological aim was to gain 
"clinical experience in the use of a technique called sensitivity 
training", Doob et al., ( 1970 :x), argued that they were merely 
utilizing it "to try to create an atmosphere in which international 
discord might be better understood and eventually diminished". 
1.3 Structure of the research 
The structure of this research can be briefly outlined as follows: 
Chapter 1 attemps to outline and clarify the basic problem 
that underlies this study. In addition, to explain the mode of 
enquiry and approach to the subject matter. This introductory 
chapter concludes with an attempt to locate the material within the 
broader fi.eld of international relations scholarship. 
Chapter 2 attemps a selective and exploratory overview of 
the intellectual history of conflict research. The chapter reviews 
conflict research against the backdrop of four dominant 
perspectives on conflict. These are: Conflict in psychological 
perspective; conflict in sociological perspective; conflict in 
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philosophical perspective, and conflict in international relations. 
Within each of these broad perspectives, a diversity of approaches 
is outlined. 
Chapter 3 addresses a number of conceptual issues. The key 
concepts used in this study, notably, "conflict", "conflict 
resolution", "conflict settlement", "conflict management" and 
"conflict structure" are clarified. The chapter ends with a 
typology of various types of conflict. 
Chapter 4 deals with the basic notion of a problem-solving 
workshop and its relevance to conflict analysis and resolution. 
Levi and Benjamin's model of conflict resolution is selected for 
this purpose. The chapter starts with an exposition of the domain 
assumptions that inform the problem-solving workshop approach, 
proceeds to discuss the key elements and procedures associated 
with Levi and Benjamin's model of conflict resolution, and 
concludes with a provisional critique of problem-solving workshops 
in general. 
Chapter 5 seeks to isolate, identify and describe the 
salient features of the problem-solving workshop which is 
associated with the research of John Burton and his colleagues. 
Apart from this, certain of the most important conclusions 
associated with this research will be presented. The chapter 
concludes with an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses 
associated with the work of Burton and his fellow researchers. 
Chapter 6 analyses the problem-solving workshops organised 
under the direction of Leonard W Doob, William Foltz, and their 
associates. This discussion will be on a comparative basis, with 
special emphasis on the similarities and differences between the 
9 
work of Burton and that of Doob. Special attention will be given 
to the Fermeda and Stirling workshops [8], both of which will be 
subjected to critical analysis. 
Chapter 7 attempts to advance certain guidelines which may 
facilitate the development of a more empirically-based theory of 
conflict resolution. Some possible areas for further investigation 
' 
and research will be suggested, notably with reference to time 
sequence, the structure of the discussion format and the process 
and practice of third party intervention. 
In the final chapter the major conclusions reached in this 
study will be briefly summarised. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT RESEARCH 
2.1 Introduction 
For centuries scholars have thought and written about the su~ject 
of conflic,t and war while the phenomenon of organised mass violence 
has been of perennial interest to historians, philosophers and 
politicians. (1] However, lt is only over the last four to five 
decades that scholars have attempted, in an interdisciplinary and 
systematic manner, to investigate the causes of conflict, violence 
and war and the problems of maintaining - indeed, defining - a 
condition of peace. 11 Such endeavours are known under a variety of 
labels, such as 'conflict studies', 'peace research', or 'conflict 
analysis'. In this study the concept 'conflict research' will be 
used, "to convey the idea that the wide ranging research effort 
focuses on the phenomenon of 'conflict', wherever this might be 
found" (Mitchell, 1981:1). 
Although this study concerns itself with recent theoretical 
developments, it would be wrong to assume that little scholarly 
interest was taken in the subject of social or international 
conflict before the 1930s. Robin Williams (1972), for example, has 
condemned what he correctly calls the 'Columbus complex' in 
sociology which holds conflict theory to be an invention of the 
1950s, ignoring the rich legacy of sociological research and 
philosophical writings. Although conflict research 'came of age' in 
the United States in the mid-1950s, its intellectual roots go back 
to pioneering scholarship of the 1930s and 1940s (Richardson, 1960; 
Wright, 1942; Sorokin, 1937), to the peace movements of the inter-
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war years and, some would argue - with considerable justification -
to European philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
(Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Machiavelli). However, characteristi~ of 
conflict research during the 1950s, was its growing eclecticism to-
the study of social conflict. [2] 
The primary concern of this chapter is to attempt a 
selective and exploratory overview of the intellectual history of 
conflict research. It does not claim to be comprehensive, but 
rather serves-as a short introduction to conflict research as a 
multi-disciplinary field of inquiry. In order to structure the 
material, conflict is examined from four dominant perspectives. 
These are: Conflict in psychological perspective; conflict in 
sociological perspective; conflict in philosophical perspective and 
conflict in international relations. [3] However, it needs to be 
emphasised, that these denote broad perspectives on conflict. A 
diversity of approaches is referred to under the rubric of each of 
these perspectives. 
2.2 Conflict in psychological perspective [4] 
On_Rummel's,(1977:33} analysis, the salient premise underlying most. 
psychological approaches to the study of conflict, is that "for an 
understanding of conflict, hostility, aggression and violence, one 
has to look to 'inner man'"· William Bolitho's Introduction to 
Twelve Against the Gods, neatly encapsulates this idea, when he 
writes 
"The adventurer is within us, and he contends for our favour 
with the social man we are obliged to be. These two sorts 
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of life are incompatible, one we hanker after, the other we 
are obliged to. There is no other conflict so deep and 
bitter as this". 
Thus, within psychological perspectives on conflict, conflict' is 
understood with reference to 'inner man', and is invariably 
explained either with reference to 'the nature of man', his 
'instincts', 'drives' or by 'heredity'. [5] Within this broad 
perspective, five distinct approaches to the study of conflict may 
be differentiated. These approaches are: ethology, psychotheraphy, 
social learning, frustration - aggression, and cultural studies. 
Each of these five approaches will now be briefly outlined. 
2.2.1 Ethology [6] 
The ethological approach to the study of conflict and aggression 
advances a biological explanation for conflict. The sources of 
conflict and aggression are sought in man's 'phylogenetic nature', 
mainly through the ethological study of man as a member of the 
animal kingdom. For Konrad Lorenz, arguably the major exponent of 
this view, conflict and aggression constitute a "driving power, an 
instinct toward the preservation of life and species" (Lorenz, 
1966:2). Conflict and aggression for Lorenz underlie all kinds of 
behaviour not only to preserve, but to evenly distribute a species 
spatially, to 'select the strongest', and 'to protect the young'. 
Lorenz adopts what has been termed a 'hydraulic model' of 
aggression. Within animals, and man, 'aggressive energy' 
accumulates like the build-up of other basic needs such as that of 
biological reproduction or food. If blocked, this 'aggressive 
energy' may be redirected to 'substitute objects', or it may 
14 
'explode destructively' on those close by. If no adequate 
'aggression - releasing stimulus' is at hand, one will be actively 
sought. Aggression and hence conflict, thus comes from 'within'. 
'Man does not learn to be aggressive. He is born to be aggressive.' 
Aggression is in-born and seen as a deterministic force in human 
nature. 
Lorenz (1966) believes that species develop a number of 
mechanisms for 'redirecting' or 'controlling' aggression. He cites 
the example of ritualised fighting in animals in which no animal is 
mortally wounded. Man does not have a similar mechanism. He has 
destroyed the natural balance through the development of technology 
and especially of destructive nuclear weapons. The sad paradox is 
that he has far exceeded the destructive capacity of any carnivore, 
but has no 'counterbalancing inhibitions'. Thus, he releases his 
aggression on his fellow man. 
Lorenz sees three ways to control conflict and aggression. 
First, . we must 'know ourselves', especially through ethology and 
psychoanalysis. Self-knowledge will help us devise mechanisms for 
'redirecting' conflict and aggression. Second~ we must promote 
and strengthen friendships across group divisions and boundaries, 
· since bonds developed between diverse people, aid in inhibiting 
mutual aggression. Finally, and most importantly, we must'redirect 
aggression'· onto 'substitute objects,' such as sports and athletic 
competition. 
Phylogenetically based studies of conflict have had 
considerable influence on other explanations of conflict, notably 
on writers that stress the 'territorial imperatives' of human 
behaviour, such as Eugene Marais [7], and Robert Ardrey [8], and 
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on scholars that advance biological explanations for conflict. The 
latter .category includesJ among othersJ Ashley Montagu's Man and 
Aggression (1968) [9]; earthy and Ebling's The Natural History of 
Aggression (1964) [10]; Tiger and Fox's The Imperial Animal (1972); 
and Tiger's The Manufacture of Evil: EthicsJ Evolution and the 
Industrial System (1987). [11] 
Various schools of psychotheraphy constitute a second 
approach to conflict. In contrast to ethology and related 
biological approaches to the study of conflictJ which postulate 
conflict as an 'instinctual drive' J such behaviour is seen here as 
the outcome of underlying 'psychological structures' J 'processes' J 
'variables'J and 'mechanisms'. The sources of conflict are to be 
found in manJ ffbut unlike the phylogenetically single and pervasive 
instinct of LorenzJ conflict manifests a particular configuration 
of biologicalJ socialJ and psychological elementsJ only~ of 
which may be instinctual" (RummelJ 1977:36). (Own emphasis.) 
The first psychotherapist to propose an 'aggressive drive' 
¥ was Alfred Adler. In 1908 he published his theory that aggression 
and conflict constitute a 'superordinate drive' [11] that dominates 
behaviour and consciousness and is a borifluence of other drives.' It 
is innateJ the organizing principle of man's behaviour."Adler soon 
reinterpreted this drive as a masculine protest (a drive to 
compensate for feelings of inferiority)J and finally as an upward 
striving for 'perfection 111 (RummelJ 1977:36). 
AlthoughJ eclipsed by the work of FreudJ many of Adler's 
ideas have been revived and reformulated by other scholars. One 
such reformulation is to be found in the writings of Rollo May on 
"existential psychotherapy". 
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Ethological perspectives on conflict also feature in the 
writings of Scott (1958); [12] Johnson (1972); [13] and Nelson 
(1974). [14] Common to ethological studies, is the notion that 
conflict is an 'instinctive drive' in man. The biological nature 
of man, and his interactions with basic preoccupations such as 
. 
survival reproduction and security, lie at.the heart of an 
explanation of human and social conflict. Thus, ethology shares 
some common ideas and explanations with social Darwinism. 
Ethology, that field of biology concerned with "genetically 
transmitted behavioural·tendencies", has had considerable impact 
upon political studies. One of the most interesting and important 
recent developments in political studies has been the rapidly 
expanding interest in the relationship between biology and poli-
tics. Three major foci of research have emerged, namely, 1) the 
implications of ethology for political studies; 2) the interplay 
between physiological variables and political behaviour; 3) bio-
logically-related public policy issues, such as population control, 
genetic engineering, environmental pollution and so forth. 
Roger Masters and Albert Somit (1976) [15] have provided a 
useful overview of the impact of ethology on political studies, 
while the noted political scientist, David Easton of Chicago, 
amongst others, has commented on the relevance of "biopolitics" 
to political theory. [16] 
The ethological view of aggression and conflict is essen-
tially reductionist and determinist. Man is seen as a victim of 
"aggressive" and potentially destructive "drives". Conflict is 
rarely portrayed as something positive and constructive, but as 
"negative" and "destructive". Thus, the underlying view of man 
tends to be a mechanistic one. 
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2.2.2 Psychotherapy 
May's major study dealing with conflict and aggression, is entitled 
Power and Innocence (1972) [17]. He considers power in its various 
dimensions to be man's 'basic drive', and, aggression, as one 
specific of this drive. Power has five 'ontological levels'. In 
May's view (1972:40-42), these levels are: First, simply "the power 
to be", to exist, to assert oneself as a humanbeing {cf Heidegger 
'Das Seiende'). Secondly, the 'power of self-affirmation', to be 
recognised, and to become significant. Thirdly, the power of 'self 
-assertion' of opposing opposition and opposing views. Fourthly, 
'aggression', the application of power to overcome 'blocked self-
assertion', and, finally, violence, to which man resorts when non-
violent aggression has become meaningless or fruitless. 
On May's analysis, aggression is basic to man, but cultu-
rally and socially determined and exacerbated and inculcated by a 
'process of learning'. The expr.ession of power in its aggressive, 
constructive forms is healthy. It is when such expression is 
inhibited or blocked that violence erupts. 'Violence expresses 
impotence.' A view also held by Konrad Lorenz. 
The views of Adler and his followers stand in marked con-
trast to other psychoanalytical perspectives. Adler was a member of 
Freud's psychoanalytical school when he proposed his 'aggressive 
drive' in 1908. Freud initially rejected this view, believing that 
aggression did not constitute a 'significant instinct' or 'drive.' 
It was not until more than a decade later that Freud, perhaps as a 
result of the brutalities of World War I and its socio-political 
consequences, recognised an 'aggressive instinct'. This he first 
introduced in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1950) [18] developing 
{ 
and refining the concept in his later works. 
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In Freud's earlier work, man was dominated by self-
preservation and sexual instincts. He referred to these 
respectively as the 'ego' instinct and 'eros'. Aggression had no 
status as a separate instinct but was an integral part of 'eros' -
an aspect of human sexuality. Moreover, 'eros' was a 'tension.:.. 
releasing instinct'. As in the Lorenzian 'hydraulic model' of 
aggression, man builds up internal tensions that must be released. 
'Release' (catharsis) constituted pleasure. His was essentially a 
mechanical conception of human nature. 
In developing the idea of a 'death instinct', Freud took a 
strongly biologica"i view of human nature and of human behaviour. 
All living things were now driven by 'two competing instincts'. One 
was a 'life instinct' (called eros) 'which strove to create, 
maintain, and unify living things into larger and more complex 
forms of organisation.' The 'death instinct' on the other hand, 
'drove toward the disintegration and destruction of livi~g 
systems'. Being the ultimate application of the ·, pleasure 
principle', death constitutes the absence of all tension, 'the 
perfect state'. 
The 'death instinct' is directed inward toward the 
destruction of the organism. To preserve the organism, the 'libido' 
engages in battle with the death instinct and directs it outward, 
whereupon it becomes external aggression as Rummel (1977:38) puts 
it: 'the drive for mastery, the will to power'. Aggression and 
conflict are therefore secondary, a deflection of the death 
instinct away from the self. "Moreover, in its battle with the 
'libido', the death instinct.may combine with eros into sadism or 
masochism, two of its worst common pathodological manifestations". 
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To Freud, then, aggression was always negative or 
destructive. It constituted'anti-life'or 'pathology.' Human behaviour 
was a manifestation either of 'eras', of the desire for death, or 
of a combination of these. 
Although Freud had a considerable impact on psychoanalysis, 
few scholars had accepted the notion of a 'death instinct,' even 
though some of his followers, such as Melanie Klein (1950) [19], 
have adopted and further amplified this view. 
In a recent noteworthy study on aggression by the 
psychoanalyst Erich Fromm (1973) [20], the notion of the 'death 
instinct' is revised in the direction of current ethological 
findings. Freud viewed aggression as rooted in a 'death instinct', 
although its manifestation may blend with 1 eros 1 • Fromm, however, 
recognises two independent sources, only one of which is 
'instinctual'. 'Instinctual aggression' is 'benign' and 
'defensive'. 'Uninstinctual aggression', rooted in .man's character, 
is malignant and destructive. 
In Fromm's (1973:198-199) view, man instinctively protects 
himself against threats to his survival, his freedom, and other 
basic concerns. Harm or destructiveness that results from this 
instinctive defence mechanism is unitended or purely instrumental. 
Thus benign aggression is purely 'reactive'. It is aroused by 
external stimuli, not internally generated by an increase in 
tension. In this Fromm's instinctual aggression differs 
fundamentally from that of Lorenz and Freud. Moreover, where 
aggression for Lorenz and Freud is largely negative, hostile, and 
destructive, for Fromm 'instinctual aggression' is positive, 
'contributing to man's growth, self-assertion, and independence, and 
to the survival of the species.' 
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'~alignant' or 'uninstinctual aggression', however, results 
from specifically human passions seated in our character. Shaped by 
historical experience and institutions, man's 'character structure' 
. 
may be full of 'vengence, sadism, masochism, hate or destructive-· 
ness'. For Fromm, the way to reduce malignant aggression is to 
radically change what he terms 'techno-cybernetic society', to 
provide for new forms of decentralised control in which man would 
be freer to assert himself and to live the 'good life'. 
While psychotheraphy shares some ideas with biological 
explanations of conflict and aggression, it has advanced our 
knowledge of the subject, notably in the areas of social learning 
and personality studies. 
2.2.3 Social learning 
A contrasting approach to conflict is provided by social learning 
theory (Rotter, 1954 [21]; Mowrer, 1950 [22]; Bandura, 1973 [23]; 
and Walters and associates. [24] Within this approach conflict is 
defined socially. Man learns to be aggressive when such behaviour 
enables him to satisfy his wants and desires, when the aggression 
of others is perceived (through the mass media), to be rewarded, 
and when alternative non-aggressive behaviour is less effective. 
Bandura, 1973:222 captures the essence of this approach wheµ he 
writes : "Once learned and reinforced through social approval and 
acquired status, through the esteem of success, and through 
observing the success of others, aggression will be avoided only if 
costs in punishment become prohibitive or negative sanctions 
develop and non-aggressive behavioural patterns are rewarded." 
21 
This view of conflict and aggression is essentially 
behavioural. There is a concern about goals and intentions, "but 
the focus is on stimulus-response, on observable response 
contingent experiences, on patterns of reinforcement or learning 
patterns". Laboratory experiments provide the research setting, and 
the findings rest upon quantitative analysis of observed and 
systematised data. Thus they differ in their methodology from the 
naturalistic observations of the "instinctivists", such as Lorenz, 
Scott and Johnson and the case-intuitive verstehen approach of 
psychotherapists. Boe and Church (1968) [25], have provided a 
useful overview of social learning approaches to the study of 
conflict. 
2.2.4 Frustration-aggression 
This behavioural view.of conflict is shared by a variety of 
scholars that assert that aggression is a consequence primarily of 
frustrated goals, desires, needs, value expectations, or 'drives'. 
The intensity with which a goal is desired, the degree to which 
frustration blocks this desire, and the history of an individual's 
frustration presumably influence the extent and intensity of his 
aggression. 
The frustration-aggression hypothesis, along with its 
variants such as the theory of relative deprivation, have gained 
currency since the pioneering work of Dollard and his colleagues at 
I 
the University of Yale in 1939, The salient aspects of their view 
may be summarised as follows: 
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First, they equated aggression 'with the desire to hurt 
others'. Secondly, frustration was conceptualised "as interference 
with goal realization". On this coqceptual base, the Yale group put 
forward its well-known proposition (Dollard, et al., 1939:1), 
namely: 
"This study takes as its point of departure the assumption 
that aggression is always a consequence of frustration. More 
specifically the proposition is that the occurrence of 
aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of 
frustration and, contrawise, that the existence of 
frustration always leads to some form of aggression". 
Dollard and his colleagues further posited a direct and positive 
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relationship between the instigation to aggression and the degree 
of frustration present at any given point in time. 
A variety of scholars followed on where Dollard and his 
associates had left off. Particularly noteworthy are the contribu-
tions of Berkowitz (1962) [26]; Davies (1962) [27] with his well-
known 'J curve'; Gurr (1970, 1980) [28] with his theory of relative 
deprivation, and the Feierabends (1966) [29], 
Although Runciman (1986) [30] also employs the concept of 
relative deprivation (RD), his is a sociological theory of relative 
deprivation in which frustration plays no role, Relative depriva7 
tion'is related to the dimensions of manifest inequality existing 
in society: These he sees as 'class', 'status', and 'power'. 
Deprivation along one dimension may not be matched by deprivation 
along another dimension, nor is actual inequality along a dimen-
sion necessarily matched by the sense of deprivation felt. 
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Runciman applied his theory of relative deprivation of the manual 
working class in England, both historically and to aggregate data 
of various societies he collected by means of surveys. 
Frustration-aggression theory and its variants such as 
relative deprivation enjoy relatively widespread popularity, and 
constitutes an important psychological perspective on conflict. In 
Zimmerman's view (1977:19-22), the frustration-aggression approach 
to conflict constitutes 'a major and useful perspective on 
conflict', especially because it has influenced other approaches 
such as learning theory. Berkowitz (1973), for instance has had 
considerable influence upon the writings of social learning 
theorists such as Bandura, Walters and his associates. 
2.2.5 Cultural studies 
There is one final approach to consider under the rubric of 
conflict in psychological perspective, that of the cultural 
anthropologists notably Alexander Alland (1972). [31] The basic 
premise here is that aggression is embedded within a culture; it is 
learned in the same way a language is learned. To understand 
conflict the researcher should focus on the cultural context of 
aggression and its functions in the maintenance and development of 
that culture. 
The basic observation is that some cultures are relatively 
free of collective conflict and seldom manifest interpersonal 
violence and destructiveness. Therefore, although man has the 
potentiality for aggressive behaviour, whether it actually 
manifests itself is a matter of cultural learning. Man is not 
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aggressive. Cultures are aggressive, even imperialistic. 
Cultural studies share with social learning theory and 
emphasis on external (environmental) factors - on learning. 
However, they differ in methodology. While social learning theory 
centres on quantitative laboratory experimentation, cultural 
studies concentrate on the naturalistic obs~rvation of cultures. 
They differ also in focus. Learning theory emphasises that which 
impinges on the individual. It focuses on the individual, stressing 
the development of aggression as an interaction between responses, 
reinforcement, stimuli, and so forth. The cultural approach, 
however, is less concerned with the individual and some determinate 
variables than with the total field of societal norms, meanings, 
and values within which certain culturally induced behavioural 
patterns emerge, and the processes of socialisation at work in such 
a culture. 
A further psychological cause and condition of conflict is 
to be found in the view that conflict and war are the consequence 
of misperception. This view has been advanced by some scholars, 
notably by White (1966) [32], who argued that the conflict in 
Vietnam was a consequence of grave misperception on the part of the 
United States of America. This explanation of conflict rests on the 
premise that as Burton (1968:67) puts it: "The origin of conflict 
can be frequently traced to false perception". 
In conclusion, this section of this chapter served to 
identify five general approaches under the rubric "t::onflict in 
p·sychological perspective". These approaches contend that conflict 
and aggression result from an instinct shared with all animals, 
from an instinct or'drive'manifested through particularly human, 
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subconscioius, psychological mechanisms and processes, from an 
acquired response pattern, from frustrated goals, or from cultu~al 
learning. More generally, these five approaches view conflict and 
aggression as emanating from man's 'instincts or drives', from 
environmental and social influences, or some combination of these 
factors. Aggression is inherited or learned or both~ 
In the following section we intend focusing on •c.onflict in 
sociological perspective'. Like the preceding section the material 
will be presented in skeletal form, since the purpose of this 
chapter is to provide a selective overview of the evolution of 
conflict research as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry. 
The study of conflict and aggression from a psychological 
perspective has contributed greatly to our understanding of some of 
the biological and cultural sources of conflict. While there is a 
tendency to view man deterministically, especially within the 
ethological approach, social learning and cultural studies show 
sensitivity to social processes and environmental factors. Cultural 
explanations in particular, have contributed significantly to our 
understanding of conflict, notably in non-Western societies. The 
seminal and controversial study by Adda B. Bozeman, titled 
Conflict in Africa - Concepts and Realities (Princeton University 
Press, 1976) ., deserves special mention. 
2.3 Conflict in sociological perspective 
Like the previous category, this category is wide - encompassing a 
broad spectrum of approaches to the study of conflict. Sociological 
contributions to the study of conflict are not only wide-ranging, 
but are of great significance for an understanding of the dynamics 
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of conflict. An entire school within sociological scholarship uses 
conflict as its focus and 'organising principle'. 
One of the most powerful sociological explanations of social 
conflict is that of Karl Marx, who posited a class struggle between 
proletariat and bourgeoisie intrinsic to capitalist, industrial 
society. Conflict and its role in the changing of social systems 
(rather than within systems) is central in the philosophy of Marx. 
According to Marx, conflict leads not only to ever-changing 
relations within the existing social structure, but the total 
social system undergoes transformation through conflict (Coser, 
1967:25). 
Marx viewed the structure of society in relation to its 
major classes, and the struggle between them as the engine of 
change in this structure. His was no equilibrium or consensus 
theory. Conflict was not a deviational phenomenon within society's 
structure, but the very essence of its existence. The driving force 
of history. 
The key to understanding Marx is his definition of a 
'class'. A class is defined by the ownership of property. Such 
ownership vests in a person with the power to exclude others from 
the property and to use it for personal gain and advantage. In 
relation to property there are three classes in society: the 
bourgeoisie (who own the means of production such as machinery 
and factories, and whose source of income is profit), landowners 
(whose income is rent), and the proletariat (who own their labour 
and sell it for a wage). 
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The force transforming latent class membership into class 
struggle is class interest. Out of similar class situationsJ 
individuals come to act similarly. Similar class situations imply 
similar class interestsJ but because the relation to production is 
different between classes their interests are also different. This 
makes for inevitable conflict - conflict which is class - based. 
On Marx's analysisJ the development of class conflict, the 
struggle between classes was initially confined to individual 
factories. EventuallyJ given the expansion of capitalismJ the 
growing disparity between life conditions on the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariatJ and the increasing homogenisation within each 
classJ individual struggles become generalised to coalitions across 
factories. Increasingly class conflict is manifested at the 
societal level. Class consciousness is increasedJ common interests 
and policies are formulated, and a struggle for political power 
ensues. Classes become vital political forces. 
The distribution of political power is determined by power 
over production (i.e. capital). Capital confers political power, 
which the bourgeoisie uses to legitimise and protect their property 
and consequent social relations. Class relations are socio-
political. MoreoverJ the ideas and interests justifying the use of 
state power and its distributionJ are those of the ruling class. 
The politico-social systems are mere superstructures resting on the 
relations of productionJ on ownership of the means of production. 
FinallyJ the division' between classes will widen and the 
condition of the exploited worker will deteriorate so badly that 
the social structure collapses. The class struggle is transformed 
into a proletarian revolution. The triumph of the workers will 
I 
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eliminate the basis of class division in property through public 
ownership of the means of production. With the basis of class 
formation thus removed, a classless society will ensue, and since 
political power to protect the bourgeoisie against the workers is 
unnecessary, political authority and the state will wither away. 
The salient elements of Marx's view of class conflict may be 
itemised as follows: 
(1) Classes are authority relationships based on the ownership 
of property. 
(2) A ~lass'denotes individuals with shared interests. 
(3) Classes are naturally antagonistic by virtue of their 
interests. 
(4) Political organisation and power is an instrument of class 
struggle, and reigning ideas reflected by it. 
(5) Structural change is a consequence of the class struggle. 
Marx's emphasis on class conflict as constituting the dynamics of 
social change, his observation that change was not random but the 
outcome of a conflict of interests, and his view of social 
relations as based on power were contributions of the first 
magnitude. However, time and history have invalidated many of his 
assumptions and predictions. 
A noteworthy sociological contribution to the theory of 
social conflict came from the German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf. 
His Soziale Klassen und Klassenkonflikt in der industriellen 
Gesellschaft [33], first published in 1957 was soon to be 
translated, revised, and expanded in Class and Class Conflict in an 
Industrial Society which appeared in 1959. [34] 
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Dahrendorf (1959:119) recognises two competing 'paradigms' 
of society, which he respectively terms the 'utopian' and the 
'rationalist'. 'The first emphasises equilibrium of values, 
consensus, and stability. The second revolves around dissension and 
conflict, the latter being the engine of structural change!' Both 
are social perspectives. Neither is completely incorrect, but each 
mirrors a separate face of society. Regrettably, he argues, the 
consensus view has dominated contemporary sociology, especially in 
the United States, and he sets out to create some balance-between 
the two paradigms by developing and illustrating the explanatory 
power of a class-conflict perspective. 
He begins with a useful review of Marx's writings, a 
clarification of his model, a discussion of the sociopolitical 
changes since Marx. A review of subsequent sociological works on 
class, is followed by a sociological critique of Marx. These 
necessary scholarly chores completed, Dahrendorf presents his own 
view of class and of class conflict. 
In the second part of his book (1959), entitled "Toward a 
Sociological Theory of Conflict in Industrial Society", although 
building on past theoretical foundations, the author advances a 
number of new and useful insights. One of these is his distinction 
between two dimensions of social conflict, namely intensity and 
violence. 
"Intensity refers to the energy expenditure and degree of 
involvement of conflicting parties ••• By contrast, the 
violence of conflict relates rather to its manifestations 
than to is causes; it is a matter of the weapons that are 
chosen ••• " ( 1959: 211-212). 
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These two dimensions of conflict, Dahrendorf argues, may vary 
independently and are therefore distinct aspects of any conflict 
situation. He discusses specific situations in which either 
intensity or violence or both are minimized or increased. For 
example, organised conflict groups tend to use less violent means 
of combat than those that lack organisation. These and. other 
valuable analytical distinctions have [all] been incorporated into 
a more general theory of social conflict. 
Dahrendorf continued his concern for a theory of social 
conflict in a series of important papers, among these: 
"Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis" 
(1958) [35], and "Toward a Theory or Social Conflict" (1958). [36] 
Dahrendorf's contribution is noteworthy for his introduction of 
useful analytical distinctions, and for his critique of Parsonian 
functionalism. Perhaps Dahrendorf's best - though still incomplete 
- statement of conflict theory is to be found in his Essays in the 
Theory of Society. Here he developed the thesis that a basic aspect 
of social life is that people living together have different 
interests which come into conflict with each other. Some of these 
individuals gain more power than others, and use their power to 
pursue their own interests. It is ~ocial power,' especially the 
control over sanctions, which· serves both to organise society and 
to institutionalise the basic confl1.cts" over interest~ -prese.nt in: 
the society. 
Other useful studies of conflict within sociological 
perspective include those of John Rex, a British sociologist, 
especially his Key Problems of Sociological Theory, published in 
1961. [37] In this publication, Rex advances an impressive 
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critique of Dahrendorf, Coser and Gluckman, especially for 
neglecting or underemphasising large-scale societal conflict. 
A very useful synthesis was provided by Pierre van den 
' 
Berghe, in an article entitled "Dialectic and Functionalism 
Toward a Theoretical Synthesis" (38], published in 1963. He argues 
that both functionalism (a la Parsons and Durkheim) and the 
Hegelian - Marxian dialectic, present'one-sided but complementary 
and reconcilable views of society: 
Johan Galtung of th~ University of Oslo, has. made a 
significant contribution to the sociology of conflict. Most of his 
articles have appeared in The Journal of Peace Research (Oslo) 
which he edits. Among his many papers, his "A Structural Theory of 
Aggression" (39], published in 1964, is especially useful. 
Galtung advances the thesis that conflict and aggression 
between individuals, groups, and nations is most likely to arise 
when their respective social positions are in "rank-
disequilibrium", that is, when individuals or groups have 
dissimilar ranks in different status dimensions so that they are 
"topdogs" in one dimension (and) yet "underdogs" in another. This 
conceptualisation is applied to a variety of areas from relations 
between nations to revolutions and deviant behaviour. Noteworthy 
also is Galtung's notion of "structural violence", which has 
enriched our conceptual language. 
Worth mentioning is a paper by Raymond W. Mack and Richard 
C. Snyder, entitled "The Analysis of Social Conflict - Toward an 
Overview and Synthesis" (40], published in 1957. In Coser' s view it 
is still "one of the best codifications of theoretical and 
empirical work in the area of social conflict. It remains 
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indispensable to any student in this field of inquiry" (Coser, 
1967:6). 
No overview of conflict within sociological perspective can 
be complete - or even marginally useful - without r~ference to the 
contributions of Lewis Coser, Max Gluckman, PitirimSorokin, 
Georges Sorel, and Georg Simmel. 
The noted sociologist Lewis Coser, has provided a seminal 
treatment of the functions o"f social conflict. His two most famous 
works in this respect are, The Functions of Social Conflict [41], 
first published in 1954, and his Continuities in the Study of 
Social Conflict (42], which appeared in 1967. In both of these 
studies, Coser distinguishes between two functions of social 
conflict, namely that of "integration" and "coercion". Both of 
these consequences of social conflict have been admirably analysed 
by Coser. He is concerned with what he termed the "positive" or 
"integrative functions" of conflict. In this, he has been 
criticised by other sociologists, notably by Dahrendorf (1959:207). 
Dahrendorf argues· that Coser emphasises the integrative potential 
of conflict and that his functionalist view of society is 
inadequate and essentially static. 
On the one hand, Coser states in the unmistakable 
terminology of the consensus view of society, that : 
"Conflict may serve to remove dissociating elements in a 
relationship and to re-establishunity. Insofar as conflict 
is the resolution of tension between antagonists it has 
stabilizing funct'ions and becomes integrating components of 
the relationship. However, not all conflicts are positively 
ftWctional for the relationship •••• Loosely structured 
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groups, and open societies, by allowing conflicts, institute 
safeguards against the type of conflict which would endanger 
basic consensus and thereby minimize the danger of 
divergencies touching core values. The interdependence of 
antagonistic groups and the crisscrossing within such 
conflicts, which serve to 'sew the social system together' 
by cancelling each other out, thus prevent disintegration 
along one primary line of cleavage" (1954:80). . 
On the other hand, Coser (1957:197)-follows Sorel in postulating 
"the idea that conflict prevents the ossification of the social 
system by exerting pressure for innovation and creativity". 
Conflict may, indeed, from Coser's perspective, be viewed 
together with role allocation, socialisation, and mobility as one 
of the "tolerable" processes which foster rather than endanger the 
stability of social systems (cf Dahrendorf, 1959:207). 
Coser (1954:73) has also made a significant conceptual 
contribution with his distinction between what he calls "Basic 
cleavage conflict" - conflict over the very nature of a consensual 
framework within which groups and individuals have to operate - and 
conflicts over means and subordinate ends within such a consensual 
framework. 
While specific attention will be given to Coser's contribu-
tions toward an understanding of the dynamics of conflict in other 
parts of this study, it can be safely asserted that his contribu-
tion has been a lasting one. 
In the early 1960s the noted anthropologist Max Gluckman of 
the University of Manchester published two works which dealt with 
conflict and its regulation in "tribal societies", namely, his 
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Custom and Conflict in Africa (1956(a)), [43] and Politics, Law and 
Ritual in Tribal Society (1956(b)). [44] The central thesis of the 
first work involved an analysis of "how men quarrel in terms of 
certain of their customary allegiances, but are restrained from 
violence through other conflicting allegiances which are also· 
enjoined on them by custom. The result is that conflict in one set 
of relationships ..• lead to re-establishment of social cohesion" 
(Gluckman, 1956(a):2). 
Gluckman drew upon the work of some leading British 
anthropologists of the time, notably E.E. Evans-Pritchard, 
Elizabeth Colson, Meyer Fortes and Isaac Shapera. Other 
anthropologists of that period that have made significant 
contributions to the understanding of conflict in non-Western 
societies, include Ruth Benedict Patterns of Culture (1935) [45] 
and Lucy Mair Primitive Government (1962). [46] 
Gluckman and Coser's importance stems from the fact that 
they both emphasised the functionality of conflict, in line with 
Sorel and Merton. 
In Rummel's (1977:116ff) view, one of the best contemporary 
sociological analyses of the view that similarity between people 
' 
attracts and consideration of the evidence both for and against 
this view, is Sorokin's chapter "The Roles of Similarity and 
Dissimilarity in Social Solidarity and Antagonism", in his highly 
rated Society, Culture and Personality (1969), [47] 
Sorokin begins by introducing three major views on this 
question. One is that similarity between people leads to 
expressions of solidarity, such as marriage or friendship, Another 
view holds that dissimilarity leads to solidarity, as in the notion 
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that opposites attract; and, finally, that both similarity and 
dissimilarity lead to solidarity. The latter view includes theories 
of Durkheim [48], Tennies (49], and Maciver [50], which 
respectively divide solidarity into 'mechanical versus organic,' 
'gemeinschaft versus gesellschaft,' 'community versus association.' 
Sorokin then considers the view "that similarity leads to 
solidarity" in its most popular and widespread contemporary 
manifestation: that similar people would marry each other. His 
survey of the empirical evidence tends to support this view. But 
the evidence shows only a relatively weak tendency, and as Sorokin 
notes, there is every reason to question this. First, the 
correlations between marriage and similarity are low. Secondly, the 
findings are not consistent regarding what constitutes similarity. 
Sorokin finally concludes that he must reject the theory that 
similar people necessarily marry. He also rejects the opposite view 
that dissimilarity leads to solidarity. 
Sorokin then examines the view that similarity and 
dissimilarity in combination underlie solidarity. Regarding the 
relation of similarity and dissimilarity to solidarity in general, 
Sorokin first asserts that the identity of the elements that 
comprise socially relevant similarity and dissimilarity depends 
"on the socio-cultural mentality" of the people concerned, thus 
on their meanings and values. This dimension ultimately consti-
. tutes significant similarity or not. Secondly, and somewhat more 
problematically, if the characteristics are unimportant within a 
system of values, similarities or dissimilarities between them are 
unrelated to solidarity or antagonism. 
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A third generalisation is that significant socio-cultural 
similarity generates social solidarity if (a) the values for all 
are abundant and sufficient, to put it differently, the values can 
be shared by all, such as God for Christians, pride for patriots, 
or truth for scholars; (b) the egos of the parties are fused into 
"we", as in a family, 'intimate friendship, or a close association 
and (c) the relevant norms - standards or rules of conduct are 
concordant (cf Rummel, 1977:116). 
A fourth proposition is that conflict is generated by 
similarity if (a) values such as land, status, or food are scarce 
and the norms are permeated by an egoistic competition and discord; 
(b) and the norms are divergent and the values cannot be shared by 
all. Fifthly, if two people hold quite dissimilar values, and those 
of one party are considered unimportant by the other party, neither 
solidarity nor conflict is generated. 
A final proposition put forward by Sorokin, is that 
solidarity is enhanced if the 'core values' and norms are similar, 
and the 'secondary values 1 are supplementary, or at least diverse or 
neutral. Thus a marriage between people belonging to different 
racial or religious groupings, can attain solidarity, provided that 
the partners' main or core values are similar and their secondary 
values and norms are not discordant. 
Apart from this valuable sociological contribution to 
conflict and its dynamic, Sorokin has also ventured to discuss 
conflict, war, and internal disturbances within a broader 
historico-sociological perspective. For Sorokin, conflict is part 
of the process of rapidly changing social relationships\ Sorokin 
viewed social systems as causal - functional entities - as an 
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'integrated set of meanings, values, and norms; of social 
interactions of official norms and laws.' 
In Sorokin's view, all societies.change and the "official 
law-norms" of the state have to make provision for new "law:....norms" 
through legislation, decrees, judicial interpretation of governing 
law-norms, or constitutional revisions. These means of adjustment 
may not suffice, however, and a widening discrepancy between 
official "law-norms" and unofficial law convictions can develop. 
This can result in escalating conflict between different groups 
within the state, as one group supports official "law-norms" and 
another feels that these "are obsolete, unjust, or exploitative" 
(Sorokin, 1957:102). Presently South Africa provides an example in 
point! 
·The eventual consequence of this is a breakdown in organised 
relations (such as the state), and thus in the social equilibrium. 
The system of values and norms is undermined; order and peace 
disappear. The result is widespread social conflict. 
Within this perspective that views conflict as a process of 
change, Sorokin sets out to determine the historical.trends in war 
of what he terms "internal disturbances". He developed a scale of 
the "intensity, duration, scope, and importance" of these con-
flicts, which he analysed over twenty-five year periods for 
classical Greece, for Rome, and separately for the major West 
European nations. He found some of the following interesting 
trends: 
(a) There is no positive correlation between war and internal 
disturbances, they fluctuate independently over time. 
(b) War and revolutions tend to increase during periods of 
significant socio-political transition, especially 
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when such transition takes place from "sensate" to 
"ideational" culture. [51] 
(c) The peak of internal disturbances are periods of transition 
in social relations - the real historical turning points. 
Sorokin's interesting.and significant cont~ibution:ioward. a 
deeper understanding of conflict, may be summarised as follows: 
(i) Conflict is "a manifestation of rapid transition between 
different systems of organised relationships." As such, 
conflict and violence are "permanently working forces, 
inherently connected with the essence of social life itself, 
which do not permit either a complete elimination or the 
unlimited growth of disturbances" (Sorokin, 1957:592). 
(ii) Manifest conflict is the effect of a breakdown in the formal 
"law-norms" of society. 
(iii) Sorokin makes no provision for the notions of latent 
conflict or of conflict situations. Values or official 
"law-norms" become incongruent, and disruption causes unrest 
and conflict. "The idea of latent or incipient conflict 
groups or classes, is not an explicit part of his 
perspective, although implicit within it" (Rummel, 1977:148). 
(iv) Sorokin ignores the mechanism by which the disruptions or~ 
breakdown occurs. The notion of precipitating or "trigger 
events" is omitted from his theory. There is simply 
incongruence a~d incompatibility of values; then disruption 
and conflict. 
In a useful overview of Pitirim Sorokin's works on conflict 
and war, Eckhardt (1983:147-177), notes that his view of conflict 
and its resolution has changed considerably over time. 
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In the 1920s he held a 'power view' of peace, similar to the "peace 
through strength" theories so common today. In the 1930s 'peace' was 
presented as a function of stable cultures and integrated values. 
In the 1940s the 'Golden Rule' pointed the way to reconciliation 
and peace. In the 1950s 'love' was the only way to peace. Even 
later peace'was to be achieved by stripping governments of their 
power through universal disarmament and by establishing a 
'universal moral order', a set of values to which all people could 
give their allegiance. 
Sorokin's writings not only reflected some of the salient 
changes in conflict research over the last sixty or more years, but 
also influenced some of those changes. 
The syndicalist philosopher, Georges Sorel, had a 
considerable influence on the writing of Lewis Coser. The latter 
followed Sorel in postulating the notion that conflict'prevents the 
ossification of the social system by exerting pressure for 
innovation and creativity'. Both Sorel and Coser emphasised the 
functionality of conflict, and in doing so have contributed 
significantly toward an understanding of its dynamic. 
The German theorist Georg Simmel, has written extensively on 
the sociological nature of conflict. His famous essay Der Streit 
[52], first published in 1908, provides a seminal treatment of 
conflict within sociological perspective. On Simmel's analysis, 
conflict has both negative and positive aspects. These aspects are 
closely_interrelated - they can be separated conceptually, b'ut not 
empirically (Simmel, 1955:14). In a sociological sense, conflict 
resolves the tension between ~ontrasts or opposites'· 
Simmel also addressed the problem of the sociological 
relevance of conflict. On his analysis, conflict is basic toward an 
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understanding of the unity ("Einheit") in social relations. 
Contradiction and conflict not only precede this pnity, but are 
operative in it at every moment of its existence. Similarly, there 
probably exists no social unit in which convergent and divergent 
' views and values among its members are inseparably interwoven. An 
absolutely centripetal and harmonious group, a pure "unification" 
("Vereinigung"), not only is empirically impossible,"it could show 
no real life process"(Simmel 1955:15). Just as the universe needs 
"love and hate", that is, "attractive" and "repulsive forces", in 
order to have any form at all, so society, too, "in order to attain 
a determinate shape, needs some quantitative ratio of harmony and 
disharmony, of association and competition, of favourable and 
unfavourable tendencies." (Ibid.) But these discords are by no 
means mere sociological liabilities or negative forces in society. 
Conflict itself is a vital 'integrative force' in both small groups 
(such as the marital couple), and in social relations and systems. 
Thus, the Hindu social system rests not only on hierarchy, but also 
directly on the mutual repulsion, of the caste system. Conflict not 
only prevents boundaries within and between groups from gradually 
disappearing, but is salient for the maintenance of group cohesion. 
Essentially, Simmel argues, that the'contrasting forces of 
conflict and of unification, of homogeneity and of heterogeneity in 
social relations,' are vital for the cohesion of social systems. In 
his view, conflict is sociologically of great significance, because 
it denotes a basic form of association. The two opposing principles 
of "conflict" and "unification", provide the dynamic that 
integrates both small groups and societal relationships (Simmel 
1955:359). 
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Apart from Simmel's contribution toward an understanding of 
the dynamic and sociological significance of conflict, he also 
contributed conceptually, especially with his discussion 
of "legal" and "interest conflicts". (Simmel 1955:35-43). 
Sociologists have contributed greatly to conflict research, 
in the sense that a sub-field called "Conflict sociology" emerged 
within sociological discourse. The contributions of noted 
sociologists such as Marx, Dahrendorf, Simmel and Coser, and that 
of other scholars notably Neil Smelser and William Kornhauser in 
the area of collective behaviour, have been of lasting importance 
to conflict studies. 
Having briefly surveyed the understanding of conflict within 
sociological perspective, conflict will now be discussed within 
philosophical perspective. Like the previous discussion, it will of 
necessity be skeletal and-broadly focused. 
2,4 Conflict in philosophical perspective 
For centuries man has been captivated by what RllJIDllel (1977:167) 
called "a philosophy of opposition", a belief in reality as a 
manifestation of an underlying struggle between "opposing or 
contradictory tendencies, elements, or forces". An insight into 
the nature of these 'oppositions'was believed to provide an 
essential understanding of history, and of harmony, conflict, and 
change. 
Greek philosophy, under the influence of Anaximander and, 
especially, of Heraclitus, "believed that reality comprised 
opposites whose unity underpinned all things" (Durant, 1939:138; 
Burnet, 1957). [53] For Heraclitus, the key to understanding 
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reality was the perpetual conflict of opposing forces and ideas. 
Reality is made up of opposites, such as white-black, day-night, 
up-down, hot-cold. 
This philosophical point of departue is also to be found in 
the yin-yang of classical Chinese philosophy, elaborated in the 
conunentaries of I-Ching. The yin and the yang are complementary 
principles or forces, capable of explaining all processes of social 
development and decay. "Yin, is the negative,.passive, weak, or 
destructive element present in all things, and yang the coexisting 
positive, active, strong, and constructive element. All change 
manifests an interaction between these two complementary forces. 
Harmony is their equilibrium, conflict their opposition" (Rununel, 
1977:168). 
A similar reasoning can also be found in the 'Pair of 
Opposites of Buddhism' (Humphreys, 1955) [ 54], or in the blending of 
the two antagonistic forces (the life-monad versus matter) in non-
Aryan Indian philosophy (Zinuner, 1969:379), in medieval 
Christianity (as in the coincidentia oppositorum of Nicholas of 
Cusa), and in Marxist philosophy. 
A belief in a basic opposition in all things has had its 
greatest modern influence through Marxism, and especially through 
Engels' contribution. For Engels (1934, 1954) [55], the unity and 
struggle of opposites was one of the dialectic laws through which 
change is understood and explained. Without a tension between 
opposites, the world would be unchanging : the overcoming and being 
overcome of opposing ideas and forces explain all natural and human 
evolution. 
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Contemporary Maoism (Mao, Vol. 2, 1965) combines this 
Western dialectic notion of opposites with a classic Chinese 
perspective. Contradiction - defined as 'the unity of opposites' -
constitutes a universal principle capable of explaining all change. 
The principal internal contradictions, as that between proletariat 
and bourgeoisie in capitalism, provide the real un~erstanding of 
the direction and dynamic of change, for it will constitute a 
conflict between these opposites arid the eventual triumph of one 
over the other. 
Like all theories of conflict, philosophical perspectives on 
conflict, rest on assumptions about human nature and on visions of 
the "good" or "ideal" society. On the basis of their views of human 
nature and their descriptions of the societies of their times, 
Bernard (1983) [56], developed a fourfold typology of conflict and 
consensus theories. "Conservative consensus theorists", such as 
Aristotle, Aquinas, and Locke, employ consensus terminology in 
describing their respective societies and share a basically 
consensus view of human nature. "Sociological consensus theorists" 
like Hobbes,Durkheim, and Parsons employ consensus terminology in 
analysing their respective societies but hold a less benign, more 
conflictual view of man. Hobbes in particular, is noted for his 
view of man, and how it related to the so-called "problem of 
order". "Radical conflict theorists", such as Plato, Rousseau and 
Marx, utilised a conflict terminology for analysing their 
respective societies, but took an optimistic view of human nature. 
Finally, "Sociological conflict theorists" like Machiavelli. and 
Dahrendorf use a conflict terminology to analyse society and share 
an essentially conflict vision of human nature. 
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In the case of Machiavelli, nearly everything that he said 
about politics was based on the assumption that human pature is 
essentially selfish, and that the effective motives on which a 
statesman must rely are egoistic, such as the desire for security 
in the masses and the desire for power in rulers. Government is 
really founded upon the weakness and insufficiency of the 
individual, who is unable to protect himself against the aggression 
of others unless supported by the power of the state. Human nature, 
moreover, is profoundly aggressive and acquisitive; men aim to 
keep what they have and to acquire more. Neither in power nor in 
possessions is there any normal limit to human desires, while both 
power and possessions are always in fact limited by natural 
scarcity. Accordingly, men are always in a condition of strife and 
competition which threatens open anarchy unless restrained by the 
force behind the law, while the power of the rule is built upon the 
very imminence of anarchy and the fact that security is possible 
only when government is strong. 
While examinations of the consensus-conflict debate in 
philosophy often begin with the works of Auguste Comte and Karl 
Marx, both of these scholars wrote in the context of long 
intellectual traditions going back to the time of classical Greek 
philosophy (Bernard, 1983:30). Comte, cited Aristotle as his 
"incomparable predecessor", while the writings of Marx, argued 
Popper, grew out of the Platonic ~radition (Popper, 1968, 12~162). 
Thus a philosophical discussion of conflict has to start with the 
earliest philosophical writings, proceed to·the works of classical 
Greek scholarship, and continue ·to analyse the contribution made by 




the scope of this study. However, this short and exploratory 
overview of conflict in philosophical perspective has been included 
to emphasise the point that conflict like so much else can be 
better understood within this perspective, for as Peter Winch has 
argued so convincingly, social science has (and should have), a 
special relation to philosophy (Winch, 1958). Kenneth Waltz (1959) 
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[57], provides a short but useful overview of conflict in 
philosophical perspective. Philosophically, he argues, conflict has 
been viewed within three broad divisions. First, those scholars 
like St Augustine and Spinoza, who, as Morgenthau [58] and Niebuhr 
[59] later, found the causes of conflict and war in the nature and 
behaviour of man; second, those like Plato [60], Kant [61] and 
Bentham [62], who found the basic sources of conflict in the 
political structures, and the social and economic conditions of 
separate states; and third, those like Rousseau [63] and James 
Mill [64], who found the major causes neither in men nor the state 
but in the international system based on states. 
While there is a diversity of approaches that can be grouped 
under the rubric of conflict within philosophical perspective, this 
broad perspective is of special importance to the evolution of 
conflict research. Its importance stems from two considerations. 
Firstly, the fact that philosophy provides the broadest possible 
canvas for the understanding of human action, and secondly, that 
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for an understanding of the intellectual history of the social 
sciences, it is clearly indispensable. 
In the following section, the focus shifts to 'conflict in 
international relations'. Clearly, this section is of greater 
importance to. this study than the previous sections, therefore it 
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will be discussed at greater length and depth. However, the 
emphasis is on the evolution of conflict research as such, rather 
than on a detailed examination of the various contributions to this 
field of inquiry. 
2.5 Conflict in international relations 
As Nicholson, (1970:19) reminds us, 'it is only comparatively 
recently that the causes of conflict, of peace and war have been 
regarded as suitable material for generalisation, study, and 
detailed theorisation. Grand theories of war have appeared as 
features of grand theories of society, but the analysis of war has 
taken the form of detailed analysis of particular wars, rather than 
the analysis of war as an aspect of human behaviour". 
Two relatively early attempts at a scientific theory of 
conflict and war were those propounded by Hobson (1902) [65] and 
subsequently adapted by Lenin (1917) and that by Von Clausewitz. 
[66] The former theory asserted that war and conflict are the 
outcome of struggles relating to colonialism and imperialism. 
Nicholson (1970:19-20) provides the following useful summary: "The 
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capitalists of one nation find that the rate of return on their 
capital in domestic investment falls. More profitable investments 
are to be found in the underdeveloped countries. However, the 
capitalists of other states are similarly involved in the 
systematic exploitation of the poorer areas of the world. So long 
as there are plenty of areas to be exploited, capitalists can keep 
out of each other's way, but as the supply of 'virgin territory' is 
lapped up they come into conflict. As, according to Marxist theory, 
the state is the tool of the ruling class, in this case the 
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capitalists, the various groups can call upon the assistance of 
their states to help enforce their particular claims. The states 
thus come into conflict and war follows." 
On Nicholson's analysis (1970:20), we must give this 
explanation of conflict and war credit for being an attempt to 
formulate a general theory,"however convenient it happened to be 
ideologically, but fault it for its inadequacy." Unfortunately, he 
adds, that there"still exists nothing even resembling an adequate 
theory to fill the vacuum." 
Von Clausewitz made a lasting contribution to the study of 
war, when he defined war as'a continuation of politics by different 
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means. 
The development of the study of war and conflict as a branch 
of the social sciences began much more clearly after the First 
World War, as one of the consequences of this destructive 
experience for the world. Lewis Fry Richardson, an English Quaker, 
produced a remarkable mathematical and statistical discussion of 
the problems of war, entitled Statistics of Deadly Quarrels [67]; 
and Quincy Wright, working at the University of Chicago, produced 
in 1947 a monumental volume titled A Study of War [68] in which he 
attempted to encompass all approaches to war which had been made 
(Zawodny, 1966). 
Richardson was the first person in his field to recognise 
that, not only is it necessary to collect .statistical data, but 
also to test hypotheses by statistical means. A similar development 
was going on in economics at the same time, but Richardson was 
apparently unaware of this. Richardson was, in fact, not a social 
scientist, but a meteorologist. He did his work on the causes of 
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war in the period from the end of the Great War until his death in 
1950, -His major contributions are contained in two books published 
posthumously, Arms and Insecurity [69] and the already mentioned 
Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. 
Since the Second World War there has been a much heightened 
interest in the study of the causes of war, and social scientists 
have entered the field in a variety of ways. The destructiveness 
and trauma of-the Second World War itself, greatly stimulated 
serious scholarship into the causes of wars, and their prevention. 
The second reason for the renewed interest by social 
scientists in the problem of war and peace is the important 
development of new research techniques since the end of the Second 
World War. The statistical testing of hypotheses in such disci-
plines as economics, still in its infancy before the war, has 
progressed enormously. Furthermore, the invention of the computer 
and its now quite widespread accessibility, has greatly extended 
the scope of the social scientist's analysis. 
Finally, the technological revolution that followed the 
Second World War in general, and the development of new and 
superior military technology, especially nuclear weapons in 
particular, have dominated much of the scholarship in the 1950s and 
early sixties (Hoglund & Ulrich, 1972:77-78). 
After the Second World War, the pioneering scholarship of 
Richardson and Quincy Wright, was followed by a number of scholars 
who developed a variety of approaches for the study of conflict. 
The major approaches that crystallised in this period, were 
statistical descriptions of war; the theory of games; the theory of 
alliances; the theory of arms races; experimental approaches 
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(notably simulation), and studies that emphasised bargaining and 
third-party intervention. The latter category also in~ludes the 
various workshops that have been proposed to deal with 
international crises. Each of these major approaches, and their 
variants, will now be briefly outlined. 
2.5.1 Statistical descriptions of war 
Wars are events which take place with relative frequency in social 
life. Statistical analysis can assist us as to how frequently. We 
might also tentatively assume that statistical analysis might give 
us some insights into the causes of war - rather indirectly - by 
suggesting factors which are related to each other. Simply getting 
a relationship is not, of course, by itself telling us that there 
is a casual relationship present, but it does give us some idea of 
where to start our analysis. 
The objection to using statistical analysis of war, which is 
made by classical historical theorists of the international system, 
is that all wars are different. However, even if we accept this 
argument, it seems unlikely that, of the 315 wars reported by 
Richardson in his Statistics of Deadly Quarrels as having taken 
place betwen 1820 and 1949, some characteristics were not shared by 
"clusters of war". Nicholson (1970:31), comments as follows: "It 
seems more plausible to hypothesise that there are some connecting 
links than that there are none. In view of the frequency of war, it 
is certainly worth a try". 
The statistical analysis of conflict and war, involves the 
classifying of data in some manner. Obvious ways of classifying 
wars are according to the adversaries involved, the number of 
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participants, the sources of war, and so on. Another important 
basis for classification is the size (scope) of war. This is an 
obvious way of getting some indication of its importance and, in 
any case, the size itself is taken to be a matter of significance. 
However, the issue of the size and intensity of a war, is in itself 
problematic. 
One indicator of the size and intensity of a war which 
suggests itself immediately is the victims of people killed. 
Nicholson (1970:31-32), comments : "Other indicators are the 
amount of destruction or the number of people both killed and 
injured. The objection to the first is that it is extremely 
difficult to measure, both because of the difficulty of getting 
raw data and then of valuing it. Monetary value is, at best, a 
crude guide. It is inherently problematic to compare property 
values (as one example) from different periods. The difficulty 
with the other measure lies in the definition of wounded, which 
can vary widely. Furthermore, counts of wounded, particularly in 
earlier wars, were rather rough and ready". 
A virtue of using size as a criterium for classification, is 
that it is reasonably objective and does not run into the legal 
definition of war. Size classification, Nicholson ·(1970:32) reminds 
us, in getting round one difficulty of definition leads itself in 
another one. When is a violent conflict too small to be called a 
war? Richardson tackles this problem rather bluntly by drawing no 
distinction between "world war", on the one hand, and "murders" on 
the other. All constitute incidents of "deadly quarrels". Moreover, 
the destructive potential of modern weapon systems renders Richard-
son's indicators of size and intensity useless. 
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While Richardson was the pioneer in the collection and 
analysis of statistical data about the international system, a 
great deal of work has gone on since then, both in the collection 
and analysis of data. The application of the technique of factor 
analysis in particular, has yielded new results. One of the most 
startling results which has come out of one factor analysis study 
is the fact that there is only a slightly positive relationship 
between foreign and domestic conflict (Tanter, 196~). [70] In 
general, one would expect that nations which were prone to violence 
internally would similarly be prone to external violence, but this 
is not always the case. 
Attempts at quantification of the international political 
system have gained renewed impetus through political risk-analyses. 
The so-called "behavioural revolution" of the fifties and the 
sixties, has contributed toward the quantification of theories of 
internatonal relations. The best known, and more important, of 
these behavioural studies are : Political System Stability Index 
(PSSI), and World Political Risk Forecasts (WPRF). On their part, 
these studies drew upon the works of various noted scholars, 
notably McClelland's World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) [71], 
Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) [72], Rummel's 
Dimensionalities of Nations (DON) [73], and Singer and his asso-
ciates' Correlates of War Project. [74] Apart from Richardson's 
pioneering statistical analysis of war, Singer and Jones (1972) 
[75] and Singer and Small (1972) [76] have contributed much to this 
approach. Their respective contributions published in 1972, and 
titled Beyond Conjecture: Data-Based Research in International 
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Politics (with Susan Jones) and The Wages of War) 1916-1965: A 
Statistical Handbook (with Melvin Small)) provide a sound 
introduction to statistical analyses of conflict and war. 
For a summary of the research design and some results) see 
J.D. Singer) "The 'Correlates of War' Project : Interim Report and 
Rationale") World Politics) vol. 24) no. 2 (Jan. 172)) pp.243-270. 
While statistical studies of conflict and war have yielded 
rather limited insights into the causes of conflict and war) they 
have contributed toward the formulation of useful hypotheses for 
the construction of empirically based theories of conflict. 
2.5.2 The theory of games 
The theory of games is the not altogether appropriate name of· a 
body of theory which describes how 'rational people' should make 
decisions in some rather stylised conflict situations. The theory 
has many ramifications. 
The subject first came to prominence in 1944 with the 
publication of John Von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern's The Theory 
of Games and Economic Behaviour. [79] The theory had been 
developing slowly during the interregnum years) one name of 
significance being that of the French mathematician Emile Borel. 
"Von Neumann) too) was working on the problem at the time) arid to 
him must go the main share of the credit for the theory in its 
present form" (Nicholson) 1970:51). 
In its pure form) the theory of games is a branch of pure 
mathematics. From a particular set of mathematical propositions) 
interesting and sometimes surprising mathematical conclusions were 
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derived. It is this mathematical structure which is, strictly 
speaking, the theory of games. To be useful to the social 
scientist, however, these conclusions have to be interpreted in 
terms of what goes on in the real world, and this has not always 
proved easy. For instance, the description and explanation of 
actual behaviour in terms of this theory has not so far proved very 
rewarding. 
Essentially the theory is prescriptive and not descriptive. 
That is, it recommends a course of action, defined as "rational", 
and then goes on to describe the consequences of such behaviour. It 
is open to dispute as to whether the recommendations are, in fact, 
"rational" - there are various different possible definitions of 
rationality. The theory tells us what would happen if the 
particular behaviour rules recommended are followed, but it does 
not follow that these rules are accepted as rational or not. Thus 
the prognostic capabilities of game theory are inherently limited. 
In Schelling's (1960:5) view, strategy is "essentially a 
prescriptive study - that is, the study of how to achieve various 
objectives in war - and, possibly for this reason, the theory of 
games has seemed appropriate and been popular amongst strategists". 
It should be clearly recognised, however, that, if it is used in 
strategy or in any other prescriptive sense, the theory only tells 
one how best to achieve a given set of goals. Whether those goals 
are good or appropriate or not is a question outside the scope of 
the theory as such, though it should not be beyond the concern of 
the theorist. 
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The development of the theory of games since the publication 
of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's-study in 1944, has been slower 
than would have been expected. A depressing fact is that a book 
published in 1957 - Games and Decisions (78], by Duncan Luce and 
Howard Raiffa, is still a useful exposition of the theory at this 
time. There have, of course, been developments, but the book has by. 
no means been superseded by the work done in the years succeeding 
its publication. In Nicholson's opinion (1970:52), the theory of 
games still "lacks some crucial requirements which would make it an 
effective tool for the analysis of human conflict behaviour". 
However, there are important uses for the theory of games. 
There is little doubt that the formal statement of conflict 
relationships has clarified the nature of conflict. Further, there 
is a great deal of work which has clearly been inspired by the 
theory of games, such as bargaining and negotiation theory, and 
notably the work of Anatol Rapoport and Martin Shubik (1964). (79] 
Game theory has inspired much experimental work on how people 
actually behave in various gaming situations - the best-known 
gebeing the 'zero sum game', the 'variable sum game' with its two 
well-known variants the 'Prisoneris Dilemma' and 'Chicken' games, 
and it has also suggested the description of conflict relationships 
and situations in game theory form. While an analysis of conflict 
according to the precepts of game theory leaves us little wiser on 
how people a~tually behave, the formulation of the problem in 
broader game theory terms is helpful. (80] 
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2.5.3 The theory of alliances 
Both at the international and domestic level, alliances are formed 
to enable their members to achieve specific objectives. Since such 
alliances are disbanded when the objectives for which they have 
been established have been realised, they tend to be far less 
enduring than the political communities formed as nation states. 
Because of the historic importance of such alliances in the 
international system, and the widespread use of coalitions by 
political groupings intent upon attaining elective office, "such 
collaborative efforts have been the object of scholarly investi-
gation especially by the 'political realists', notably Hans J. 
Morgenthau (81], Arnold Wolfers (82], Henry Kissinger (83], Naidu 
( 197 4) and Raymond Aron [ 84]" (Dougherty & Pfal tzgraff, 1971: 301). 
The theory of alliances has been suggested as an effective 
way to deal with inter-state conflict in the international system. 
While the structure of international alliances vary greatly, it is 
argued that alliances can effectively deal with specific dimensions 
of conflict, notably the thr~at or reality of armed conflict. There 
are also alliances, neither formal nor informal, which commit 
countries to helping others under certain specified situations such 
as military invasion, but which do not commit them to a more 
general support of each other. Obviously, the borderline between an 
agreement and an alliance "is a thin and wavering one". One could 
also define an alliance as existing when there are some 
sufficiently large number of explicit or implicit agreements 
(Nicholson, 1970:87) between two or more parties. 
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Alliances in the international system, can be classified 
into two main types - 'hierarchic' and 'egalitarian'. A completely 
hierarchic alliance is one in which the leader of the alliance 
virtually tells the rest what to do; in a completely egalitarian 
alliance there is no discernable leader. The Eastern European 
Alliance appears, during the late forties, to have closely 
resembled hierarchic alliance, though the Warsaw Pact is now 
somewhat looser. The Western Alliance, though in theory more 
egalitarian, nevertheless had a clear "leader" in the United 
States, whose influence on the behaviour of the alliance was much 
in evidence, despite considerable unease on the part of France. 
Pure instances of either type are inevitably hard to find except, 
perhaps, for short periods of time. 
Two scholars in particular, George F. Liska and William 
Riker, have propounded theories of alliance behaviour. In their 
theoretical expositions, Liska and Riker share some important 
similarities. First, they agree that alliances or coalitions disband 
once they have achieved their objective(s), because they are formed 
essentially "against, and only derivatively for, someone or 
something" (Liska, 1962:12; Riker, 1962). Although a "sense of 
community" and value compatibility may reinforce alliances or 
coalitions, it seldom brings them into existence. In forming 
alliances to achieve some desired objective, decision-makers weigh 
the costs and rewards of alignment. A.decision to join an alliance 
is based upon perception of rewards in excess of costs. Each 
country considers the marginal utility from allia~ce membership, as 
contrasted with unilateral action. Ultimately, the cohesiveness of 
an alliance "rests on the relationship between internal and 
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external pressures, bearing on the ratio of gains to liabilities 
for individual allies" (Liska, 1962:175). Once costs exceed 
rewards, the decision to realign is taken, However, Liska fails to 
distinguish between different kinds of costs such as social, 
political and economic costs. 
In Liska's view, nations join alliances for security, 
stability and status considerations. On Liska's theory a primary 
prerequisite for alliance cohesion is the development of an 
"alliance ideology". The function of 'alliance ideology' is to 
provide a justification for alliance. Periodic cons~ltation, 
especially between a leading member and its allies, both on 
procedural and substantive issues, contributes to the development 
and preservation of alliance ideology and thus alliance cohesion 
(Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1971:302). 
After victory, the size of the alliance or coalition must 
first be reduced if additional gains are to accrue to the remaining 
participants. Secondly, alliances or coalitions are crucial to the 
attainment of a balance of power. In Riker's framework, the 
I 
formation of one coalition contributes to the formation of an 
"opposing coalition". When one coalition is on the verge of 
victory, neutral actors often join the weaker side, some members of 
the leading coalition must shift to the weaker of the two 
coalitions if the system is to regain equilibrium. In establishing 
his 'rules of equilibrium', Riker draws upon rules set out by 
Morton Kaplan in his balance of power system. Moreover, in relating 
alliances or coalitions to balance of power, Liska and Riker 
incorporate into their theories ideas found in realist 
international relations scholarship. 
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A most useful exposition of conflict dynamics between and 
within alliances is to be found in Johan Galtung's recent book 
titled "There are Alternatives: Four Roads to Peace and 
Security", published in 1984. [85] In this book, Galtung 
(1984:55-59), deals with conflict dynamics between and within 
alliances with reference to values and interests, and how these 
manifest in inter-party and intra-party conflicts between East and 
West, and within East and West. Recently, David Singer and his 
associates [86] examined themes such as "capability distribution", 
"behavioural indicators" and their relevance for alliance formation 
(J David Singer and Associates Explaining War - Selected Papers 
( 1979), 
While a discussion of the internal structure and dynamic of 
alliances or coalitions falls outside the scope of this study, the 
theory of alliance formation and its relation to conflict in the 
international system, have hopefully contributed to a clearer 
understanding of their relevance. 
2.5.4 The theory of arms_ races 
The concept 'arms race' is used to describe a situation where two 
or more countries increase their armaments in response to increases 
in the other country's level of armament, because of the threat 
they believe to be involved. This is a process in which the actions 
of one country cause a reaction in another, which induces the first 
country to extend the scale of its actions, and so on (Kahn, 1960 
:370), 
Arms races have constantly occupied the mirids of scholars 
that are interested in the problems of peace and war. The reasons 
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for this are not hard to find. If two states continuously increase 
their armaments, the likelihood of conflict and war would seem to 
increase (Richardson, 1960; Kahn, 1960:370-377). That arms races 
are a real phenomenon is not just a figment of the pacifists' 
imagination is patently obvious. One classic example is that of the 
naval race between Britain and Germany in the period before the 
First World War. Britain and Germany were enlarging their fleets by 
building, among other things, the large Dreadnoughts; and the 
explicit motivation in the case of both countries was the naval 
build-up of the other power. More recently, the Soviet Union and 
the United States have been increasing their nuclear armaments and 
accompanying delivery systems in response to the armaments of the 
other. There have be~n many more cases. 
Not surprisingly, there has been renewed interest in the 
theory of arms races in the fifties and sixties, with the 
development of more sophisticated (and deadly) nuclear weapons. 
But, what is the function of a theory of arms races? The basic idea 
is to be able to specify the relationship between the armaments 
programme of two competing states, and the propensity for armed 
conflict between them. It is also hoped that such an analysis will 
provide some insights into the causes of arms races as well as some 
understanding of when and how armaments races stop. 
The more prominent scholars in this field include, amongst 
others, Richardson (1960) [87]; Kahn (1960 and 1962) [88], and Bull 
(1961). [89] However, it should be emphasised that the theory of 
arms races is not, in itself, a theory of the cause of war. Wars do 
not start simply because of the mutual hostility engendered by an 
arms build-up. What is necessary to connect the two is an explicit 
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theory which relates levels of arms to the likelihood of war. In 
principle, this can be built into the theory of the arms race to 
give -a more comprehensive picture of the whole process. 
There are various arguments which relate the quantity of 
arms to the likelihood of war. Some of these emphasize the 
destabilising effects of arms, and others argue that, under certain 
conditions, arms have a stabilising effect. Stated in their extreme 
forms, there is the one view which Richardson seems to support by 
implication: that the likelihood of war increases the more arms 
there are. The concern here is with the total quantity of arms held 
by both parties, the distribution between them being seen as of 
minor significance. The opposite extreme is where the over-all 
level of arms is thought to be of no real significance, what 
matters being the balance between the two parties involved. In this 
case, if there is a balance of terror (it is important to 
differentiate this from a balance of power, which is a situation 
where there are several states which can switch alliances), then 
there is little likelihood of war, as it would be equally costly to 
both sides. 
Few scholars hold either of these two positions in the 
extreme forms stated. "One can therefore quite easily hold a view 
which combines elements of both, arguing that the probability of 
war increases if ~n imbalance develops between the two contending 
parties, that this is aggravated if the level of arms is high and, 
further, that, even if a balance exists, the probability of war 
increases as this balance moves up to higher and higher levels" 
(Nicholson, 1970:134). 
While the theory of arms races has not gained widespread 
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acceptance, it is useful in the sense of providing some insight 
into the dynamic of arms build-up. However, for a fuller 
understanding of the nature of arms races, and especially of their 
causes and prevention, it has to be combined with other approaches 
such as third-party intervention and negotiation theories. 
2.5.5 Exprimental approaches 
The experiments which have been conducted and which are of interest 
to the scholar of the behaviour of states fall broadly into two 
groups which lie at opposite ends of the spectrum of complexity. On 
the one hand, there are the simulations where a situation is set up 
which attempts to approximate as closely as possible the 
international decision-making environment. 
At the other extreme of the experimental spectrum are a 
variety of games such as 'war games', where the choices available 
to the players are more constrained. These 'games make no pretence 
of reproducing real situations, the aim being to gain an 
understanding of some aspects of behaviour in the hope that the 
knowledge may be transferable to more complex situations. 
Simulation is different from game theory and gaming, 
although related to them. Whereas game theory seeks the 'optimum 
mathematically rational strategy' for playing a game (purely as a 
game, with no r~ference to the "real world"), simulation deals with 
a "let's pretend" situation (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1971:369), A 
simulation experiment may be defined as a special kind of game 
designed not merely for the sake of "playing a game" but rather 
"for the purpose of demonstrating a valid observation about actual 
social processes through the unfolding of an artificially 
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constructed yet dynamic model. Thus, simulation techniques are 
essentially laboratory techniques which permit the study of 
replicated human behaviour". Through the application of these 
techniques the researcher attempts to learn something significant 
and useful about the complexities of human behaviour "out there", 
which he cannot control, by cr~ating "in here" a more simplified 
version of that phenomenon which he can control and which is in 
some way analogous or isomorhic (Snyder, 1963:2-5). Social 
scientists have long experienced that it is virtually impossible to 
obtain from the real world certain kinds of data needed to verify 
their hypotheses about conflict behaviour. The experimental method 
of simulation represents a tentative effoft to compensate for some 
of these data deficiencies (Guetzkow et al., 1963). 
Recently simulation techniques have found many uses. War 
games and other exercises in strategic analysis have a long 
history. Every strategic planner has some sort of model or 
"simulation" in mind when he attempts to forecast the outcome of 
specific developments. The notion of a "scenario" to describe the 
situation at the outset of a game was always implicit in military 
gaming. Formalised political-military gaming with government 
personnel as participants made its appearance in the period between 
the two world wars, and became quite common after 1945 in the work 
of the Rand Corporation and other institutes. 
Simulation __ ~y assume a variety of forms, depending upon the 
political knowledge-level and experience of the participants; the 
total resources available, including personnel, physical facilities 
and administrative support; and the purpose intended to be served 
by the experiment. Simulation experiments in the field of 
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international relations and conflict research are commonly designed 
with a view toward one or more of the following objectives 
111) teaching and training of students; 2) advancing the policy 
sciences and clarifying policy alternatives through the interaction 
of professional practitioners; 3) promoting theoretical research 
and analysis through the testing of social science hypotheses. It 
seems .important to ke~p distinct these three functions of 
"gaming", at least conceptually'' (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, .1971:37), 
Despite its considerable limitations, simulation exercises 
can throw light on two aspects relevant to conflict resolution, 
First, the technique can provide a pattern of decisions and events, 
the "state" being presented as the behavioural unit. [90] Secondly, 
it is a technique for studying the various changes in perception 
which occur, particularly in conflict situations. In the 
experimental setting, the perceptual variables can be studied much 
more closely than is possible in real conflict situations, where 
the method of content analysis, though valuable, is about the only 
formalise method available (Nicholson, 1970:156). 
2.5.6 Bargaining and third-party intervention 
Thomas C. Schelling of Harvard University although widely regarded 
as a leading game theorist, 'Soon began to shift his intellectual 
focus to bargaining/. "In Schelling's- work we find a combination 
of the social-psychological and the logical-strategic approaches to 
the subject of human conflict. In Schelling's model, conflict is 
seen not exclusively as the opposition of hostile forces but rather 
as a more complex and delicate phenomenon in which antagonism and 
cooperation subtly interact in the adversary relationship" 
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(Nicholson, 1970:157). His theory seeks"to make use of game theory, 
organization and communication theory, and theory of evidence, 
choice and collective decision"·_. This strategic theory, according to 
Schelling (1963:15): 
"Takes conflict for granted, but also assumes common 
interest between the adversaries; it assumes a "rational" 
value-maximizing mode of behavior; and it focuses on the 
fact that each participant's "best" choice of action 
depends on what he expects the other to do, and that 
"strategic behavior is concerned with influencing another's 
choice by working on his expectation of how one's own 
behavior is related to his." 
Schelling, then, is primarily interested in such issues as 
the 'conduct of negotiations', the maintenance of 'credible 
deterrence', the making of threats and promises, 'bluffing', 
'double-crossing', the waging of limited conflict, and the 
formulation of formal or tacit arms control policies. His writing 
reflects a conviction that in most international strategic 
situations the notion of the zero-sum game is simply irrelevant. 
Indeed, his "theory of interdependent decisions", as he prefers to 
call it, is addressed less to the application than to the threat of 
violence as a means of influencing another party's'behaviour. 
While Schelling is very much interested in what constitutes 
'rational behaviour' between two parties to a conflict, he shies 
away from the idea that rationality can be accurately quantified. 
Thus, instead of looking for the "minimax solution" to conflict 
situations, Schelling is more interested in what has been termed 
I 
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"motivational dialectics" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1971:365). He 
goes so far as to suggest that even though rationality is a 
desirable commodity, it is not always and under all circumstances 
desirable to appear rational. 
Schelling (1963:18-19), focuses particularly upon what he 
terms "the theory of precarious partnership or ••• incomplete 
antagonism". This implies a situation in which parties to a 
conflict, despite their strategic opposition to each other, 
perceive some minimum mutual interest, even if this amounts to no 
more than the avoidance of mutual destruction. 
Schelling contends that the resolution of conflict is not 
only theoretically possible but also historically actual. Recent 
cases in point include the mutual abstention from the use of gas 
weaponry in World War II and the various restrictions imposed upoq 
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the conduct of the Korean War with respect to geographical 
boundaries. Schelling also suggests that it may be possible to make . 
arrangements prior to the outbreak of conflict which increase the 
likelihood that limits could be observed once hostilities are under 
way. This involves keeping channels of communication open, 
clarifying in advance the 'authority' and 'authenticity' of messages 
calculated to reduce the pressures,,for uncontrollable escalation, 
and 'identifying parties who might plausibly act as intermediaries'. 
But he concedes that there are certain exigencies in the strategy 
of threats, bluffs and deterrents which may make one or both parties 
reluctant to enter into such contingency plans as might reduce the 
risk of destructive conflict. 
The major objective in bargaining, Schelling reiterates, is 
for each party to make his commitments, threats and promises 
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credible to the other party, so that the latter cannot conclude 
that the former is 'bluffing'. In the opinion of Dougherty & 
Pfaltzgraff (1971:368-369), it is the rich variety of "subtle 
signalling problems associated with this type of political game 
that makes The Strategy of Conflict one of the most interesting and 
readable works in international relations theory." 
The development of conflict research in general, and 
bargaining theory in particular, benefited greatly from two related 
developments. The first, which originated in the United States, 
centred around the Journal of Conflict Resolution at the University 
of Michigan. The pioneers in this period were Kenneth Boulding, 
Anatol Rapoport, David Singer and Lewis F, Richardson. The second 
wave came from the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, 
headed by Johan Galtung. The Journal of Peace Research was carried 
forward by this wave. During the second wave, more researchers 
became active, while more journals and several peace research 
institutes were established (Hoglund & Ulrich, 1972:78). 
Several influential works have been published that have 
shaped the development of conflict research. Most notably, 
International Conflict and the Behavioral Sciences [91], edited by 
Roger Fisher (1964); International Behavior [92], edited by Herbert 
C, Kelman (1965); The Nature of Human Conflict [93], by Elton B, 
McNeil (1965), and Human Behavior and International Politics [94], 
edited by David Singer (1965), All these sources have played a role 
in the development of a common frame of reference. 
Starting with a relatively restricted study of conflict 
behaviour, conflict research has gradually accepted the insight 
that the processes of social conflict are intimately linked to and 
67 
influenced by the nature of the social systems themselves, their 
structure and their transformation. 
Various scholars followed on the pioneering work of 
Schelling and Lewis Richardson. Morton Deutsch for instance, 
provided a useful overview of conflict resolution techniques, 
including bargaining and third-party intervention in his The 
Resolution of Conflict - Constructive and Destructive Processes 
(95], published in 1973. On negotiation theory and third-party 
intervention a variety of useful texts appeared. What follows is a 
short, and incomplete, list of some of the better-known sources 
How Nations Negotiate (96], by Ikle (1964); Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes: Ide~s and proposals for research (97], by Bailey (1971); 
Conflict and Communication - The Use of Controlled Communication in 
International Relations (98], by Burton (1969); The Intermediaries 
- Third Parties in International Crises (99], by Oran Young (1967); 
Conflict and Defense (100], by Kenneth Boulding (1962); 
Interpersonal Peacekeeping: Confrontations and Third-Party 
Consultation [101], by Walton (1969); Basic Negotiating Strategy -
International Conflict for Beginners [102], by Fisher (1971); 
Getting to Yes Negotiating Agreement without giving In [103] by 
Fisher and Ury (1982); The Negotiations Process: Theories and 
Applications [104], by Zartman (1978); The Practical Negotiator 
[105], by Zartman and Berman (1982), and the concise,but eminently 
usefu],Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role [106] by Mitchell 
(1981). 
From the above incomplete list, it is clear that conflict 
research has entered a much more complex phase, characterised by a 
variety of special applications. In the fields of industrial 
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relations and riot control, for ,instance, ideas from bargaining and 
negotiation theory find specific application. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to sketch the evolution of conflict research 
in broad outline in terms of four dominant perspectives, namely: 
"Conflict in psychological perspective"; "Conflict in s0ciological 
perspective"; "Conflict in philosophical perspective", and 
"Conflict in international relations". From the above it is clear 
that conflict research is characterised by eclectism and 
interdisciplinary ventures. 
Conflict research came into its own in the 1950s in the 
shadow of the Cold War, and a Cold War perspective has 
characterised its first phases of development. Especially in the 
discipline of international relations, there has been a 
concentration on military structure and action, on arms races, 
disarmament negotiations, alliance formation and weapons 
management. 
The trauma of the Vietnam experience produced altered and 
new perspectives within conflict research. Attention has 
increasingly been focused on inequalities and dissimilarities in 
the structure of world society. From research on prejudice, 
aggression, stereotyping, perception, and distortion of 
information, attention has shifted to studies of alienation, 
apathy, and dependence. An important consequence of this shift in 
focus is the search for methods of reducing inequalities between 
social groups in conflict, or systems change and social development 
(Hoglund & Ulrich, 1972:13-36). 
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Two important new sets of questions are being posed to 
conflict research as a result of this changing perspective. First, 
if the goal of conflict research is the development of techniques· 
of conflict control, conflict management, conflict resolution and 
social integration, toward what ends should these techniques be 
used? Conflict control for what reasons? Conflict resolution in 
whose interests? Integration around what - or whose - system of 
values? 
Secondly, is the conflict studied functional or 
dysfunctional for the participants? What will be the consequences 
of controlling a given conflict? In any given situation, is 
conflict increasing or decreasing the rate of social change and 
development? Under what conditions does - or can - conflict 
contribute to 'integrative' as well as 'disintegrative' results? 
It has become increasingly clear that when conflict is 
dysfunctional, it is pursued as an end in itself. If conflict 
research is confined to the study of conflict without regard to its 
larger socio-political context, then this research itself may be 
contributing to the maintenance of such dysfunctional tendencies. 
In order to be relevant, conflict researchers must view conflict in 
its relationships to broader processes of development and change of 
social systems. 
Against the backdrop of this wider historical and 
intellectual canvas, the following chapter will address the 
. 
conceptual intricacies and ambiguities associated with the concept 
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3.1 Introduction - some theoretic~l considerations 
The concern of this chapter is to clarify key concepts used in this 
study. These are: "conflict", "conflict resolution", "conflict 
settlement", "conflict accommodation", "conflict management", and 
l 
"conflict structure". The chapter concludes with a typology of 
various types of conflict. 
The usage of concepts in the social sciences is problematic, 
and is subject to the practice and preferences of different schools 
of thought, subjett fields, methodologies and theoretical 
orientations. Conceptual imprecision and ambiguity, constitutes an 
important obstacle to the improvement of communication among social 
scientists, and hence, "the growth of an efficient network for 
social science information" (Riggs, 1981:13). 
The entire problem of conceptual clarity, lead the 
International Political Science Association (IPSA), to establish a 
research 'Committee on Conceptual and Terminological Analysis' 
(COCTA) within IPSA, with Giovanni Sartori as its chairman and Fred 
W. Riggs as its secretary. This committee, established in 1970, has 
met on several occasions (for example in Montreal, Canada, in 1973) 
to discuss the whole problem of the definition and analysis of 
concepts in the social sciences. Various working papers were later 
publised in a book entitled "Tower of Babel: On the Definition and 
Analysis of Concepts in the Social Sciences" [1], edited by 
Sartori, Riggs, and Henry Teune. 
This was followed by a "Conference on Conceptual and 
/ 
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Terminological Analysis in the Social Sciences" held in Bilefeld, 
West Germany in 1981. The proceedings of this conference has been 
edited and published by Fred W. Riggs, under the title of The Conta 
Conference. [2] 
If the assertion is correct that there is much conceptual 
ambiguity in the social sciences, then an analysis of the concept 
of "conflict" and related concepts such as "conflict resolution" 
and "conflict structure" as these appear in contemporary political 
science and international relations literature would serve two use-
ful purposes. First, it might tell us something about the pheno-
menon of conflict and so deepen our understanding of a dimension 
central to political life, and secondly, it might tell us something 
about the study of politics, as it is and as it should be, and 
thereby help us enlarge our capacity to understand other aspects of 
political life as well. 
3,2 Conflict - a conceptual clarification 
There is widespread agreement amongst social scientists that one of 
the most relevant aspects of a theory is its key concepts - "those 
which incorporate the distinctions in terms of which its 
descriptions and explanations are framed and upon which its 
conclusions ultimately rest". Nardin (1971:6), conunents as 
follows:-
"It is these concepts which define reality by delimiting and 
classifying experience, which determine what questions can 
be asked, hence answered, about this experience, and which 
may entail in diverse ways a variety of evaluative 
commitments with implications for both scientific and 
political practice". 
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Considerable ambiguity surrounds the concept of "conflict". In 
popular use it is often taken to mean some dispute in which two or 
more parties are using violence in a destructive fashion as a means 
of winning. It is also popularly assumed that the term "conflict" 
refers to actual behaviour, which normally involves either coercion 
or violence or both. Such behaviour is seen as aimed at preventing 
the other party or parties from threatening or realising one's own 
objectives and value preferences. Its absence is taken to be a sign 
of peaceful co-existence, or "at peace" (Mitchell, 1981a:15), 
Underpinning this popular notion of conflict is the idea that 
conflict implies "breakdown" or some kind of "pathology", and that 
it invariably involves violence, and hence is seen as destructive 
and "negative". 
Concentrating solely upon the behavioural manifestations of 
conflict is rather limited, and leads to neglect of other 
dimensions. Conceptually, understanding of the dynamics of 
conflict, can be greatly facilitated by drawing a distinction 
between three inter-related dimensions. These are: 
(i) a conflict situation 
(ii) conflict behaviour 
(iii) conflict attitudes and perceptions. 
Following Galtung (1969) the above distinctions can be presented as 
a triadic conflict structure. 
Behaviour O Attitudes 
. - TRIADIC · CONFLICT STRUCTURE 
80 
. It needs to be emphasised that these three structural 
dimensions of conflict may be analytically separated but that, in 
any real world of conflict, all three are intimately related with 
each other in various ways. Each of these three dimensions, will 
now be briefly outlined. 
Initially, following Mitchell, (1981a:17), a situation of 
conflict will be defined as:-
"Any situation in which two or more social 
'parties' (however defined or structured) 





The term "goals" refers to consciously desired or perceived 
future outcomes, conditions or "end states", which often have 
intrinsic (but different) value for members of particular parties, 
but which also bring with them increased benefits or costs for 
party members. The importance of goals or values, underpins a 
useful distinction betwee~ conflict of interest or value and 
conflicts of attribution or means. This distinction will be further 
explored in the section that deals with "Types of conflict". 
Goal incompatibility in a situation of conflict, may arise 
from different sources. On Mitchell's analysis, (1981a and b), 
three such sources are particularly important. These are:-
(i) "Tension(s) between social structure and social values; 
(ii) Perceptions of scarcity with reference to both material and 
positional goods; [3] and 
(iii) resource scarcity, which refers to the physical limitations 
of the amount of material goods at any one point in time." 
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Goals can be of two basic types, namely positive goals, such as 
increased wealth, access to material resources, security and 
independence, and negative goals, such as the avoidance of an 
undesirable state of affairs, or the extermination of one's 
opposition. 
Conflict attitudes and perceptions refer to the 
psychological and perceptual dimensions or conditions that 
accompany (and often exacerbate) both conflict situations and 
resultant confl~ct behaviour (Mitchell, 1981a:25). The "psychology 
of conflict" comprises both emotive and cognitive processes such as 
stereotyping or refusal to accept non-conforming information. 
Following Burton (1969:11), this study operates on the 
assumption that the psychological elements of conflict should best 
be regarded as an exacerbating factor, rather than a prime source 
of conflict. [4] This has the important implication for the 
resolution of conflict, that "the mere rectification of perceptions 
alone will not necessitate in the resolution of the conflict". In 
each case the underlying sources of the conflict have to be 
understood and addressed. 
The dimension of conflict behaviour, refers to the actual or 
manifest behaviour of the opposing parties in their attempts to 
achieve incompatible goals. Conflict behaviour may nominally be 
defined as: 
"Actions undertaken by one party in any situation of 
conflict aimed at the opposing party with the intention of 
making that opponent abandon or modify its goals" 
(Mitchell, 1981a:29), . 
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This working definition raises a number of problems. Among these, 
the immediate problem of interpreting the intentions and 
motivations of the behaving party. 
From the above brief exposition, it becomes clear that 
conflict has three inter-related dimensions, namely: 
(i) A situation of incompatible goalsA values, and/or 
interests; 
(ii) A range of "psychological conditions" experienced by the 
parties involved; and 
(iii) A set of related behaviours employed to realise the 
disputed goals and interests. 
The above exposition of conflict, however, does-not clarify 
the essential properties of conflict as a basic kind of social and 
interactional phenomenon. These properties may be itemised as 
follows: 
(1) At least two parties are involved. However, in the case of 
social conflict, normally more than two parties are 
involved. 
(2) Conflictful relationships arise from either "position 
scarcity or resource scarcity" or both. 
(3) Conflictful relationships are designed to destroy, injure, 
thwart or control another party or parties. 
(4) "The key is the intent of action and the object of action. 
This element of intent distinguishes conflict from 
competition". [5] 
·(S) A conflictful relationship is one in which a party or 
parties can only gain (relatively) at the other's expense. 
Gain implies loss of some kind, although not necessarily in 
a zero-sum fashion. 
SJ 
(6) Conflictful relationships imply interactions among parties 
in which actions and interactions are mutually opposed. 
(7) Conflictful relationships always involve attempts to gain 
control of scarce resources and positions to influence 
behaviour in certain desired or perceived directions. 
(8) Conflict does not imply "breakdown", it is a social 
relationship with implications for all involved. These 




This last observation is an important one, because it 
implies that conflict is not only a destructive relationship, but 
that it can be both constructive and "functional" in certain 
situations and contexts _(Coser, 1956:3, and Coser, 1961:347-353). 
The above exposition of the essential properties of conflict 
as a social relationship, based on the work of Mack and Snyder 
(1957:212-248), however, should be complemented with a discussion 
of "conflict" as a basic social relationship, and contrasted with 
"co-operation" and "isolation" as two other basic types. 
While bearing in mind the mixed nature of social 
relationships, three such "ideal" types, may be suggested. These 
are "conflict", "isolation" and "co-operation" (Mitchell, 
1981a:24). Table 1 lists these three basic ideal types. 
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Table 1 emphasises the central role of a party's goals in defining 
what sort of relationship exists between it and another party or, 
more correctly, what degree of conflict characterises the inter-
party relationship. As previously indicated, these basic social 
relationships hardly occur in their "pure" form in the real world. 
Social relationships are by nature mixed, and hence, contains 
elements of all three of these basic types. 
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In our presentation of these three basic social relationships, the 
order amongst them has been changed. In Mitchell's original 
presentation (1981a:24), "conflict" is placed first. This is 
followed by "co-operation" and "isolation". However, we are of the 
opinion that, logically speaking, "Conflict" needs to be pla<;:ed 
between "co-operation" and "isolation", because it provides the 
dialectic between these two patterns of behaviour. 
Table 1 is useful, because it highlights some of the 
essential properties of conflict as a social relationship and 
contrasts these with both "co-operation" and "Isolation" as two 
other basic types. 
3.3 Conflict - a synthesis 
Based on the above exploratory discussion, the concept of conflict, 
may nominally be defined as follows:-
Conflict is a social relationship among parties in which actions 
and interactions are mutually opposed, and which implies a 
structure with situational, behavioural and attitudinal dimensions. 
Pettman (1975:235-236) following Fink (1968:414), prefers a 
broad definition of conflict, which includes: 
..• "any social situation or process in which two or more 
social entities are linked by at least one form of 
antagonistic interaction. This emphasises that while 
antagonism .•. is the common element in all conflicts, there 
are a number of different kinds of psychological antagonisms 
(e.g. incompatible goals, mutually exclusive interests, 
emotional hostility, factual or value dissensus, traditional 
enmities, etc.) and a number,of different kinds of 
antagonistic interaction (ranging from the most direct, 
violent and unregulated struggle to the most subtle, 
indirect, and highly regulated forms of mutual interfe-
rence), none of which is necessarily present in all 
instances of conflict." 
... 
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This nominal conceptualisation of conflict has various 
important implications. The following may be regarded as of special 
importance, namely: 
(1) For a social relationship to exist at least two or more 
parties (however defined) are needed. Thus, conflict is an 
interactional phenomenon. 
(2) The goals guiding such social relationship(s) are 
incompatible in two basic senses. First, they are in 
different order of priority and importance, and secondly, 
they are either contradictory or mutually exclusive. 
(3) As a social relationship, conflict may manifest itself at 
different levels of interaction. This implies, as Burton 
reminds us, th~t resolution at one level does not 
presuppose resolution at every level of interaction. 
Clearly, this dimension has important implications for 
conflict analysis and resolution. 
(4) Conflict displays an underlying structure which consists of 
three inter-related dimensions, namely a situation of 
conflict, conflict behaviour and conflict attitudes and 
perceptions. 
Depending upon the structure of conflict, various types of 
conflict may be distinguished. These will be discussed, after an 
attempt at clarification of the remaining key concepts used in this 
study. These concepts are: "Conflict resolution", "conflict 
settlement", "conflict accommodation", "conflict management" and 
"conflict structure". Each of these concepts will now be briefly 
clarified. 
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3.4 Conflict resolution/termination 
For the purposes of this study, the concept "conflict resolution", 
or termination "denotes a process whereby the sources of the 
conflict relationship are removed, rather than the behaviou~al or 
attitudinal components being altered. It implies an outcome which 
benefits both parties" (Burton, 1969:233-235). 
Conflict resolution or termination, to use Mitchell's 
(1981a) phrase, is a far more complex and comprehensive process· 
than mere conflict settlement which is based on the notion of 
mutual compromise. It requires theoretical and practical knowledge 
and understanding of the structure and dynamics of conflict. 
Conflict resolution implies a process whereby the sources of 
a specific conflict relationship are addressed and ultimately 
removed. This implies that the underlying causes or sources of 
conflict need to be clearly identified and understood by the 
parties involved in the conflict. The trend toward growing inter-
dependence in the world, implies that the bases or sources of 
conflict are to be found at different levels of interaction. 
Moreover, that "there are different kinds of disputes to be found 
within one conflict relationship" (Burton, 1969:11). The implica-
tion of this is that conflict has to be resolved at different 
levels of interaction and may demand the application of different 
techniques to do so. 
3.5 Conflict settlement 
Following Mitchell (1981a:253), "conflict settlement" will be taken 
to imply some compromise solution derived at by "splitting the 
differences" between conflicting parties. A conflict may thus be 
"settled" without being necessarily "resolved". Conflict settlement 
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is a less complex and comprehensive process than conflict 
resolution, and implies that the underlying sources or causes of a 
conflict may be unaffected by it. The majority of conflicts in the 
world are "settled" as distinct from "resolved". 
3.6 Conflict accommodation 
The usage of the concept of "conflict accommodation" is 
problematic. Some authors like Burton (1969 and 1972) and Mitchell 
(1981a and 1981b), use it interchangeably with the concept "conflict 
settlement". The more normal usage,however, relates to the 
institutional accommodation of conflict by the state or agency of 
the state. Hence, one can refer to the accommodation of conflict in 
terms of a particular policy or institutional arrangements. 
"Conflict accommodation" presupposes some institutional or policy 
response to conflict. 
3.7 Conflict management 
Political systems are conditioned by a variety of constraints found 
in both social and physical environments. Political elites must 
manage these environments and must be responsive to pressures from 
them. As argued above, .all political and social systems are 
characterized by both value and position scarcity. Resource 
scarcity can be managed by successful manipulation of the physical 
environment. Position scarcity can be managed by successful 
manipulation of the social environment. The essence of conflict 
management, according to Dennis Pirages (1976:13) is an attempt by 
political elites "to formulate policies through which optimal 
manipulation of these environments may take place and conflict can 
thus be avoided". 
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Conflict management is a process that aims at both the 
regulation of conflict, and at its avoidance. There are many 
different perspectives from which analysis of political conflict 
management can begin. One perspective emphasises politics as· a 
"cooperative venture" involving the coordination of a division of 
labour within society. This perspective is common ambngst consensus 
sociologists such as Talcott Parsons, and functionalists such as 
Gabriel Almond (Himes, 1980:15). 
Within democratic discourse, political leaders seek to 
minimize conflict, largely by including as many divergent views as 
possible within the system of political participation. While 
"minimization" of conflict is considered to be a worthy end, this 
does not imply that the elimination of all forms of conflict is 
possible or desirable. 
Dennis Pirages (1976:15), comments: 
"Conflict management, in contrast with conflict minimization 
or elimination, is an active process undertaken by all 
political incumbents in seeking to maintain political 
stability and themselves in power." 
One obvious democratic strategy of conflict management is 
responsiveness to conflicting citizen demands and interests. 
Conflict management also involves the substitution of more remote 
issues for those that are in the public eye and that are 
potentially more pressing. Another tactic that has been used by 
ruling political elites is the substitution of conflicts with 
external intervention when internal problems become unmanageable or 
politically embarrassing. 
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3.8 Conflict structure 
The concept of conflict structure refers to the interactions among 
three inter-related dimensions, namely a conflict situation, 
conflict behaviour, and conflict attitudes and perceptions. A 
situation of conflict will be defined as - "Any situation in which 
two or more social entities or "parties" (however defined or 
structured) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals" 
(Mitchell, 1981a:17). 
Conflict attitudes and perceptions refer to the 
psychological and perceptual environments or conditions that 
accompany (and often exacerbate) both conflict situations and 
resultant conflict behaviour. Conflict behaviour refers to actions 
undertaken by one party in any situation of conflict aimed at the 
opposing party with the intention of making the opposing party 
abandon or modify its goals. 
Taken together, these three inter-related dimensions 
constitute the structure of a conflict. 
3. 9 Conflict : a typology 
Having clarified our key concepts, a typology of various types of 
conflict is offered. Normally scholars identify the following types 
of conflict on the grounds of the parties, issues, and objectives 
of the participants involved. However, as Rap?port (1960) reminds 
us, there is no agreed classification for conflict itself. 
(a) Conflict within persons or intraparty conflict. In this type 
of conflict the actions and interactions within a person or 
party are mutually opposed or incompatible. 
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(b) Conflict between persons or parties or interparty conflict. 
In this type of conflict the actions and interactions 
between two or more parties or persons are mutually opposed. 
The majority of conflicts are of this type. 
(c) Conflict between groups or inter-group or communal conflict 
(Mack and Snyder, 1957:212-248). Inter-group or communal 
conflict refers to conflict where groups or communities 
(however defined) are the main actors in a conflict 
relationship. Such conflict revolves around divergent goals, 
interests, and values between groups or communities. 
(d) Realistic versus non-realistic conflict - "the former 
involves conflict between opposed means and ends, the latter 
implies a need for tension to be released and stems from 
deflected hostility, historical tradition, from ignorance or 
error" (Coser, 1956:49), 
(e) Coser (1956:49 and 1972:58), distinguishes between "basic 
cleavage conflict", which revolves round the very nature and 
consensual framework within which parties have to operate, 
and conflict over means and subordinate ends within such a 
framework. 
(f) Institutionalised conflict, which denotes conflict within a 
body of rules, (e.g. organised labour within an 
institutional framework), versus non-institutional conflict 
such as war and insurgency (Zimmermann, 1977:5,8). 
(g) Ideological conflict, which implies conflict over 
conceptions of the desirable, over prescriptive norms,. and 
beliefs which do or should govern particular behavioural 
patterns (Kluckhohn, 1951:391). 
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(h) Cultural conflict, which derives from differences in life-
styles and values. "However, this conception is,so broad 
that it needs to be broken down into component elements such 
as biological, psychobiological, ethnic and so forth to be 
useful as an analytical category" (Mack and Snyder, 1972: 
8-9). 
(i) Structural violence as defined by Galtung (1969:168), in 
terms of the difference between "the potential and the 
actual", between what could have been and what is. In this 
notion of conflict, structural factors make it impossible 
for people to realise their full potential. People or groups 
subjected to state discrimination for instance, may be 
considered victims of "structural violence". 
(j) Content conflict, where the cause of conflict is a matter of 
the distribution of resources, be they material, political, 
symbolic or economic. 
(k) Ego conflict, where conflict between political leaders is 
overriding other conflicts in society. 
(1) Pseudo conflict, where there is no real cause for or no real 
conflict. 
(m) Exogamous and endogamous conflict. In the case of the former 
the sources of the conflict are to be found external or 
outside a specific grouping or association. For example in 
the case of cross-border conflict. In the case of the latter 
- endogamous conflict - it originates within a particular 
party or association. Examples inlude ethnic and class 
conflict (Dahrendorf, 1958:171). 
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(n) Latent versus manifest conflict. These two notions 
constitute points on a conflict continuum. In the case of 
the former (latent) conflict, is transformed into manifest 
conflict by a process of conflict group formation. In the 
case of the latter, non-violent manifest conflict is 
transformed into violent manifest conflict (de Kock, 
1984 :259). 
Clearly, this is not an exhaustive typology of conflict. While 
these distinctions are analytically useful and necessary, in 
practice different types of conflict are often mutually 
reinforcing. 
3.10 Conclusion 
The concept "conflict" denotes a social relationship between two or 
more parties. The interaction and relations between parties can 
display various characteristics. For example they can be of a 
direct or an indirect nature. They can display differences in 
intensity and commitment. They can be positive, in the sense of 
fulfilling the mutual aspirations and value expectations of the 
parties. Finally, they can be acrimonious; destructive, and 
antagonistic. 
As a relational phenomenon, conflict may be presented on a 
continuum. If one examines the interactions between two or more 
parties on such a continuum, then the following differences will 
become apparent: 
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THE CONFLICT CONTINUUM 
Competitative Conflict 
--
a) Indirect negative interaction 
b) Mutual expectations are 
fulfilled by adherence to the 
rules of the game 
c) Low level of animosity 
d) Latent violence 
d) Regulated conflict 
f) Non-violent conflict 
g) Positive conflict 
(de Kock, 1984:266) 
Violent Conflict 
a) Direct negative interaction 
b) Mutual expectations remain 
unfulfilled - no agreement 
on rules is possible 
c) Extreme animosity 
d) Manifest violence 
e) Unregulated conflict 
f) Violent conflict 
g) Negative conflict 
The difference between competition and conflict becomes 
clear in terms of a useful distinction proposed by Mack and Snyder 
(1957:217). Competition involves striving for scarce resources 
according to an agreed set of rules governing the behaviour of the 
competitors. Conflict occurs when competitors disregard rules or 
when they seek to destroy each other in their quest for scarce 
resources satisfaction. However, a clear distinction between 
competition and conflict cannot easily be upheld in the real word, 
hence the term "competitative conflict". 
Having dealt with some conceptual issues, the following 
chapter will attempt an exploratory analysis of the various 
workshops designed to resolve conflict in its different 
manifestations and dimensions. 
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Endnotes to Chapter 3 
1. Sartori, Giovanni, Riggs, Fred W., and Henry Teune. Tower 
of Babel - On the Definition and Analysis of Concept~ 
the Social Sciences, International Studies Association, 
occasional papers, no. 6, 1975. 
2. Riggs, F.W. The Conta Conference - Proceedings of the 
Conference on Conceptual and Terminological Analysis in the 
Social Sciences, Indeks Verlag, Frankfurt, 1982. 
3. Fred Hirsch has shown that circumstances of scarcity may 
arise over material goods (oil wells, motor cars), and 
positional goods (roles as managers, permanent members of 
the UN Security Council), the latter being scarce in some 
absolute and final sense. For a discussion of these two 
concepts, see Hirsch, F., Social Limits to Growth, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, London, 1977. 
4. In each case, the real sources of a conflict have to be 
clearly analysed and removed for resolution to take place. 
5. The difference between conflict and competition can be 
clearly illustrated with reference to a rugby match. For as 
long as the players play according to the rules, we have 
competition. The minute, however, when one or more of the 
players ignore the rules, we have conflict. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE BASIC MODEL - A TENTATIVE EXPLORATION 
4.1 Introduction 
In the analysis of interstate conflict, processes is central to 
much of international relations scholarship. Three phases of 
conflict processes are frequently identified [1], namely:-
(a) The "pre-conflict" phase, which refers to the sequence of 
events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities [2]; 
(b) the "actual conflict"phase : the outbreak and subsequent 
events of the conflict itself; and 
(c) the "post-conflict" phase, which refers to an overt attempt 
to end hostilities and culminating in a resolution of the 
conflict. [3] 
Predominantly, the emphasis of international relations 
scholars has been on the first two phases - the causes or sources 
of conflict (e.g. the "Correlates of war") and the conflict 
behaviour of states and nations. Relatively little attention has 
been directed toward models for the termination and prevention of 
conflict. Hill (1972:110), comments: 
"This is somewhat surprising since, even if one leaves aside 
the debate regarding the desirability of achieving an 
absence of conflict [4], it is highly unlikely that such a 
state of affairs will ever be achieved. Therefore, a strong 
case can be made for the scientific analysis of conflict, 
and especially for the processes by which conflicts can be 
controlled and terminated." 
Much of the literature on conflict resolution and, in 
particular, the role of third party intervention in conflict 
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processes to bring about such a resolution, has been from a 
historical or legalistic perspective, providing descriptions of 
case studies of particular conflicts, often overemphasising their 
uniqueness and presenting them as sui generis. Frequently, it is 
asserted that the success (or lack of success) of third-party 
intervention bringing about a resolution was due primarily to the 
"special skills" and "expertise" of the third party involved. 
"Diplomats and mediators are born, not made" encapsulates this 
popular assumption. Much of the work in this area is concerned with 
the role of the United Nations in peace-keeping activities. Other 
more traditional meth~ds of third-party intervention would focus 
upon the International Court of Justice, negotiation and 
arbitration by the League of Nations, and the use of "neutral" 
parties to mediate disputes between conflicting parties. [5] 
In the latter part of the 1960s, however, a new approach to an 
analysis of conflict processes and the resolution of conflict was 
developed : the problem-solving workshop. [6] Barbara Hill 
(1982:111), comments: 
"The workshop was designed to serve two functions : 
(1) to provide conflict researchers with the opportunity to 
investigate the dynamics of an ongoing international 
conflict; and (2) to provide a setting in which the parties 
to the conflict could meet and learn techniques that would 
enable them to resolve eventually the conflict peacefully". 
The development of this approach arose from a belief that more 
conventional methods of third-party intervention, based upon legal 
and diplomatic approaches, were not particularly successful in 
resolving conflict. More specifically, it was argued that 
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conventional techniques relied upon "coercive methods," resulting 
in solutions based on "compromise" and "imposed by authority," 
whereas 'social science research had suggested that these 
traditional methods were not necessarily the.most effective at 
reducing violence and conflict"(Burton, 1972a:5-6). Whereas 
traditional approaches treated conflicts as contests to be won -
the new approach was to examine conflicts as problems to be solved, 
to explore more 'integrative solutions'where both sides might "win". 
[7] Within this new approach "an effort was made to apply concepts 
developed in social-psychological literature and analyses of small 
group behaviour and insights gained from industrial disputes" 
(Kelman & Cohen, 1976:79-80). 
John Burton and his associates at the Centre for the 
Analysis of Conflict are widely seen as the inventors of this 
technique. Burton (1969;ix), termed his initial efforts exercise~ 
in "controlled communication". A pilot workshop was held in London 
in December 1965. In 1966, a follow-up second project, which 
included three American academics, R.C. North, C.F. Alger, and H.C. 
Kelman, was held. In that same year, Leonard Doob and William Foltz 
of Yale University independently began to explore the need for an 
alternative to traditional approaches to border disputes. Their 
first workshop, called Fermeda, which dealt with border conflict 
..,. 
involving Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenia, took place in August 1969. 
[8] Subsequently, Herbert C. Kelman and Stephen Cohen (1976:79-90), 
developed an approach that is essentially a synthesis of Burton's 
and Doob's techniques. More recently, some other scholars, notably 
Levi and Benjamin (1977:405-425), have refined and amplified the 
technique further. 
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The concern of this and the following chapters is to analyse 
how the application of techniques associated with, and developed 
by, problem-solving workshops, have influenced our knowledge of 
conflict processes and the techniques needed to enhance their 
termination. More specifically, how do the experiences and results 
of these workshops contribute to the development of a more general 
theory of conflict processes and their resolution? One argument in 
favour of this approach to conflict resolution is that it is more 
successful than more traditional approaches, and is premised on the 
assumption that indeed one can train individuals to be mediators 
and diplomats. Another, is the learning potential of the workshop 
approach. In an attempt to deal with these questions, this chapter 
is divided into two parts. First, a critical explication of the 
domain assumptions and propositions that inform this approach 
will be attempted. The second section analyses Levi and Benjamin's 
(1977:405-425) model of conflict resolution, since it seems to 
underlie most attempts at problem-solving and conflict termination or 
resolution. The special problems associated with Levi and 
Benjamin's model will be tentatively discussed, since these will be 
dealt with more fully in the following three chapters. 
4.2 Domain assumptions and basic postulates 
The conceptualisation of the term "conflict" used in the various 
problem-solving workshops is a broad one. Conflict is 
conceptualised as essentially a social and interactional 
phenomenon, with both constructive and destructive manifestations 
and implications. The majority of problem-solving workshops, thus 
conceptualise conflict as a social relationship with both , 
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functional and dysfunctional potential, In this, these workshops 
subscribe to the view advanced by Coser (1956) and other scholars, 
who pointed out that even the most violent and widespread social 
conflict might have some 'beneficial effects', perhaps totally 
unappreciated by the parties involved or the rest of society at the 
time. Thus, a conflict could be considered functional for the 
parties involved and for the society at large (Coser, 1956:24), 
Burton (1972a:137-138), comments 
II 
Conflict, like sex, is an essential creative element in 
human relationships. It is the means to change, the means 
by which our social values or welfare, security, justice and 
opportunities for personal development can be achieved. If 
suppressed ... society becomes static ••• (Conflict is) neither 
to be deprecated nor feared ••• Indeed, conflict, like sex, 
is to be enjoyed". 
Coser's initial argument (1956) has since been simplified by 
many scholars, in the sense that some conflicts are seen to be 
"functional" rather than "dysfunctional" (Mitchell, 1980:62). A 
less simplified version argues that, for some parties, factions and 
individuals, at certain times and under certain specified condi-
tions, being involved in conflict can have beneficial results. 
These may be'side'or'indirect benefits; and not immediately appa-
rent, or have little to do with the original goals for which 
the conflict is being pursued. However, even for an overall social 
system, positive benefits may accrue in the long (or even short 
run), even in circumstances where various kinds of conflicts take 
place. Typical of this perspective is Martin Marty's view: 
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" ••• Social science seems to have forgotten that conflict is 
a form of social interaction ••• Uncontrolled conflict (and 
violence) can be destructive, but the important task of 
creating and maintaining a productive social system is 
subverted by denying the efficacy of conflict·in stabilising 
the social order and advancing the commonwealth ..•. The 
important task is therefore not indiscriminate and 
undisciplined elimination of conflict, but rather the 
creation and preservation of devices whereby conflict can be 
made socially productive ••• " (Marty, 1964:5). 
The above assumptions about the social nature of conflict, 
and its implications, imply that these workshops do not aim at the 
total elimination of conflict, but rather at the "management" of 
conflict (Hill, 1982:113). 
It should be apparent from this conceptualisation of 
conflict, that the approach to conflict resolution termination is 
interactional. A basic domain assumption upon which this technique 
rests is that "an understanding of conflict requires a focus on the 
way in which interactions between the parties - at different levels 
- create the conditions for conflict, and help to feed, escalate 
and perpetuate it" (Kelman, 1979:100). Thus the implications are 
that a conflict involves at least two parties, and that it may 
manifest itself at different levels of interaction. This again, 
means "that resolution at one level of interaction, does not imply 
resolution at all levels of interaction" (Burton, 1972a:5-29), 
In the opinion of Hill (1982:113), these problem-solving 
workshops rest upon five key domain assumptions. These are : 
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"(1) ·Rationality: Individuals pursue their own self-
interest and therefore, seek to enhance their relative 
advantage. 
(2) Methodological Individualism: In any conflict, the basic 
unit to be considered is the individual humanbeing. 
(3) Adaptive Nature of Humanity: Individuals are fallible, but 
they also possess the capability of learning and modifying 
their behaviour based on the results of their experiences. 
(4) Necessity for Political Constraint : Some systems of 
political order (broadly defined) are needed to maintain 
conditions of social organization, such as reason and 
justice. 
(5) Democratic Values of Equity and Liberty: Humanbeings seek a 
balance between the potential paradox created by desiring no 
constraint upon their own actions (liberty) and the desire 
that no one shall have special privileges and/or immunities 
(equality)." 
Burton (1972a:6-9), compares the respective domain 
assumptions of more traditional mediation and conflict resolution 
techniques (such as mediation and diplomacy), with the assumptions 
that underpin his model of conflict resolution. Such a comparison 
is useful - and is reproduced in its entirety for - it sensitises 
one to the different contexts associated with different conflict 
mediation and resolution techniques. Table 1 lists these contras-




11 1) Mediation is an art; there 
are 'born' mediators who 
cannot pass on their techni-
ques; success is measured 
by the reputation of me-
diator as diplomat or 
lawyer, and not by his 
performance, for that is 
determined by the complex-
ity of the situation. 
2) The personality of the me-
diator is the important 
consideration. 
3) 'Time is the essence' : at 
some stage, which cannot be 
defined, conflicts can be 
resolved; at others not. 
4) No two cases are the same; 
conflicts are like road 
accidents; they just happen. 
5) The mediator requires powerful 
support from an international 
institution, powerful states, 
or financial institutions. 
6) It is the duty of the mediator 
to suggest solutions. 
7) The mediator's genius is in 
suggesting reasonable and 
workable compromises. 
Conflict Resolution 
Mediation is a learned tech-
nique and performance is 
measured by success and 
failure. 
Personal temperament is 
relevant to all occupa-
tions, but the presence 
or absence of learned 
techniques is the impor-
tant consideration. 
Conditions in which conflict 
can or cannot be resolved 
can be determined : if 'time 
is the essence', then con-
flict is like the common 
cold and will cure itself, 
making the mediator 
irrelevant. 
There are common patterns in· 
conflicts, making them essen-
tially the same and subject 
to the same techniques of 
resolution. 
There is a difference between 
enforced settlement and reso-
lution of conflict, and the 
latter is accomplished with-
out support except respect 
for the professional know-
ledge and status of the me-
diator; authority is derived 
from the parties and not from 
external institutions. 
It is only the parties that 
can arrive at solutions, and 
the mediator should never 
prejudice his position by 
suggesting them. 
No party should ever be asked 
to accept a compromise, and 
the mediation exercise is to 
arrive at alternative goals 
or means that do not require 
compromise. 
Traditional Mediation/Diplomacy 
8) The interests of greater 
powers and world society 
as a whole must sometimes 
be placed before the in-
terests of the parties. 
9) Relations between states 
are relations between 
authorities within them, 
and mediation must be 
between authorities 
involved in a conflict 
situation. 
10) International conflict is 
separate from domestic 
conflict. 
11) States 'should' accept 
processes of arbitration 
and mediation. 
12) Some decision-makers 
behave 'irrationally'. 
13) No fixed procedures are 
possible. 




In any conflict, the 
relations of the parties most 
directly concerned take 
precedence, and are then 
subjected to the resolution 
of any conflict they have 
with interests at other 
levels. 
World society is not 
comprised of states as sepa-
rate entities, but of trans-
actions of all kinds that cut 
across.state boundaries : me-
diation must be at different 
levels involving different 
parties and different issues, 
sometimes parties within 
parties, and not legal 
authorities. 
International conflict is 
usually a spillover from 
domestic conflict in which 
parties seek foreign assis-
tance, and mediation must 
involve domestic considera-
tion of ethnic and other 
groups, and not be confined 
to international conflict. 
No state can be expected to 
submit to third-party judge-
ments or be involved in 
processes which place it in a 
position of having to accept 
a consensus view. Failure to 
accept some form of arbitra-
tion or mediation is a 
reflection on the mediation 
process and not evidence of a 
government's unwillingness to 
resolve the conflict or to 
cooperate in world society. 
Parties to a conflict are 
responding to the situation 
in the ways that appear most 
beneficial to them in the 
light of the knowledge they 
have of the motivations of 
others and the options open 
'irrational' behaviour is 
behaviour not understood or 
not approved by others. 
A quite rigid adherence to 
rules of procedure is 
desirable once they have been 
tested. 
The mediator needs to be a 
panel of specialists in the 
field of conflict. " 
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One could add more differences in assumptions and approach 
between traditional mediation and conflict resolution as it is used 
within the framework of these problem-solving workshops. But these 
seem sufficient to emphasise one significant methodological 
difference : the approach adopted by Burton and his associates is 
deductive, rather than inductive. Rather than work from ascertained . 
"facts" in a particular situation, the attempt by the mediator is 
to apply generalizations about conflict to the particular situation 
being examined, thereby helping to analyse and explain it. 
"There is a hidden postulate here. If the role of the third 
party is confined to introducing information about conflicts and is 
not concerned with suggesting "solutions" or arriving at 
"assessments", there is an implied assumption that the analysis of 
a particular conflict, within this analytical framework, itself 
leads to the resolution of the conflict. The postulate implies that 
once the relationships have been analysed satisfactorily, once each 
side is accurately informed of the perceptions of the other, of the 
alternative values and goals, of the alternative means and costs of 
attaining them, there are outcomes acceptable to the parties."It is 
further assumed, for instance, that "some crucial misunderstandings 
will be revealed that will alter the relationship" (Burton, 
1972a:9). 
Thus, the above assumption implies that conflict contains 
"alterable components" such as"perception of external conditions, 
selection of goals, and assessments of values and means in relation 
to assessments of costs and conflict!' This proposition rests upon 
the further assumption of human rationality (Mitchell, 1981a:46; 
Janis, 1968:454-479). 
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The previous postulate rests on another assumption, namely 
that conflict is essentially subjective. The traditional view is 
that while subjective elements are present, there is a dominant 
"objective" conflict of interests. The notion of what Burton calls 
(1972a:10), "a fixed amount of satisfaction", by which he means a 
proverbial "'cake' of given size to be divided in some proportion", 
underlies the more traditional view of conflict. Conflict is 
subjective in at least three ways. First, in terms of the percep-
tions of the parties involved in the relationship. Secondly, in 
terms of the values pursued by the contending parties, and, 
thirdly, in terms of the priorities assigned to goals and values 
by the parties. 
A further assumption, shared by various conflict 
analysts, is that conflict arises from "position scarcity and 
resource scarcity". Hirsch (1977:5-6), for instance, has shown that 
circumstances of scarcity may arise over material goods (mineral 
resources, motor cars), and "positional goods" (roles as managers, 
permanent members of the UN Security Council), the latter being 
scarce in some absolute and final sense. In this particular sense, 
the sources of conflict may be "objective". "However, the subjec-
tive elements of perception by the parties is accompanied by 
another, namely the assessment of values sought in relation to 
costs". In theory, if not in practice, no goal has an absolute 
value. On the Burtonian model, goal - changing in policy could be 
"due only to subjective elements - i.e., to perceptions of the 
situation and to reassessments of values in relation to costs" 
(Burton, 1972a:11). 
It is further assumed, that the assessment of values in 
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relation to costs, is "intrinsic" to conflict itself. Burton 
(1972a:ll-12), for one, questions whether there can be talk of an 
"objective" conflict of interests. If not, then it gives rise to 
the question to what extent is conflict due to false perceptions of 
the motivations of the other party, and to erroneous forecasting of 
costs (i.e., wrong assessments of strength of-commitments on the--· 
part of the other party) in relation to values sought? 
The entire issue of the subjective nature of conflict rests 
on the assumption that images of reality tend to create their own 
reality. For instance,"an image of another state as a threat could 
lead to defensive measuresthat may persuade that state to increase 
its military capabilities, and the correctness of the original 
image appears to be confirmed. A tangible breakthrough would be 
made in the abilities of states· to manage their interstate 
relations if, means were found to alter the relationship from one 
in which r fixed' or ·'negative outcomes' were anticipated, to one in 




Based on this description, the inherent subjective nature of 
conflict is taken as a basic point of departure. This does not mean 
that conflicts do not have objective elements. Chris Mitchell 
(1973:128), has discussed at length the elements behind the 
argument that conflict is subjective. He summarizes this view as 
follows: 
"While a conflict may be objective at a particular point in 
time, changes in the parties' objectives, preferences, 
evaluations, and calculations that occur over a period of 
time render it a changeable and hence an intensely 
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subjective phenomenon. Conflict may be described as 
subjective, then, in the sense that changes occur within the 
parties themselves (and in their orientations to the dispute 
forming part of their environment), rather than in the 
"objective" situation external to them from which·the 
originally mutually incompatible goals arose". 
If conflict is defined subjectively, the method of resolving 
it must include changes in the subjective orientations and 
psychological environments of the parties. Thus the objective of 
this approach to conflict resolution is to achieve through 
synthesis a common perspective on the conflict. This involves a 
mutual "reperception" of the conflict !from a contest to be won to a 
problem to be solved;' hence the term "problem-solving" workshop. 
Therefore, an implicit assumption of this approach is that any 
'zero-sum conflict' [9] may in principle be reformulated as a 
ipositive-sum conflict." [10] 
Finally, as argued elsewhere, a distinction is made between 
the resolution and the settlement of conflict. When parties are 
compelled into accepting a solution, the conflict is said to be 
"settled", but not "resolved". For resolution to occur, 
"Conflicts must not be suppressed by threat, and they must not be 
settled by reference to past norms and practices that are no longer 
·~perceived as relevant or just'' (Burton, 1972b:1J8). A conflict is 
"resolved", as distinct from "settled", when the "outcome is self-
supporting, and for this to happen the new relationships must be 
negotiated freely by the parties themselves" (Burton, 1969:171), 
Conflicts are to be resolved to the satisfaction of the parties, 
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and, to the greatest possible extent possible, by the parties 
themselves. Thus, Burton and Mithchell argue, parties are to be 
encouraged to develop "integrative solutions" and should not be 
required to "compromise". 
Nevertheless, both Burton (1969,1972a,1972b,1972c), and 
Mitchell (1980,1981a,1981b), accept that other elements of the 
international community may have legitimate interests in the 
outcome of the conflict. This is essentially a recognition of the 
fact that parties to a conflict do not exist in isolation to the 
general international system. Thus, resolution must be compatible 
with the wider interests of the international system. This results 
in a complex and paradoxical situation which Burton (1972c:138-
139), characterises as follows: 
(1) "How can conflict be resolved without third party 
coercion, without reliance upon conserving laws and norms, 
and to the satisfaction of the parties?" 
(2) "How can social needs be ensured without authorities 
intervening in ways which would prevent resolution of the 
conflict by the parties?" 
The problem-solving w·orkshops represent an attempt to deal with 
this essential paradox. 
Having dealt with the domain assumptions that underpin 
models of conflict resolution, the focus now shifts to an 
examination of what a problem-solving workshop is. Levi and 
Benjamin (1977:405-425), have proposed a model of conflict 
resolution that appears to underlie most existing attempts at 
problem-solving workshops. It is this model that will now be 
examined, 
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4.3 Conflict resolution - the basic model 
Figure 1, graphically presents the key processes and procedures 
associated with Levi and Benjamin's model of conflict resolution. 
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Levi and Benjamin's model of conflict resolution (1977:405-
425), is based on six experimental workshops on conflict in the 
Middle East. They wish to demonstrate'~he need for optimal balance'' 
between 'focus and flexibility' in the area of conflict resolution. 
'Focus' is defined as "the function of exclusion and constancy, 
flexibility that of variety and variability" (Levi & Benjamin, 
1977:405), A central paradox, which is present in all applied 
behavioural science application, is the simultaneous need for these 
two paradoxical requirements. Argyris (1970), Bennis (1966), and 
others emphasise the need for such flexibility in organizations and 
people in a rapidly changing world. In a perceptive study, Rogers 
(1961) argues that those elements in human culture which limit our 
ability to be flexible set real restraints to our human potential. 
In the area of conflict research, flexibility is a central and 
constant need. For example, John may desire A and Andrew may want 
B, yet both cannot be realised. As long as John presists in wanting 
A and Andrew in wanting B - and both define A and Bin zero-sum 
terms - the conflict will remain unresolved. The moment A and Bare 
not defined in total mutually exclusive terms, the prospects for 
resolution increase. 
"There is, however, a contrasting theme. Flexibility requires 
an ability to view problems inclusively (holistically), to take as 
much as possible into consideration, to change one's views easily. 
Human endeavour, however, requires at times just the opposite : the 
ability to focus on certain details exclusive of others, to decide 
between alternatives!'This need for 'focus' plays a pivotal role in 
most intervention strategies, and is particularly important in 
'task-oriented interventions' (Blake and Mouton, 1971); Kepler and 
Tregoe, 1965). In the view of Levi and Benjamin (1977:406), 'focus' 
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, and 'flexibility', should also play a central role. They also give 
equal consideration to process in their model. Fisher (1972) has 
summarised advances in conflict resolution, Walton (1969) has dealt 
extensively with two-party or bi-party conflicts. Blake and Mouton 
(1961) have analysed conflict between groups in industry. Doob and 
Foltz (1973) have worked with community conflict, while Burton 
(1969) and Doob (1970) wrote on efforts to resolve international 
conflict. Fisher (1972:67-94) suggests that the functions of the 
third-party are to "(a) induce and maintain mutual motivation in 
resolving conflict, (b) improving communication between the parties 
in conflict, (c) diagnose the conflict, and (d) regulate 
interaction between the parties", This is achieved by being 
"facilitative, non-coercive, diagnostic, non-directive, and non-
evaluative". 
Thus, in terms of function and roles, the third-party 
consultant has been essentially process-oriented, However, it is 
Levi and Benjamin's contention that conflict resolution involves 
more than process issues.'~he conflict must be resolved. Whi~e the 
exclusive focus on process may alleviate the conflict, it cannot 
ultimately resolve the conflict. Dealing solely with process 
addresses symptoms, not the conflict its elf!' 
Levi and Benjamin (1977:407), began each workshop with a 
'process-oriented exercise', to relax the tension which exists when 
conflicting groups first interact. Self-selected pairs, consisting 
of one member from each opposing group, met 'to get acquainted'. 
They then introduced each other to the entire group. There are, of 
course, other alternative "ice breakers", such as "group 
conversation" (Pfeiffer and Jones, 1970), Blake and Mouton's 
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(1961), "exchange of images", Fisher's BATNA (Best Alternative to 
a Negotiated Agreement) or even, as Doob (1970) reports, lengthy 
T-group and brainstorming sessions. 
Following this initial attention to process, the 
participants are then submitted to their particular 'psychological 
approach' to group discussion. The basic approach, formulated in 
the form of a contract, 'stipulates that each participant tries to 
adopt a problem-solving orientation and express his views openly 
and honestly.'All participants agree to respect the confidentiality 
of the various opinions expressed and to follow the structured but 
experimental model of the consultants. 
With these process preliminaries completed, the business of 
resolution can then start in all earnest. Each of the elements 
presented in Figure 1, will now be systematically outlined. 
4.3.1 Defining and rating of the conflict 
Conflicts often tend to be unclear. The first steps in the model of 
Levi and Benjamin (1977:408-411), therefore is to define the nature 
of and issues involved in the conflict. To put it differently, to 
determine precisely what is at conflict. This they accomplish by 
"having the opposing parties define two solutions, each of which is 
favoured by one side and opposed by the other. 11 This focus on the 
conflict also serves a process function by clarifying the degree to 
which the parties are not in conflict with one another, thus 
reducing the tensions between them. To accomplish this, they asked 
each individual participant to write down privately his most 
"desirable goal'which he suspected the other side opposed. Each 
person then announced his/her particular goal, and all issues 
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(goals) were then listed. For example, at the Nachsholim workshop 
(Benjamin and Levi, 1975), the noted list consisted of "ending 
Jewish immigration", "no third state should be established in the 
West Bank", "Israel should retreat from all areas _conquered in the 
Six Day war", "a Palestinian state should be established in 
accordance with the 1947 partition plan", and "a Palestinian state 
headed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) should be 
established". 
While going through this list, the participants discovered 
that they were in agreement on the last two points, while at least 
one participant opposed each of the others. The group then voted on 
the most important issue on which to concentrate; the role of the 
PLO in a Palestinian state. The Arab participants favoured "PLO 
Rule", while the Jewish members rejected such an outcom~. 
In order to establish the degree of conflict at that point, 
the participants were asked to go a step further, when each 
participant was asked to rate (on a -10 to +10 scale) his 
"preference for each of the opposing solutions which define the 
" conflict. The degree of conflict is expressed by the degree of 
divergence of ratings of the two opposing groups for each solution 
proposed. In the Nachsholim workshop [ 11], for instance, "PLO Rule" 
obtained the maximum negative rating of -40 from the four Jewish 
participants, and +39 from the four Arabs. Apart from establishing 
whether conflict really exists, these ratings serve another useful 
purpose. "They provide a criterion measure, some point of reference 
on which the participants can focus to compare their degree of 
progess throughout the workshop" (Levi and Benjamin, 1977:410). 
The notion of ratings also serves to introduce an important 
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concept in their model, namely, that of 'total satisfaction'. All 
the 'ratings' for each proposed solution are added up, providing an 
'index of total satisfaction' for that particular solution. When 
conflict in the group is high this index will be low, since the 
high negative scores cancel out the high positive ones. For 
example, in the case referred to above, namely, "PLO Rule", the 
ratings were -40 +39= -1, Yet even if all participants equally 
favour a solution, this index may still be rather low. For example, 
everyone may submit the low ratings of +1. The aim of their model 
is not merely to reduce conflict, but to increase 'total 
· satisfaction' with some solution. Levi and Benjamin (1977:410), 
comment :-
"The evaluation of the conflicting solutions thus serves as 
a beginning point of reference against which progress can be 
measured and introduces as goals the reduction of 
conflicting preferences and the increase in total 
satisfaction". 
The participant's next task is to focus on the most 
important reasons for preferring one solution over another. To be 
able to do this, additional information is gathered, with a view 
toward deciding among options. It is to this aspect that we turn 
next. 
4.3.2 Gathering of information - deciding among options. 
Each participant is asked to write down the most important reason 
for preferring his solution to the opposing one. Each person 
reports his/her reason, which is then catalogued by the 
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consultants. To enable the participants to decide among options, 
the difference between 'preference' and 'belief' is explained, and 
together,"the preference and belief inherent in each solution are 
extracted."[12] Thus, for example, from the reason "the PLO aims 
to destroy Israel" they extracted the preference "Israel's 
existence", the crucial preference for the Jewish participants, and 
the belief that the PLO indeed aims to destroy Israel, accepted by 
all the Jewish participants and rejected by all the Arabs. 
Similarly, they discovered that the crucial preference for the Arab 
participants was that "the true and only representative of the 
Palestinians should head their state", while they believed that the 
PLO fulfilled that role. The Jewish members thought differently 
(Levi and Benjamin, 1977:411). 
The idea behind the establishment of the respective 
preferences and beliefs of the participants, is to enable them to 
obtain a clearer understanding of the sources of the conflict. 
Beliefs and preferences, also serve to establish whether a 
particular conflict is over 'means' or attribution rather than over 
'ends'. [13] 
'~y focusing on the sources of the conflict, the gathering of 
information is intended to help the participants to decide among 
options and thus, to enhance the prospects for resolution." During 
the early stages of the model which involves defining the conflict, 
rating it, and gathering information, their method is relatively 
structured. The model relies upon particular types of data [14], in 
order to en~ance the prospects for conflict resolution. The 
emphasis on structure is intended to enhance the process of 
resolution by providing for a problem-oriented approach amongst the· 
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participants. In addition, it is argued that progress made in this 
respect, may well increase trust and understanding between the 
contending parties. 
Levi and Benjamin (1977:412) are at pains to point out that 
structure ~oes not imply "coercion". By providing a structure for 
gathering the relevant information, they strive to maximize the 
freedom of the participants by granting them the power of "informed 
choice" (Argyris, 1970). 
Up to now, the primary emphasis has been on focus, namely, a 
definition of the essential elements and sources of the conflict. 
The emphasis now shifts to flexibility, enabling the participants, 
on the basis of the previous focus,'~o choose their next step!' 
Since some alternative solutions have already been produced by the 
conflict definition stage (the conflicting solutions of the 
participants define the conflict), they already have a basis for 
'influence attempts'. On the other hand, these "solutions" are 
conflicting, and, therefore, creating further new solutions may be 
called for. The information gathered may have resulted in changed 
attitudes, and new ratings may be needed to determine whether 
conflict in fact still exists. The information gathered may have 
resulted in changed attitudes, and new ratings may be needed to 
determine whether conflict in fact still exists. The information 
may also have led to a realization that the conflict was poorly 
defined, and, thus, to a redefinition of the conflict. Finally, 
gathering more information may be required before a sensible choice 
about the other options can be made. In this context the 
availability of and accessibility to new information are of 
cardinal importance. Since the choice among the options (which have 
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been suggested by the participants in the first place) is based on 
their subjective definition of the situation, the participants are 
seen to possess the relevant information for choosing and deciding 
among them. Therefore, the consultant(s) present(s) the 
participants with the various options for their consideration and 
decision. 
4.3.3 Gathering more information and influence attempts 
The general process of the workshop, as illustrated in Figure 1, is 
to begin with an attempt to define the conflict, which involves 
that each party is given time to express its view of the conflict 
situation in terms of the key issues involved. The next step is to 
gather information regarding conflict processes in general and the 
particular conflict in question. The third stage involves an 
assessment of the options available to each party, and in some of 
their workshops a decision is actually made on which option should 
be pursued. Attempts to influence the parties' preferences for a 
given option may be undertaken during this stage. These "influence 
attempts" may also be sought by the parties themselves-The process 
of influencing the participants,"is intended to allow the 
participants to make a rational choice among various options!' The 
consultants are also involved, in the sense, that they highlight 
the inherent limitations associated with each of the options. Part 
of these "influence attempts" is a comprehensive debate on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the different options. The role-of 
the consultant(s) is to assist the participants to make 'reasoned 
choices' (Levi and Benjamin, 1977:413). 
Following this third stage, the workshop may develop into 
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one of four directions, namely·:-
"(!) Efforts may be undertaken to generate new options (i.e. 
possible solutions'.). 
(2) Actual resolution or termination of the conflict may occur 
as a result of the options selected in the earlier stage. 
(3) Based on the information obtained in the second stage, an 
attempt may be made to redefine the conflict (with the 
assistance of the consultants) so as to make it more 
amenable to resolution; and 
(4) It may be decided that additional information is needed to 
proceed further, either regarding conflict processes in 
general or in terms of specific information on the given 
conflict. In the case of the latter situation, a 'fact-
finding mission' may be necessary." (Levi and Benjam:in, 1977: 413-414). 
Figure 1 illustrates these four possibilities. 
In the case of the first and the fourth outcome, the 
generation of additional information is required. This is achieved 
through asking each participant to write down the most important 
rationale for each of his preferred options or choices. The model 
operates on the premise that increased information may well assist 
in the formulation of the eventual 'soluticn'.However, since total 
information is impossible, an increase in information as such is 
not a sufficient condition for resolution. Thus, new solutions may 
have to be generated by the application of other techniques. These 
will now be briefly discussed. 
4.3.4 Creating new solutions 
It is likely that somewhere in the process of conflict resolution 
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new solutions will be generated, even if these are revisions or 
restatements of one of the initial positions. In contrast to 
gathering additional information, which serves mainly a 'focusing' 
function in the model, creating new solutions serves essentially a 
'flexibility' fW1ction of producing new ideas for consideration. 
Thus, while the former process lends itself to incremental thinking 
akin to De Bono's (1970) 'vertical thinking', the latter requires 
the flexible skill which he terms 'lateral thinking'. To create 
flexible (lateral) thinking, Levi and Benjamin, have experimented 
with varous techniques such as brainstorming, [15] The principle 
of this technique consists of participants suggesting new and even 
'wild ideas'. At this stage no one is allowed to judge these ideas, 
in order to encourage maximal freedom of imagination and 
expression. 
At another of their workshops, the one at Nachsholim, they 
experimented with a variation of brainstorming. Here individuals 
worked separately rather than in a single group. A large sheet of 
paper w~s given to each participant, and he/she was requested to 
write down every possible idea (in accordance with brainstorming 
instructions) and also to examine each other's sheets to gain 
additional suggestions. In the experience of the authors, a 
conflict over means is sometimes open to resolution via what they 
term an "insurance policy", "a solution which contains provisions to 
II 
protect a threatened party. 
Depending upon' the degree of complexity, difficulty, and 
symbolic importance of the conflict,' participants may participate 
in the problem-solving workshop for a very short time, without 
utilizing every option, or else participate in it much longer, 
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'moving back and forth' among the suggested options. Solutions to 
certain issues may result in new conflicts. Levi and Benjamin claim 
that their model "balances the focus requirements of following a 
certain logical progression among certain stages with the 
flexibility needs of being able to choose, after information 
gathering, amongst a number of options" (Levi and Benjamin, 
1977:418). The function of creating new solutions (and the rating 
of these), is to enable a redefining of the conflict to take place. 
Redefining of a conflict is a logical step before its resolution. 
A comparison with typical problem-solving models, such as 
those developed by Zand, Miles, and Lytle (1970), and illustrated 
in Figure 2, serves to highlight the similarities and differences 
between such general problem-solving models and Levi and Benjamin's 
(1977) model of conflict resolution. This is briefly attempted in 
the following section. 
4.3.5 A comparison with a problem-solving model 
At the outset the two models follow essentially a similar course, 
"since conflict resolution is basically a very special case of 
problem-solving" (Kelman, 1972; and Kelman and Cohen, 1976:79). 
First the problem is defined, and then information is gathered. The 
rating of the conflict forms part of the information, so does the 
diagnosing of causes. Then, however, the models diverge. 
"The basic difference between general problem-solving and 
conflict resolution is with the former the problem tends to be of 
an 'external', 'objective nature' (e.g. constructing a bridge, the 
allocation of resources), while with the latter the issue is 
normally 'internal' and 'essentially subjective'"(Burton, 1969, 
1972). 
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In the more 'objective' problem-solving situation [16], the 
gathering of information often leads logically to creating 
solutions and evaluation. However, on the other hand, in the case 
of conflict resolution, the generation of more information, 
although important for the operation of the model, does not in 
itself result in resolution. The subjective nature of the conflict 
itself, coupled to the perceptions of the participants of the 
values, interests, and costs involved, and the selection of the 
appropriate time for intervention, tend to complicate the process 
of resolution. In the model of conflict resolution, the element of 
choice between alternatives always involves subjective dimensions 
and often mutually exclusive views and positions. 'Deciding among 
options' is invariably a more complex and subjective process, which 
is heavily influenced by the particular historical experience and 
political and organizational context within which the contending 
parties find themselves. 
Figure 2 illustrates the basic components of Zand, Miles, 
and Lytle's (1970) typical problem-solving model. 
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FIGURE 2: THE PROBLEM-SOLVING MODEL 
Defining the 
Problem 













Levi and Benjamin's model (1977) also differs from the more 
conventional problem-solving model in that their four options 
referred to earlier, do not lead to a predetermined outcome, but 
may continue to recycle in various ways until the conflict is 
(hopefully) finally resolved. Their model places much emphasis on 
'flexibility' due to the subjective nature of conflict. Each stage 
of the procedure generates new information which may be relevant to 
its resolution. The relevant information cannot be produced at the 
outset. It is continuously generated as the participants disclose 
(and discover) the bases of their positions and disagreements. Levi 
and Benjamin (1977:421) characterise their model as "a search into 
the minds of the conflicting parties, probing for those cognitive 
and emotional el~ments that might constitute a mutually 
satisfactory solution". Viewed in this way, it is obviously very 
different from mathematical models of .conflict resolution which 
assume access to all information at the outset (Luce and Raiffa, 
1957; Bain, Howard, and Saaty, 1971), which clearly is not the case 
here. 
''The emphasis upon greater ~flexibility' in their model suits 
the 'task requirements' of conflict resolution. It also aids the 
'process requirements' of the model. Participants have a need for 
autonomy. They want to make their own decisions, and they resent 
being passively submitted to a predetermined model, especially 
while dealing with tension-producing conflict. Accordingly, when 
the tension is highest (following the initial definition of the 
conflict and the justification of the various stances taken by the 
participants), the participants are given the choice among the 
various options or alternatives." 
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4.4 Further considerations 
In their model, Levi and Benjamin place special emphasis upon the 
'focusing role' of conflict definition and information gathering, 
versus the 'flexibility function' of generating new outcomes. Yet 
process considerations can decrease the relationship between the 
particular option and the emphasis on focus or flexibility. Each 
option can be pursued by methods involving varying degrees of 
structure. For instance, participants in the Maagen Michael 11 
workshop (Levi and Benjamin, 1975), 'an ongoing work and study 
group oriented toward a therapeutic, human relations approach', 
used a Gestalt (Fagin and Shepard, 1970) technique for information 
gathering which proved reasonably effective for both generating new 
information and changing attitudes. On the other hand, Bouchard 
(1969), has demonstrated that brainstorming techniques may not 
always be the most effective in creating new options. Personality 
and organizational variables seem to play a role, and, therefore, 
participants must be given some choice between specific techniques. 
At times participants simply do not wish to act 
constructively. Levi and Benjamin (1977:422), stress the tendency 
among par~icipants to debate when tension is high."Often a free 
discussion is preferred over a more focused and structured one~' At 
such times the consultant's interventions will often be aimed at 
"helping to restore the 'focus' and 'flexibility needs' of the 
model. Thus, for example, if the 'task requirement' is information 
generation, the consultant can summarise from time to time the main 
points which have been raised in the discussion to provide the 
required 'focus'. If, on the other hand, creating new solutions 
(options) is required, the consultant can call for new ideas." 
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In a perceptive contribution, Kelman (1972), has extensively 
analysed the strengths and weaknesses of the problem-solving 
workshop in general, into which Levi and Benjamin's model falls, as 
a technique for resolving international conflict. He also discusses 
the different approaches inherent in the models of Burton (1969) 
and Doob (1970), and gives special attention to the proximity of 
the participants and the workshop itself to the actual decision-
making process. Levi and Benjamin's workshops have been quite 
removed from this process. One should not deduce from this, 
however, that they favour such distance. [17] Their research 
emphasis has been to develop an applied model of conflict 
resolution focusing on the internal dynamics of the model itself, 
with the goal of arriving at more mutually satisfactory solutions. 
Clearly, their model is thus relevant to both Burton's and Doob's 
work, as well as to domestic conflict situations. 
The authors concur with Kelman (1972) that, while no 
panacea, ~he problem-solving workshop is a useful addition to the 
tools of international conflict resolution.' They assume that most 
conflicts are susceptible to resolution, but realize that their 
model is only "a first step" toward what could eventually be 
achieved in this field (Levi and Benjamin, 1977:422). 
The problem-solving workshop is designed to achieve two 
purposes. It should provide researchers with an opportunity to 
observe the dynamics of real conflict behaviour, which means, that 
it is research of the participant-observer variety. Secondly, it is 
intended to provide a learning environment for both the conflicting 
parties and the consultants. This second purpose is essentially a 
'service function', somewhat analogous to that of the psychoanalyst 
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or the social worker. However, "these two purposes - that of 
research and of learning - may not always be entirely compatible. 
Thus, any given workshop may tend toward the realization of one of 
these purposes at the expense of the other" (Hill, 1982:117), 
A critical stage in the working of the problem-solving 
workshop, is the definition of the dimensions of the particular 
conflict under consideration.'~ne could blithely state that the 
parties will be allowed to define these. However, this does not 
solve the problem, but rather forces a reformulation of the 
original question:'we now ask, "Who are the parties?" Burton 
(1969:13) comments :-
"An analytical approach requires the identification of the 
parties to any conflict in relation to the issues that are 
in dispute between them". (Own emphasis.) 
Furthermore, he asserts that, " ••• Unless each party can be 
identified, unless representative views and aims can be determined 
there is no possibility of mediation in any form" (Burton, 
1972a:15). Thus, conflicts are defined by issues, which 
subsequently determine the parties involved. [18] However, the 
exact method of selecting representatives of these parties differs 
from workshop- to workshop. 
Within this context a provisional examination of the role of 
the third party is useful. The assumptions regarding conflict 
processes in general [19] and the design of the conflict resolution 
model used by the problem-solving workshop approach, in particular, 
impose certain restrictions on the role of the third party. The 
third party is primarily a 'facilitator' who seeks to : 
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(1) establish "the conditions in which negotiation will lead to a 
de-escalation and avoid escalation of the conflict"; ( 2) "extend the 
range of choices of functional cooperation"; and (3) "present the 
conflict as a problem to be solved and not as a contest to be won" 
(Burton, 1969:157). The primary function of the problem-solving 
workshop is to prepare the groundwork for subsequent negotiation. 
"Thus, it is a preliminary step to more traditional methods of 
third-party intervention, not necessarily a replacement for them. 
However, it is also possible that as a result of the workshop, 
parties will resolve the conflict without the assistance of a third 
party. Therefore, it is important to emphasise that conflict 
resolution is not designed to occur within the confines of the 
workshop context (although this possibility is not ruled out); 
rather, the workshops are designed to enhance the chances of 
success of future and more comprehensive resolution attemps"(Hill, 
1982:118); Kelman, 1972:187; Burton, 1972a:27; and Kelman and 
Cohen, 1976:88). 
Since the emphasis of this approach is on resolution (as 
opposed to settlement), the third party must be'non-coercive! The 
third party should not start the workshop with his own subjective 
definition of the conflict, or with a preconception as to the 
precise nature of its resolution. In this special sense, the third 
party should be relatively 'neutral'. However, this 'neutrality' 
should not be seen as disinterest. The third party should be 
actively interested in a resolution, "otherwise the parties may 
react negatively to what to them may appear as aloofness" (Fisher, 
1972:78). Further, a basic assumption of the problem-solving 
workshop is that the third party is there"to provide an insight 
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into, and understanding of, conflict processes. Thus, the third 
party is not an area specialist or a historian!' Rather, "the third 
party is someone knowledgeable about the nature of conflict 
processes in general (rather than the unique characteristics of the 
particular conflict), the behaviour patterns of actors in the 
international system, and the functional imperatives of the 
international system" (Burton, 1972a:12). 
The interventions of the third party are designed to enable 
parties to see how their particular conflict relates to more 
general characteristics of conflict processes. The insights and 
training derived from the workshop should then enable them to 
determine methods of peaceful conflict termination. Finally, the 
third party is intended to be'amoral'in the sense that no 
judgements or normative statements are to be made regarding the 
behaviour of the parties. If at all possible, the third party 
h ld k II . "( sou adopt a "case-wor er",.or supportive, role De Reuck, 
1974:69). 
4.5 Critique 
At the outset it needs to be emphasised, that problem-solving 
workshops are not meant as panaceas or as total solutions to 
conflict."They constitute special kinds of inputs into a more 
comprehensive resolution process"(Kelman, 1972:169). They are not 
designed to be alternatives to diplomatic and political 
negotiations, but supplementary or preparatory to them. The~ 
procedures associated with these workshops are meant to prepare the 
ground for negotiation and establishing some of the preconditions 
of agreement - not as a substitute for negotiation. 
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In the most general terms, the strength of the workshop approach is 
that it allows certain processes of communication that are 
difficult to achieve in the settings (particularly the more formal, 
politicised and public ones) where conflicting parties usually 
interact. Kelman (1972:187) comments :-
" .•. The workshop facilitates such interactions, first, by 
providing a novel context for communication and, second, by 
using a unique set of techniques and third-party inputs to 
guide the communication process". 
For the individual participants, the workshop setting also 
"offers the opportunity to communicate with minimum commitment and 
risk." This fact not only influences their decision to participate, 
but also influences the type of communication they are willing to 
engage in. To provide a constructive setting for communication, 
Kelman (1972:188) emphasises that,. the workshop should "preferably 
be held under the auspices of some reputable institution 
independent of the political process which can bring an overarching 
set of norms to bear on the proceedings". 
A workshop held under the auspices of a body such as the 
United Nations Security Council, for instance, might not provide 
the required setting, since it does not claim a set of norms 
independent of those of the member-states."An agency that is nearly 
transnational in character - set up to perform a function that cuts 
across (rather than coordinates) national interests - would be more 
suitable."Burton's and Doob's experiences suggest that such a 
transnational institution for conflict resolution might be most 
effective if it included research and training as part of its 
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activities. In the case of the various workshops organised by Levi 
and Benjamin, the institutional base was the university. The 
workshops themselves, provided the normative setting of a research 
and 'learning laboratory'. 
The primary goal of a problem-solving workshop is to 
transmit the changes and solutions it has generated into the policy 
process."However, in terms of methodology, method, and design, the 
problem-solving workshop is more effective in producing changes in 
its participants and to generate innovative solutions than it is to 
transfer these outputs to the policy process."Much of the work-
shop's strength derives from its separation from the policy 
process. Kelman (1972:195) comments :-
"It is held under independent auspices, in a setting removed 
from decision-making agencies, with participants acting as 
relatively uncommitted individuals, and according to ground 
rules that encourage the transcendence of official posi-
tions. All of these features, by removing some of the usual 
barriers to change, make its occurrence more probable, but 
by the same token they make its transfer more difficult". 
The 'problem of transfer' involves two interrelated issues. 
"First, if an individual changes in the workshop setting - that is, 
if he reassesses his perceptions and attitudes and accepts a new 
approach to resolve the conflict - what is the likelihood that 
he/she will maintain these new attitudes and reformulations once 
he/she returns to his/her home setting? Second, assuming he/she 
does - or to the extent that he/she does - maintain these changes, 
what is the likelihood that he/she will be able to bring his/her 
new attitudes and changed perceptions effectively to bear on the 
. " policy process? 
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The first issue is common to all types of workshops, ranging 
from those primarily oriented toward affecting individual change to 
those oriented toward organizational problem-solving. It refers to 
what has been termed the "re-entry" problem. The workshop takes the 
participant into a 'new world' ,"frees him/her from his/her usual 
pressures and constraints that bind him/her to a limited 
perspective, and thus allows him/her to re-examine his/her 
assumptions and to develop new ways of looking at things. But once 
he/she leaves this more open and protective environment and returns 
to the real world, there is the constant danger that the old 
dominant frame of mind will again reassert itself. Moreover, the 
participant may find that the new ideas he/she expresses are met 
with hostility and the proposals he/she advances are systematically 
rejected." [20] The severity of the re-entry problem varies as a 
function of many factors. But, one has to concur with Kelman 
(1972:195), "that given an influence attempt that removes an 
individual or a small group from their usual environments, any 
feature that enhances the probability for change almost invariably 
compounds the problem of re-entry". 
The ease of maintaining changes produced in the workshop 
depends partly on the nature of the setting and the experiences it 
provided for the participants. Walton (1970:482-483), comments : 
" .•. comparative insulation allows for deeper immersion in 
the mental and emotional processes of the workshop and 
permits the development of a 'cultural island', which in 
turn encourages participants to challenge cherished 
assumptions, break old thought processes, and modify 
attitudes". 
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However, it also has real disadvantages :'The cultural island may 
be considered 'too complete; Moreover, participants may loose 
credibility if they express ideas that are at variance with 
commonly held views'.' (Wal ton, 1970: 483-484) • 
Thus changes are more likely to take place in a 'cultural 
island', but more difficult to sustain once the individual returns 
to the 'mainland'. 
The question of the participants' organisational backgrounds 
and contacts has a bearing on the second problem involved in the 
transfer of changes generated by a workshop: what is the 
likelihood that participants will be able to bring their new 
attitudes and formulations (assuming that these have been 
maintained) to bear on the policy process? Since the workshop is, 
by its nature, removed .from the policy process, the problem of 
feeding its products back into that process must inevitably arise. 
The ease and success of achieving such feedback depends largely on 
the participants' composition and orientation and their 
relationship to the policy process. 
In general, it seems that if the decision-makers are 
involved in the planning for the workshop, if the workshop 
organisers consult with them before and after, and if the 
participants are close to the centre of decision-making and are at 
least informally acting as 'representatives'of the decision-makers, 
then the opportunity for feedback and re-entry will improve. 
However, there may well be less change in this case than in a 
workshop where the participants act purely as. private citizens. The 
closer the participants are to decision-making bodies, the more 
likely that they are to be constrained by official positions and 
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decision-makers' expectations, and the less likely they are to be 
open to change. Whatever changes do occur, however, will come to 
the attention of the decision-makers much more readily in this 
case. Kelman (1972:198) views the problem in the following way 
"Thus it would appear that there is a reciprocal 
relationship between change and transfer : the closer the 
participants are to the center of decision-making, the less 
open they are to change, but the more capable they are to 
feed whatever changes they do experience into the policy 
process." 
However,"the problem is even more complex than this. Whether 
or not participants closest to the locus of decision-making are 
most likely to inject their changes into the policy process may 
well depend on the nature of the changes in question, as well as on 
the precise relationship of the participants to the decision-ma~ing 
process."For example, if change takes the form of some new learning 
about the intentions of the other party, then the proposition is 
likely to hold. 'Dn the other hand, if the changes experienced are 
more fundamental - if the participant leaves the workshop convinced 
that the whole policy pursued by his/her government is inappro-
priate, and committed to a basic reformulation of the issues and 
the possibilities for solution, then his/her proximity to the locus 
of decision-making may make little difference. It may not improve 
his/her ability to inject his/her new insights into the policy 
process and may, in fact, reduce it, depending on the exact nature 
of his/her relationship to the decision-makers!' (Kelman,1972:passim). 
• 
137 
In conceptualising this problem, our starting point is that 
the workshop approach can change individual perceptions, attitudes, 
and formulations of problems and solutions}' Thus the techniques 
used within the workshop setting can be most useful when directed 
at those points in the decision-making process at which individual 
perc~ptions and formulations of the conflict become relevant and 
importantJ' It can be argued that diplomats and foreign affairs 
officials do not represent such points in the process. They tend to 
act within a highly institutionalised conceptual framework; the 
assumptions of that framework are built into the routine operations 
of the decision-making apparatus and are constantly reinforced by 
the interactions of the various units. Thus, it is not too likely 
that (acting within their roles) these individuals would 
effectively use changes gained through a workshop experience. 
On the other hand, the situation may be different for 
legislators, or for executives of powerful and influential interest 
organisations. Such individuals are not necessarily bound by the 
perspectives of the decision-makers and are relatively free to 
promote changes in policy. Thus the analysis tentatively suggests 
that the ideal participants in a workshop are not necessarily tho~e 
closest to the locus of decision-making. This seems to hold even if 
the goal of a workshop is to have maximal impact on the policy 
process. 
Viewed analytically, Levi and Benjamin's model of conflict 
resolution has much in common with the work of Burton, Doob, Kelman 
and Fisher. Essentially all these models use the same instruments 
of knowledge, discussed in Eugene J. Meehan's writings on reasoned 
argument. Like Meehan (1982:11), these models start with 
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Description, which deals with such issues as adequate description 
(subjectivity); conceptualisation (the problem of ambiguity); 
definition; measurement and indicators, and conceptualisation and 
classification. This is followed by classification, which relates 
to the ranking of the conflict under investigation. After 
classification, the models allow for generalization, which takes 
place following the gathering of more information and the 
redefining of the conflict. The final stage in these models relates 
to the generation of choices, which is intended to result in the 
creation of new solutions. The normative dimension of choice, 
relates to aspects such as : (a) The contextuality of choices; 
(b) patterns of action; (c) the structuring of alternatives; 
(d) normative variables of choice; (e) empirical dimensions of 
choices, and (f) priorities. 
The element of choice, which is at the heart of models of 
conflict resolution is exercised with reference to the knowledge 
and experience of the participants, the personality factors of the 
participants, and the risks and costs associated with different 
choices. It is assumed that individuals involved in conflict will 
make a reasonably 'rational' calculation of the benefits and costs 
associated with different choices. 
The various workshops all assume a rather direct nexus 
between thought and action. To put it differently, it is assumed 
that people in conflict think first before they act, Furthermore, 
it is assumed that because people are capable of rational thought, 
their actions will also be reasonably 'rational'. This assumption 
seems highly suspect in the real world of conflict. People may, for 
instance, engage in conflict before subjecting such behaviour to 
, 
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dispassionate and rational reflection. The element of thought may 
indeed only enter into the equation once various avenues of action 
have been tried and found wanting. There seems to be a constant 
tension between thought and action. Especially in conflict 
relationships, people often tend to act first and then think about 
their actions, or the consequences of their actions. The analogy of 
theKuhnian paradigm seems appropriate here, in the sense that 
behaviour patterns, policies, and assumptions are only really 
changed and challenged when the dominant 'paradigm' itself is seen 
to be in serious trouble. When the person or group exhausts their 
options. [21] The point seems simply that in the case of conflict, 
one cannot readily assume a one-to-one relationship between what 
people think and how they act. Thought and action may indeed be at 
variance. 
A further problem which the workshops have to deal with, 
relates to the unintended consequences that can flow from them .• For 
example, what happens when one of the conflicting parties views 
conflict and its continuation as functional? Or when the 
termination of one dimension of a conflict (especially at one level 
of interaction) generates new conflict at a different level of 
interaction? This last issue is of considerable importance, 
especially because conflicts invariably manifest themselves at 
different levels of interaction. 
A final problem that needs to be raised here, relates to the 
eventuality where the participants in the workshop do not share the 
goals postulated by the organisers of the workshop. Clearly, in the 
event of such a development, the workshop will experience serious 
problems. For instance, it becomes questionable whether a workshop 
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will be able to yield any results when the participants in it do 
not share the goals of 'learning' and 'resolution'. It also seems 
unlikely in such an eventuality that the workshop itself has the 
potential to influence such participants holding such views to 
change them. The roles assigned to the third-party within the 
workshop setting, and especially the emphasis on the'non-coercive' 
nature of third-party intervention, seem to imply breakdown of the 
entire workshop. In any event, if the nature of third-party 
intervention becomes 'directive' and 'coercive', then it would 
undermine the objectives postulated for the conflict-resolving 
workshop. Under such circumstances, both objectives - research and 
learning - would be seriously undermined. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This introductory discussion of some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the conflict-resolution model, dealt with the problem 
of transfer, the internal logic of the model, the postulated 
relationship between thought and action, the problem of unintended 
consequences, and the possibility of goal variance between 
participants and organisers. Various other problems have not been 
discussed here, notably the requirements for and implications of 
the third-party in the workshop; the ethics of social intervention; 
the level of analysis problem, and the factor of time and how it 
relates to intervention, to mention but a few. These and other 
problems will be addressed in the parts that deal with the 
application of specific models of conflict resolution. 
As far as the strengths of the model are concerned, special 
mention was made of its capacity to facilitate communication 
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between conflicting parties, its learning potential both for the 
third-party and the participants, its capacity to influence and 
change individual perceptions, and its possibilities for conflict 
research. 
The general set of underlying assumptions regarding the. 
nature of conflict and its resolution for the workshop approach 
have now been identified. We have also discussed some general 
characteristics of all problem-solving workshops. The next chapters 
therefore attempt toanalyse the application of specific attempts at 
conflict resolution. Chapter 5 then focuses on the research efforts 
of John Burton and his associates. 
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Endnotes to Chapter 4. 
1. Kenneth Boulding presents a different view of these three 
phases 
''Each particular conflict, however, can be thought of 
as having a life cycle : it is conceived and born, it 
flourishes for a while, and then certain processes 
that are probably inherent in its own dynamic system 
eventually bring it to an end" (Boulding, 1962:307). 
2. The concept "hostilities" is used in its broadest sense. It 
refers to the first instance of a directed hostile action 
between the conflicting parties. 
3. An attempt to bring hostilities to an end should not be 
taken to imply that no hostile action takes place during 
this phase. It is certainly possible that an initial attempt 
to resolve the conflict may fail and hostilities will be 
resumed. 
4. Many scholars have argued that it is not desirable to seek 
an absence of conflict, as this would imply perpetuation of 
the status quo and, thus, stagnation. Conflict is seen as a 
necessary component to the dynamics of change. For further 
elaboration of this view, see Johan Ga1tung (1969) on 
structural (i.e. latent) versus physical (i.e. manifest) 
violence and Kenneth Boulding (1962:305-307) on balancing 
the "bitter and destructive" with the "fruitful and 
constructive" aspects of conflict. 
5. For a useful discussion of traditional approaches to the 
study and resolution of conflict, see Schuman, F.L. 
International Politics Anarchy and Crder in the World 
Society, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965, chapters 5 and 6. 
6. Dissatisfaction with traditional techniques has also 
resulted in other third-party techniques. The interested 
reader may wish to consult the articles by Ronald Fisher 
(1972) and John Mroz (1979) which surveys most of these 
other developments in third party intervention. 
7. For further explication of this argument for "integrative" 
rather than "compromise" solutions, see Follett (1951). 
8. Doob, Leonard W., W.J. Foltz et al. Resolving Conflict in 
Africa: The Fermeda Workshop, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1970. See also, Doob, Leonard W., W.J. Foltz and 
R.B. Stevens "The Fermeda Workshop : A Different Approach to 
Border Conflicts in Eastern Africa", Journal of Psychology, 
vol. 73, no. 2 (1969), pp.249-266. 
9. A zero-sum conflict implies a conflict in which the gain by 
one of the parties, implies the loss by the other in a total 
sense. In such a conflict it is impossible for both parties 
to gain (even in relative terms). What the one party gains, 
the other loses. Gain implies loss in some total sense. 
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10. A positive-sum-conflict, denotes a conflict where both of 
the parties gain relatively. The outcome of such a conflict, 
thus enables both parties to register some gain or other. 
A positive-sum conflict is often called a variable-sum 
conflict. For a useful discussion of these two distinctions, 
see Rapoport, A. and Chammah, A.M. Prisoner's Dilemma: A 
Study of Conflict and Cooperation, University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbour, 1966. 
11, See Benjamin, A. and A.M. Levi. "High school seniors attempt 
to resolve the conflict the Nachsholim workshop", Lyunim 
B'chinuch, 9, 1975, (In Hebrew.) 
12. The preferences and beliefs were extracted from the reason 
"the PLO is the.true and only representative of the 
Palestinians". 'Preferences' refer to preferred opinions, 
actions, or ideas. ~eliefs' to the acceptance of a 
proposition, statement, or fact, as true, on the ground of 
authority or evidence. · 
13. For a discussion of the difference between conflict over 
means and conflict over ends, see the conceptual material 
presented in chapter 3, 
14. Whatever the methodology, one must gather data about the 
general setting, for instance : the history of the conflict, 
the geography, demography, economy, and psychology of the 
communities in conflict, the regional and international 
contexts of the conflict, and so forth. 
15. For an excellent introduction to the techniques associated 
'with brainstorming, see Osborn, A. Applied Imagination, 
Scriber's, New York, 1957. 
16. The writer is not convinced that problem-solving does not 
also require a model similar to that of Levi and Benjamin, 
since choice between solutions always involves subjective 
elements and often conflicting perceptions. 
17. Their research simply required the necessary freedom to 
experiment with different techniques. 
18. The issues in conflict, constitute the more 'objective' 
elements of conflict, since they are based on interests. 
The perceptions of the parties in conflict, however, 
introduce a subjective element to the issues. 
19. For a discussion of these, see Section 4.2 entitled, 
"Domain assumptions" in this chapter. 
20. Such an outcome materialised in the case of Doob and Foltz's 
workshop on Northern Ireland. See Doob, Leonard and William 
J. Foltz. "The Impact of a Workshop upon Grass-Roots Leaders 
in Belfast", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 18, no. 2, 
1974, pp.237-25. 
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21. The term 'paradigm' is used rather loosely to refer to a set 
of values, beliefs, orientations and policies held by 
parties to a conflict. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONFLICT AND COMMUNICATION - THE WORK OF JOHN BURTON AND HIS 
ASSOCIATES 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to isolate, identify and describe 
the salient features of the problem-solving workshop which is 
associated with the research of John Burton and his associates. 
Apart from this, certain of the most important conclusions 
associated with this research will be presented. Following Hill 
(1982:119), the various problem-solving workshops have been broadly 
categorised into four groups. These groups are: 
(1) the London group: those workshops which comprise the work 
of John W. Burton and his associates; [1] 
( 2) the Yale group : workshops organised under the dir,ection of 
Leonard W. Doob, William Foltz, and their associates; [2] 
(3) the Harvard group: those workshops directed by Herbert C. 
Kelman, Stephen P. Cohen, and their associates; [3] 
(4) other groups, which refer to a few problem-solving workshops 
which have not been directly organised by anyone in the 
abovementioned three groups, but whose work is related to 
the research efforts of the London, Yale and Harvard groups. 
This chapter attempts a critical survey and analysis of the 
work of the so-called'London group'in the context of the underlying 
assumptions about the nature of conflict and its resolution which 
have been discussed elsewhere. [4] 
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The initial part of this chapter is devoted to a brief 
description of the domain assumptions which are implicit in the 
work which Burton and his associates have done in the field of 
conflict and its resolution. This will be followed by a more 
detailed description of the key concepts of i•controlled 
communication", "conflict", and "conflict resolution". What follows 
then is an analysis of the research setting within which the model 
of controlled communication has been applied. The chapter concludes 
with a critical assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
model. 
5.2 Domain assumptions 
The problem-solving workshop approach to conflict resolution began 
with the work of John Burton in "controlled communication". The 
Centre for the Analysis of Conflict was established in 1966 by the 
University College, London, and its staff comprises political and 
social scientists. Burton's associates in the Centre included C.R. 
Mitchell, M.H. Banks, A.J.R. Groom, M.B. Nicholson and A.V.S. de 
Reuck. [5] The development of the problem-solving workshop 
approach to conflict resolution was described by Burton (1969:x-xi) 
in the following way: 
'' The method developed initially out of a belief that 
official, historical, journalistic, and even analytically 
descriptive accounts written up after a crisis, cannot provide 
answers to many of the questions that are prompted by contemporary 
interdisciplinary studies of world politics. The obviously 
desirable procedure was to select a current conflict, preferably 
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one in which there was actual violence, and to create a situation 
in which the parties involved would expose their perceptions of 
each other, their motivations and goals, their internal political 
problems, their interpretations of events that led up to the 
conflict, and then to its escalation, and anything else to which 
contemporary theories of relations between states and of conflict 
might point. It was made clear that the exercise was an academic 
one, and that the purpose was not conciliation or mediation, and 
not to settle the conflict - though it was hoped that the 
communication established between the parties would be helpful to 
them. 11 
The practical :i,ise o'f the method thus employed "was ultimately 
supplemented by a secondary objective : the resolution of conflict!' 
This developed naturally over a period of time from applying the 
techniques themselves. 
Since the domain assumptions implicit in most problem-
solving workshops have been discussed elsewhere (see the previous 
chapter), we shall now turn to a discussion of those assumptions 
peculiar to the work of Burton and his associates. First, 
assumptions about the nature and dynamic of conflict will be 
discussed. This will be followed by a discussion of assumptions 
which relate to the resolution of conflict. 
5.2.1 The nature of conflict 
The most important domain assumptions about the nature of conflict, 
may be summarised as follows: 
II ( 1) There are patterns which are common to all conflicts. All 
patterns of conflict are therefore susceptible to the same 
techniques of resolution. 
151 
(2) International conflict is often an extrapolation from 
situations of national conflict in which various- parties 
actively attempt to enlist foreign assistance. Mediation in 
such situations should take cognizance of ethnic and other 
groups in the domestic environment. Analysis should not be 
restricted solely to components comprising international 
conflict. 
(3) The nations of the world are not entities which are either 
separate or self-sufficient. All states, to a greater or 
lesser degree, are involved in a complex network of 
transactions which transcend state boundaries. Conflict is 
always therefore 'a particular manifestation of a 
transactional phenomenon.' 
(4) Conflict implies a social relationship which interacts at 
different levels (what Burton calls 'system leVels'). 
By using such a phrase, Burton is moving in the direction of 
a structural (environmental) ~xplanation of conflict. 
(5) Conflict arises from resource and position scarcity. The 
dimension of scarcity denotes the 'objective' element in 
conflict. [ 6] 
(6) Conflict is essentially subjective by nature~ [7] 
(7) Not all conflicts are negative or destructive. Conflict may 
also be constructive and 11 functional 11 [8] (Burton, 1972a:6-9; 
Mitchell, 1980:62-75; De Reuck, 1974:64-80). 
5.2.2 The resolution of conflict 
With regard to the resolution of conflict, the work of Burton and 
his associates rests upon the-following set of assumptions: 
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"(1) Mediation is a learned technique and performance is measured 
by success and failure. This assumption differs from that of 
traditional mediation and diplomacy which postulates that 
mediation is an art which cannot be taught. 
(2) While personality factors are relevant to c6nflict, th~ 
presence or absence of learned techniques is crucial for the 
resolution of conflict. 
(3) Conditions in which conflict can or cannot be resolved may 
be determined. 
(4) Not all conflicts. are able to be resolved. Some conflicts 
may be difficult to resolve while others may be impossible 
to resolve. [9] 
(S) T~ere is a basic difference between an imposed settlement 
and the resolution of conflict. In the case of resolution, 
authority is exercised by the parties themselves and not by 
external actors. 
(6) Only the parties to a conflict can arrive at a successful 
solution, and the mediator should never prejudice his 
position by making suggestions. This procedure has various 
· implications for the role of third parties [10], which will 
be dealt with in the discussion on the "research setting". 
(7) In any conflict, the resolution of disputes between parties 
most directly concerned take precedence to the resolution of 
any secondary conflict which the principal parties may have 
with interests at other levels. 
(8) No party should be expected to accept a compromise, The 
primary objective of the mediation exercise is to arrive at 
alternative goals·or means which do not require compromise. 
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(9) Although the information which parties to a conflict possess 
obviously influences their behaviour, an increase in the 
quality and extent of such knowledge may enhance the 
prospect of a resolution. 
(10) A relatively rigid adherence to rules of procedure is 
desirable once the efficacy and acceptability of such rules 
have been tested. 
I 
(11) The mediating role in a conflict should be performed by a 
panel of specialists skilled in the theory and practice of 
conflict-resolution" (Burton, 1972a: 6-9). 
These assumptions about the nature of conflict and its 
resolution are partly derived from a critical analysis of the case 
method in social psychology and the interactional dynamics inherent 
in T-groups although they should not be equated with the latter. 
[11] "Conflict-resolution workshops exemplify the belief that 
face-to-face communication between parties in conflict, in a 
context other than diplomatic negotiations, may contribute to 
conflict management and resolution"(Kelman, 1972:168). This concept 
is not new. What is new, however, is the application of concepts 
and techniques originally employed in behavioural sciences. 
After this brief outline of the domain assumptions which 
inform the work of John Burton and his associates, we shall now 
examine the key concepts of the Burtonian model. 
5.3 Conceptual clarifications 
The concept of "controlled communication", which is central to the 
work of Burton and his associates, has been rather loosely defined 
as a technique used by social scientists to control discussions 
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between representatives of nations and states engaged in conflict. 
Burton (1969:ix) writes, "The name 'controlled communication' is 
employed at best to describe what, in practice, took place". This 
.technique shares some features with "casework", the method used by 
social workers in the treatment of individuals who are in conflict 
with their environment. It is also similar in some ways to 
techniques of conciliation and mediation increasingly used in the 
resolution of industrial and small-group conflicts (Meyer, 1960: 
159-165)."While all are similar to the extent that there is an 
absence of enforcement and an encouragement of self-adjusting 
processes, - 'controlled communication' is intended to describe a 
technique that has some special features particularly suited to the 
nature of international and inter-state conflict" (Burton, 
passim.). 
The concept of "controlled communication" presupposes three 
separate hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the conflict 
behaviour of communities and states "comprises alterable 
components" such as perception of external conditions, selection of 
goals from many possible goals, and assessments of values and means 
in relation to assessments of costs and conflict (Burton, 1969:ix). 
The second hypothesis is that;' since conflicts of interests are 
essentially subjective, knowledge and experience may alter these 
components and so produce'altered·relationships! The third 
hypothesis is that]' by applying techniques associated with 
controlled communication (C.C.), misperceptions which parties to a 
dispute entertain with regard to each other, may be exposed by the 
introduction of rel.evant theoretical and empirical knowledge. This 
in turn may result in the establishment of preconditions for 
agreement'1Mitchell, 1973:127; De Reuck, 1974:64-65), 
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As an analytical technique, controlled communication begins 
from the premise that the conflict behaviour of states and nations 
is the consequence of certain subjective elements such as 
perception of external conditions; interpretation of the 
motivations of the other party; selection of objectives from many 
possible options; choice of means for pursuing objectives; and 
evaluation of ends and means in relation to the costs of conflict. 
"Many of the questions prompted by recent behavioural studies of 
world politics relate to these variables. These can be dealt with 
only by analysing the dynamic interface during an actual dispute of 
perceptions and misperceptions, interpretations and evaluations, 
and means and ends. Such an interface could best be observed when 
representative participants of the conflicting power· structures are 
in direct face-to-face interaction"(De Reuck, 1974:64). 
As an instrument of conflict resolution, controlled 
communication has features in common with social "casework" and 
with the conciliation techniques increasingly employed in 
terminating industrial and communal conflicts. All have in common 
the absence of enforcement and the encouragement of processes of 
'self-adjustment' and reperception.' 
Thus, the technique of controlled communication has been 
used with two.different objectives in mind."Originally it was 
employed as a means by which an analysis could be made of inter-
national and inter-state conflicts. Used in an analytical sense, 
the most effective procedure would be to select a current conflict 
(preferably one in which there is actual physical violence) and to 
create a situation in which the parties involved would expose their 
perceptions of each other, their motivations and goals, their 
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internal political problems, and their interpretation of those 
events which led initially to the conflict and ultimately to its 
escalation''(Burton, 1969:x). The application of this technique of 
controlled communication therefore results in a learning process 
for both the intermediary and the parties to the conflict. For 
example, the 1965 workshop was a purely academic exercise that had 
a particular and limited research purpose."The purpose was neither 
conciliation nor mediation: its design was not to terminate the 
conflict although it was hoped that the communication thus 
established between the parties would prove helpful to them!' [12] 
It soon became clear, however,"that this particular exercise 
was of little academic value, but if repeated in the context of 
other types of conflict, it might lead to insights and hypotheses 
and perhaps even to means of testing hypotheses. Furthermore, the 
research experience suggested that a useful technique for the 
avoidance of conflict, and even for the resolution of conflict even 
during violence, might have developed. It was thus that the 
technique came to have a second objective: the resolution of 
conflict"(Burton, 1969:xi). It is primarily this further 
development of the technique of controlled communication which will 
be assessed here. 
In Burton's view, concentration on conflict should not 
direct attention away from the purpose of the study of conflict, 
which he sees as"a deepening understanding of the nature of 
politics generally~ It is clear that systemic failures arouse more 
interest than the effective operation of systems. This may be as 
true of a political or social system as it is of a mechanical one, 
and may, in part, explain why conflict has attracted interest in 
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the sphere of social research. It may also acccunt to some extent 
for the widespread interest of philosophers, historians, and social 
scientists in conflict." There is, however, a sense in which the 
study of conflict is a matter of more specialised academic concern. 
This interest revolves around the operation of the system 
concerned; the way in which it operates; the reasons why it fails; 
the methods which can be used to improve its efficiency; and-how 
similarly constructed systems operate" (Burton, 1969:xii). In 
Burton's view (1969:xii), "The study of conflict is challenging 
precisely because it requires the investigator to distil, from 
complexes of evE:r-changing circumstances, a theoretical paradigm 
for the understanding of conflict situations." 
In practice, the analysis and resolution of conflict cannot 
' II 
easily be conducted separately. The means of resolution are often 
implicitly suggested by an analysis of the nature of the conflict 
itself. Means are rigorously related to ends. Resolution frequently 
tends to depend on the skill and accuracy of analysis, At the same 
time, analytical skills may be enhanced by the experience of 
attempting resolution. Science is advanced by application. 
Knowledge advances when the practitioner is research-oriented, and 
when the researcr.er is operationally-minded" (Burton, 1969:xiii). 
This'interconnectedness 'between operation and research is 
not characteristic of the study of international relations. 
"Traditionally, interest in international conflict has almost always 
been purely academic and thus confined to broad issues. Conflicts 
have indeed been studied but not with a view to resolution. They 
are studied as a means of understanding the international system in 
both its peaceful and violent manifestations!' Traditionally 
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scholars in this field have tended to shy away from the involvement 
of the practitioner: they have hesitated to examine conflict as it 
occurs, and have usually preferred to make their analyses only much 
later when the full corpus of documentation has become available. 
The purpose of controlled communication "is to provide a clinical 
framework, and a means by which an applied science-of International 
Relations can develop" (Burton, 1969:xiii). Thus Burton proposes a 
discipline of international relations, which rests on a clear nexus 
between theory and praxis. 
This does not imply that analysis of conflict is sufficient 
for purposes of explaining behaviour. Controlled communication 
rests a great deal upon knowledge of relationships and response of 
behavioural units other than nations or states. Not only is the 
method of face-to-face communication drawn from other disciplines, 
but the features of relationships upon which it focuses attention -
perception, responses, feed-back, decision-making - have been 
examined in other contexts. In Burton's view (1969:xiv), 
international relations is an 1nterdisciplinary field,' and 'the 
technique of controlled communication is one way of taking 
advantage of empirical work done in other disciplines." 
Furthermore, general systems theory is more and more 
integrating the study of International Relations with the study of 
politics generally, and the study of 'World Society' with the study 
of any society as a whole as well as with separate aspects of it 
(Burton, passim.). 
Burton draws a distinction between- two concepts, namely 
conflict resolution' and 'conflict settlement.' Conflict resolution is 
a process that comes from the decision-making of the parties 
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· themselves. It involves a reappraisal of values, alternatives and 
costs; the appropriate international institution is one of a kind 
which facilitates this process (Burton, 1969:xvi). Conflict reso-
lution is"a far more complex and comprehensive process than mere 
conflict settlement. It denotes a process by means of which the 
sources of the conflict relationship are removed rather than the 
alteration of behavioural or attitudinal components. It therefore 
implies an outcome that benefits both parties"(Burton, 1969:233-5), 
Conflict resolution requires theoretical and practical knowledge 
and experience of the structure and dynamics of conflict. [13] 
"Conflict settlement" or "accommodation", on the other hand, 
denotes some or other compromise solution which is achieved by 
"splitting the differences" between parties concerned (Mitchell, 
1981:253). Burton has an interest in the former process. 
To conclude this discussion on conceptual issues, a few 
significant points about the nature of conflict need to be 
emphasised. First~ conflict is conceptualised as a social 
relationship which manifests at different levels of interaction. 
(Burton uses the term "systems levels".) Secondly, in a structural 
II fl' f b h d sense, con icts reveal common patterns o e aviour an common 
sequences in the development and escalation of conflict"(Burton, 
1972a:21). Finally, conflict is essentially a subjective phenomenon 
which takes place when two or more social entities or parties 
(however defined or structured)'~erceive that they entertain 
mutually incompatible goals"(Mitchell, 1981:17), 
After this clarification of how key concepts are used in 
the Burtonian model of conflict resolution, attention will now be 
focused on the research setting and application of the technique of 
controlled communication. 
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5.4 The research setting 
The first attempt to employ the technique of controlled 
communication took place in London in December 1965. The 
representatives of three governments were assembled for these 
preliminary discussions in the presence of a panel of ten 
academics. The government representatives comprised senior 
officials accredited by their respective governments as well as 
other persons nominated by responsible Ministers. Each of the three 
parties was represented by two participants. 
By the end of the first week, officials from two other 
governments were invited to join the discussions at the suggestion 
of parties directly involved. The panel consisted of two politcal 
scientists professionally engaged in the study of International 
Relations, three social psychologists, two industrial relations 
specialists, an international lawyer, a regional historian, and a 
chairman with extensive experience in the conduct of small 
meetings. [14] 
Preparatory work, apart from a visit to each of the 
countries concerned and a general study of the relevant problems of 
each, included the formulation of a set of propositions drawn from 
that theoretical literature which was deemed ~elevant to the 
conflict.'These propositions were discussed by a supplementary 
group of social and political scientists at a specially convened 
seminar. The purpose of this seminar was to question the relevance 
and validity of these propositions and to expore ways of modifying 
them. Although no agenda was prepared, it was hoped that those 
assembled would be able: 
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(a) "to obtain a statement of the situation as perceived by each 
party, and to obtain elaborations as seemed necessary to 
satisfy theoretical interests; 
(b) to deduce the general political framework in which the 
states operated (for example, a fear-framework due to 
internal tensions and external intervention); 
(c) to direct attention to specific causes of fear, means of 
removing them, means of promoting a sense of internal and 
external security; 
(d) to seek from each party, in the light of the theoretical 
framework that emerged, the 'requests it would make on 
others, and on states outside the region, and the steps 
towards normal relations it would be prepared to take 
unilaterally, or as part of a reciprocal pattern; 
(e) to make a schedule of these requests, and to examine them to 
ensure that they dealt with the basic features of the 
conflict-situation; 
(f) to submit a schedule of requests to all interested parties 
for their comment; 
(g) to isolate any requests that were unacceptable to others, 
and re-examine their value to the parties making them, and 
costs to the parties to which they were made, and to prepare 
another schedule; 
(h) to continue this process until a wholly agreed schedule was 
obtained; and 
(i) to invite states concerned to act unilaterally in accordance 
with this schedule of requests, without further negotiation, 
agreement or public statement, as from an agreed date" 
(Burton, 1969:5-6). 
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At first this seemed to be a reasonable framework for 
procedure. In practice the framework was in its requirements too 
rigid. After the initial sessions, it became apparent that the 
panel was directing rather than controlling the communication of 
the parties. (Burton (1969:6) described this development as 
follows: 
"Social psychologists tended quickly to diagnose ~he root 
causes of conflict and to impose their models on the basis 
of group relationships they thought were analogous, the 
international lawyer was intent upon drafting heads of 
agreement, and the political scientists tended to divert 
discussion to the relationships that seemed particularly 
significant to them. " 
It was the common sense and goodwill of the parties 
concerned, underscored by a genuine desire to solve their problems, 
which prompted members of the panel to reassess their tactics and 
alter their approaches. The new procedures adopted as a result of. 
these reconsiderations were \ess formal
1
and 'less tied to inflexible 
positions.
1
As opinions were more and more freely expressed, latent 
assumptions which were the source of both external and internal 
conflict, became more and more patent and open to negotiation. 
1
As this process expanded, the group dynamics involved began 
to bear strong similarities to those experienced by social and 
case workers. For example, participants began to assist each other 
to describe their problems. The perceived intractability of the 
conflict. began to be ameliorated as the problems requiring 
solution were more and more clearly defined. The discussions 
-reached a point where serious consideration was given to 
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alternative means of realizing the same goals by various means 
of cooperation rather than by resorting to conflict (De Reuck, 
1974:67). 
Reports were made back to diplomatic missions and 
governments as required. From the end of the first week 
discussions became less frequent, but communication continued by 
these means over several months as and when it was considered that 
some useful purpose might be served thereby. 
The first workshop, held in December 1965, which took place 
in the council room of a medical research foundation in London, was 
a pilot project. In this study the concept "controlled communica-
tion" was introduced to describe the specific technique. Conse-
quently, this workshop served a theoretical purpose since mediation 
or conflict resolution fell outside its domain. 
In 1965, a second workshop was held in London in a 
university committee room. On this occasion the two conflicting 
parties were representatives of a communal conflict of inter-
national concern : two representatives of the Greek community and 
two from the Turkish community on the island of Cyprus. The level 
of representation was similar, the representatives having been 
nominated by the leaders of the parties in the conflict. Three 
social scientists from the United States, Professors C.F. Alger, 
H.C. Kelman and R.C. North, assisted three members of the Centre 
for the Analysis of Conflict. In this second effort, much more 
attention was devoted to procedural matters. In particular, 'a more 
deliberate attempt was made to formulate theoretically derived 
propositions,' and preliminary discussions took place on the basis 
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of these (Burton, 1969:8). The propositions derived from the 
writings of Simmel [15], Coser [16], and work done more recently by 
Campbell and Le Vine. [17] In addition to this, various other 
propositions about the nature and dynamics of conflict were 
generated from work on political systems, communications research, 
decision-making analysis and other aspects of political studies. 
[18] 
The second workshop was conducted on the basis of which were 
distilled from the abovementioned sources. These nine propositions 
were: 
'\1) The observable trend in world society is towards 
independence of unitary communities in decision-making. This 
trend is evident in an insistence on independence from 
colonialism; for autonomy in states which have achieved 
independence; and by a determined resistance to foreign 
influences. Any opposite tendency, such as movements towards 
stable federal structures or unions, is a development which 
arises out of a condition where integrated units already 
possess similar political structures and social values. 
(2) States may be defined as political systems which operate 
within an environment which is comprised of other systems to 
which they constantly adapt and respond : "national 
interests" are never fixed goals, but on the contrary 
reflect the fluidity of these adaptive processes. 
(3) Since states which are not directly involved in a conflict 
value their independence, they usually prefer to see 
conflicting parties arrive at a settlement in a voluntary 
way rather than to see a settlement imposed upon the parties 
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from without. In such circumstances their agreements still 
attract a more general support provided that the parties 
involved have taken into account the legitimate interests of 
others. 
(4) Law and order as maintained by colonial or foreign rule 
consolidates conflict situations, inhibits the flow of 
adjustments between communities, and thus creates situations 
of open conflict once authority is withdrawn. 
(S) The necessary conditions of law and order motivate colonial 
administrations to enlist the support of elites. These, 
because of their official positions and foreign support, 
tend to move away from and lose touch with the very people 
whom they purportedly represent and govern, and this results 
in an increase of tension between the colonial 
administration and the people as well as between the elites 
and the people themselves. 
(6) When the colonial authority deliberately employes members of 
a particular faction for police or administrative duties 
because of their greater loyalty or special abilities, this 
faction will, because of their position, become identified 
with the administration in situations where the administra-
tion has to cope ·with civil unrest or increasing pressures 
for independence. Under these circumstances, this faction 
will be identified with the administration and communal 
conflict and will consequently be generated where none 
previously existed. Such communal conflict is more than 
likely to be exacerbated during the processes of transfer 
of power, and, in all probability, will outlast the 
hostilities associated with the attainment of independence. 
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(7) Leadership interests are often motivated to make statements 
which aggravate conflict and to perform actions which 
increase the intensity of conflict. In some situations, 
political leaders may actually find it expedient to maintain 
a level of conflict by artificially contriving situations 
and disseminating inflammatory propaganda as a bulwark 
against the erosion of support. 
(8) A settlement of a conflict does not necessarily imply its 
resolution : resolution may depend upon the implementation of 
long-term integrative policies. [18] 
(9) Parties to a conflict should not be required to compromise 
(Burton, 1969:10-11). Compromise in Burton's vi,ew, does not 
address the underlying sources of a conflict relationship. 
The aim should be resolution not settlement." 
The level of tension and the evident hostility betweeen the 
disputing parties was much greater at the beginning of these 
discussions than had been the case in the previous experience, but 
proceedings developed along similar lines."Misperceptions, false 
interpretations of official statements, prejudice between national 
groups, unrealistic expectations about the policies of other 
states, and other such relevant causes of misundestanding were all 
ultimately revealed. Research findings relevant to conflict, 
conflict dynamics and conflict regulation were implemented with 
much greater effect than had been in the case in the previous 
exercise " (Burton,1969:11). 
These experiences generated various hypotheses about the 
nature of conflict and also about processes of conflict resolution. 
Subsequent to the main negotiations, discussions were held for the 
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purpose of attempting to explain the objectives and procedures of 
the workshop. It is to the results of these discussions that we now 
turn. 
5.4.1 Methodology and procedures 
In the Burtonian model, conflict analysis and resolution 
necessitate the pursuance of a particular set of procedures and a 
specific methodology. These procedures and related methodology will 
now be briefly outlined. 
The first important step posited by the model is that 
conflict analysis and resolution should begin with an 
identification of the parties in relation to the issues that are in 
dispute between them. 
The identification of the parties to a conflict might, prima 
facie, seem to be a relatively straightforward procedure, and one 
that has traditionally been followed in more traditional approaches 
to the peaceful resolution of conflict. Whenever there is a 
conflict there must be, by definition, parties to it. In practice, 
however, this is rarely a simple matter. Observers have tended to 
think of it in this way"because of the frequency of descriptive 
accounts of conflicts which all too readily appear to be able to 
identify the parties on each side"(Mitchell, 1969:2-4), The 
deduction which can plausibly be made from the ready identification 
of disputing parties is that the termination of an international 
conflict depends upon agreement between the two parties or states 
in conflict." But this is both simplistic and misleading. Parties 
to a conflict ar.e hardly ever equally involved, nor are they 
necessarily concerned with the same issues. No solution can 
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therefore be found which would equally satisfy all the parties 
involved "(Burton, 1969:11). For purposes of analysis and 
resolution, each ~ubdispute'requires separate treatment. 
There are, furthermore, different 'subsets' of disputes 
within the scope of one conflict. Recent approaches to the study 
of international relations have demonstrated the degree to which 
international conflict is frequently a side effect of internal or 
communal conflict (Cot, 1972:31-39). From this perspective, the 
local dispute becomes a matter of international concern. The South 
African situation provides good supportive evidence for this 
hypothesis. 
Apart from the identification of the parties to the 
conflict, a further procedure is required for analysis and 
resolution. This relates to the identification of what Burton calls 
'system:, levels.' It is assumed that conflict should be resolved at 
one level before there can be resolution at other levels. In the 
Burtonian model, the concept of "system" helps to clarify the 
nature of the problem as a whole as well as the disputes which 
comprise it. "Systems are transactions between units of the same 
set" (Burton, 1969:18). For example, in the case of the communal 
conflict in Cyprus, the two communities constituted one 'set' while 
the governments of Greece and Turkey constituted another. 
"Transactions which are most numerous, intimate and 
intractable always occur at the local level." Eruptions in the 
sphere of this type of conflict cause conflicts on a higher level 
while resolution of conflicts in this sphere result in 
corresponding resolutions of broader conflicts. Therefore, any 
settlement "arrived at by other governments at other systems levels 
169 
and imposed at the local level does not necessarily, and in 
practice is unlikely to, restore transactions at the local level" 
(Burton, 1969:19). [20] 
This general proposition requires further clarification. In 
the case of North and South Korea, for example, the division of 
these two areas caused a cessation of previous transactions but 
I I 
established new ones, and this, in turn, created new systems. 
Parts of these new systems would be destroyed by reunification. 
The Korean case illustrates the general point that when a conflict 
leads to a severance of transactions, the resolution of conflict is 
I I 
less dependent upon resolution at local systems levels. 
The general proposition is, therefore, that the starting 
point of both analysis and resolution of conflict is at the systems 
level of'highest interaction.' A settlement imposed from other 
levels could occur, as, for example, when one party is militarily 
defeated by the other. This might even result in resolution, but 
only after a sufficiently long period of time and by procedures 
which could ensure the severance of past transactions and the 
building of new systems. Presumably this is what the United States 
of America sought to achieve in Vietnam in preference to resolution 
on the basis of negotiations at the local level. 
The concept of systems or transactions serves two useful 
purposes in the Burtonian model.
1
~irstly, it helps to demonstrate 
the options in a given situation as well as the various problems 
involved in resolution by re-establishing transactions at local 
levels, and secondly, settlement or resolution by creating new 
systems "(Burton, 1969: 19). 
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In more traditional methods of conflict resolution such as 
diplomatic intervention, the tendency has been to perceive an 
unjustifiable solidarity between states who represent one party to 
a conflict while the assumption has been that each party to a 
conflict constitutes a unified entity in which each of its members 
entertain similar perceptions about the dispute in question. It has 
also been assumed that the interests of a state in an alliance, or 
of a state acting on its own, can be represented by the government 
of that state, and that agreements entered into will be duly 
observed. 
It is usually true (apart from qualifications set out below) 
that once violence erupts and the security of the state is 
threatened, there is an increase in internal cohesion and unity. 
In such circumstances, determination to survive usually outweighs 
all other considerations. Burton (1969:20), however, disputes the 
view that states are unified in their values or can ever be 
completely represented by their respective governments. In reality 
states in conflict situations are hardly ever internally unified. 
[21] Even at their best, "governments are never wholly legitimised." 
On the contrary they are often representative of minority 
interests. Under these circumstances it is essential to analyse and 
come to grips with the divisions within parties to a conflict. 
Burton (1969:20-21) comments as follows: 
"It follows that there cannot be resolution of conflict and 
a stable condition unless there is a high degree of internal 
unity of purpose, and even then instability or rejection of 
agreements can occur through changes in values and 
interests. It also follows that the origins of conflict, 
those interests and values the state is pursuing or 
defending, may not be the interests and values of groups or 
factions within states, and perhaps not even the interests 
and values of majorities". 
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Burton and his associates also postulate that conflict 
II 
avoidance is possible only when means are found by which interests 
and values can be assessed by the parties with "full knowledge" of 
the costs of conflict in relation to the values being pursued, and 
of interests and values being destroyed by it!' Divisions within 
parties are perceived as an important cause of the escalation of 
conflict. While the aggressive and provocative statements of one 
party justify the actions of another, an escalation of a more 
serious conflict is initiated which was initially not much more 
than a domestic struggle for economic and social reform or even 
just for party political power. In due course, however, this 
escalated conflict exacerbates internal divisions and costs in 
relation to values becom~ correspondingly clearer. 
Consideration of 'unit integration directs attention to the 
issues within a conflict that require attention. Burton advances 
the proposition that a resolution of conflict between two parties 
cannot be superimposed upon unresolved and continuing conflicts 
within them. Problems of party or unit integration arise out of 
'alienation,' of 'participation in decision-making,' of 'leadership and 
elite interests.' 
II . 
The strength of contolled communication is that it is based 
on face-to-face discussion in which participants are compelled to 
clarify their thinking, and more importantly, in which they are 
forced to arrive at a recognition of the fact that the conflict 
relates to internal problems on both sides." In Burton's view 
(1969:23), the roots of conflict probably do not reside in the 
international system :"they may be located within the decision-
making processes of the parties themselves:
1
This proposition is 
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based on his earlier proposition that international conflict is 
usually a side effect of domestic conflict. 
After the Burtonian model has identified the parties to the 
conflict, clarified the levels of interaction at which the conflict 
manifests itself, and dealt with the problem of divisions within 
parties themselves, it then proceeds to an identification of the 
issues in conflict. 
Burton and his associates assert that it cannot be assumed 
'that issues identified by parties to be those in dispute are 
necessarily those at the root of conflict!' Insofar as the origins 
of conflict are to be found within states, and to the extent that 
other states become involved, the issues are quite likely to be 
both "misstated and confused" (Burton, 1969:23-24). In many 
conflicts, no clear view exists of what the issues in question 
really are. 
There are various reasons why this is so quite apart from 
the usual absence of analytical separation between parties and 
issues.'~irst, the issues which give rise to the conflict may not 
be clear to the parties themselves. Secondly, whatever the issues 
originally were, they tend to become distorted and obscured as 
conflict escalates. Finally, events that ultimately lead to open 
conflict are usually only triggers of conflict and not the 
under lying reasons for the conflict." [ 22] 
In practice the issues relevant to the resolution of 
conflict require an analysis of the motivations and perceptions of 
the parties involved, and part of the purpose of contolled 
communication is to identify them. 
The methodology employed is to isolate issues in broad terms 
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so as to be able to separate them according to 'systems level,' 
Issues and parties need to be "carefully matched." The real issues, 
however, are not always immediately apparent. The parties involved 
in an unstructured discussion themselves determine some issues, 
while others may be identified as a result of questions from the 
third party. 
The parties invited to discuss their conflicts in a 
contolled communication setting are those that in each case 
appeared to be the ones most concerned with transactions affected 
or disrupted by the conflicts, but who were not necessarily those 
expending the greatest resources in the conflict situation or those 
who ,might hav·e claimed to have a direct interest in the conflict. 
In Burton's experience even the parties that were invited to 
participate were found not to be unified :"they included factions 
with different values and interests, and discussion of these 
differences was frequently relevant." In some cases, it may indeed 
prove impossible in practice to identify parties to a conflict. In 
some cases, for example, leaders of some of the parties involved 
may be in detention or in other ways unavailable - as was the case 
in Rhodesia before events culminated in the Lancaster House 
Agreement. 
Since the issues determine the parties to a conflict, the 
identification of the issues comprising the conflict will logically 
lead to the problem of the representativeness of the parties 
involved. If there is to be negotiation between parties to a 
dispute, the parties must necessarily be capable of being 
legitimately represented. 'There can be no negotiation with a party 
that is so diverse in its values, interests, goals and strategies 
as to be unable to agree about representatives"(Burton, 1969:40). 
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Even if there is a basic unity within the parties concerned, 
the identification of persons who represent the views, attitudes 
and interests of each individual party is no more straightforward 
than the identification of parties themselves." Even recognized 
political leaders do not necessarily or always represent the views 
of their governments in their private or public statements. They 
frequently speak to different audiences in different terms; they 
adopt 'bargaining positions, and they even sometimes endeavour to 
deny the very existence of policies for which they are directly 
responsible" (Burton, 1969 :40). 
If negotiations are to result in a satisfactory and 
permanent resolution, representatives should not only represent in 
a constitutional sense : they should also reflect the opinions, and 
even be in a position to authorize the future and changes in policy 
. 
of those whom they represent. [23] 
The concept of systems levels is clearly relevant to the 
identification of representatives. For example, when an internal or 
communal conflict has extended to include foreign parties, a 
representative cannot be a spokesman - both for the internal 
faction and for the foreign party which supports it. Different 
interests are involved.'~n the final analysis, systems levels, 
parties, issues and representatives should all be relevant to each 
other"(Burton, 1969:41). 
Once the representatives of the parties have been 
established, the actual selection of representatives can take 
place. In most problem-solving workshops, the representatives of 
governments have been nominated by the head of state or by a 
responsible minister. It is only at this level that a decision can 
• 
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be taken as to whether a meeting may take place with other parties 
to a conflict. For purposes of controlled communication, however, 
'~he representatives of parties may be persons, official or 
unofficial, who are (in the view of the responsible and 
representative leaders) adequately aware of the attitudes and 
policies of their respective governments"(Burton, 1969:41). 
Since controlled communication is an essentially exploratory 
stage prior to negotiation between parties, the purpose of which is 
to reveal underlying causes of conflict, "it may effectively be 
conducted at lower decision-making levels, provided, of course, 
there is the requisite communication with decision-makers as and 
when required
11
(Burton, 1969:42; De Reuck, 1974:68; Mitchell, 
1973:123-132). 
Burton and his associates claim that there are distinct 
advantages in working with people not directly involved in 
decision-making since they have more freedom (than politicians) to 
explore, to discuss, critically to examine their stereotypes, and 
generally to stand back from the situation to look analytically at 
the responses of their respective political leaders. 
Controlled communication is based on the assumption that 
'~onflict avoidance and resolution are possible by bringing about 
altered perceptions, by offering different interpretations of 
behaviour and changed assessment of values and costs, and by 
drawing attention to options not previously contemplated."If this 
is to happen at all, the flexibility of participants involved is 
essential. Politicians who have personally declared their 
positions, and whose reactions and perceptions are the subject of 
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analysis, would naturally tend to react much more defensively than 
lower-level representatives. 
'Progressive education'of participants is important -
especially in 'the arts of being open-minded and open to persuasion.' 
The procedure of controlled communication depends for its success 
"on the absence of any fixed commitment in the nurturing of 
relationships which do not create the psychological necessity for 
such inflexibility'(Burton, 1969:42; Burton, 1972a:17; De Reuck, 
1974:68). 
According to the Burtonian view, the advantages of 
representatives at the official level is greater at the stage at 
"which functional cooperation is being discussed"- a stage reach~d 
" once communication has effectively been 'controlled.' Politicians and 
other officials, i~so facto, in an authoritative position to select 
between options made available after they have been worked out in 
detail by subordinates and after areas offunctional cooperation 
have been identified and discussed at some length"(Burton, 
1969:43). Commitment in this sense therefore only materializes at a 
much later stage in the negotiation process and is not required at 
the outset. 
Once the parties have been identified and their 
representatives confirmed, the next important procedural step 
relates to the communication between such representatives and their 
principals. 
The role of a representative of a party is reasonably clear 
and obvious when analysis of conflict is the sole objective of 
controlled communication. His function is to convey the viewpoints 
of those he represents, even though he may not agree with them 
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entirely and even though he may change his own views during the 
process of communication with the opposing party. If, however, one 
of the purposes of the exercise is the resolution of conflict which 
can only occur if the participant is open to a radical reassessment 
. II 
of both the situation and the motivations of the opposing party, he 
has to perform an additional and far more complex function 'tBurton, 
1969:45). When confronted by the necessity for resolution;' the 
representative might have to communicate a revised approach to his 
superiors; to delineate sources of misperception; and to supply 
evidence of inappropriate response to those very people (his 
superiors) who will have had as yet no direct exposure to the 
parties concerned"(Burton, passim.). In such cases the 
representative may find himself being accused of being disloyal or 
"brain-washed" and of adopting attitudes and views which are at 
variance with accepted national policies and community consensus. 
The Burtonian model provides for specific ways in which the 
transmission of altered perceptions may be facilitated. These 
include: 
(1) Working with representatives who are experienced in the 
techniques of controlled communication. 
(2) Having more than one representative. for each party. Numbers, 
however, may be a problem. Ideally, there should not be more 
than twelve to fifteen participants involved. 
(3) The transmission of frequent reports on the conflict in 
question may be helpful but there is also a potential 
disadvantage in this : discussions may become too academic. 
(4) Having access to decision-makers. This is of vital impor-
tance(Burton, 1969:45-47). 
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The crucial factor in the Burtonian model of conflict 
analysis and resolution is the establishment of communication 
and, once this has been achieved, the control of communication. 
For example, in the South African context this would imply that 
'meaningful' communication between the ruling party and all the 
significant political groupings, including the African National 
Congress (ANC), should be established. It is to these interrelated 
aspects that we now turn. 
Communication is the essence of all social relationships. 
In human relationships, communication normally comprises messages 
and transactions.
11
There can, however, be communication even in the 
absence of messages and transactions as when, for example, various 
groups of the same nationality or religion in different parts of 
the world are aware of and have'sympathy' for each other but no 
II 
direct contact (Burton, 1969:48). Pertinent examples are the widely 
dispersed Jewish communities of the world; various people of colour 
who commonly experience widespread prejudices; or religious or 
ideological groups who are separated by geographical and political 
barriers. 
"Whether communication makes for harmonious or for 
conflicting relationships depends upon its content and perceptions 
of its content"(Burton, 1969:49). (Own emphasis) 
The practice of the technique of controlled communication 
is based on two fundamental hypotheses. The first is that conflict 
occurs as a result of ineffective communication and that ".its 
resolution must therefore necessarily involve processes by which 
communication can be made to be effective"(Burton, 1969:49; De 
Reuck, 1974:70-71). Burton (1969:49) defines "effective 
communication" as"··· the deliberate conveying and accurate 
......... 
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receipt and interpretation of what was intended, and the full 
employment of information as received and stored in the allocation 
and re-allocation of values, interests and goals". 
The second hypothesis is that the deployment of the tech-
nique of controlled communication rests on the assumption that 
"conflict of interests is a subjective component which occurs when 
conditions exist that prevent accurate assessments of costs and 
values, and consideration of alternative means and goals" (Burton, 
1968:7; 1969:50). 
Burton argues that if conflict is caused by the 
aggressiveness or expansionist tendencies of states,and if power 
relations determine the nature and structure of the international 
II 
system, then the settlement of conflict can only be mediated by 
third-party intervention, enforcement of a settlement, or by the 
military defeat of one party by another."Given such a point of 
view, each state will endeavour to impose its will on another by 
negotiating a peace settlement after defeat or in circumstances in 
which defeat is acknowledged. 
Under such circumstances, effective communicat±on .would not 
constitute part of the process of terminating conflict : '~ommuni-
cation could not take place until one or other side were to concede 
defeat. But if conflict between states is based on misperceptions, 
false calculation of costs, failure to perceive alternative means 
of attaining goals and similar behavioural factors, it follows that 
each party to a conflict gains from the resolution of a conflict:' 
Consequently,"effective communication can be relevant even while 
active hostilities are in process"(Burton, 1969:50). These are two 
different sets of assumptions and correspondingly imply different 
means of conflict resolution. 
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Effective communication, as previously defined, depends on 
two key variables, namely: 
(i) 'whether it is intentional or unintentional - designed to . 
convey information accurately or to mislead; and 
(ii) whether it is correctly perceived, or misperceived." 
Both these variables are in turn influenced by the form of 
communication whether, for example, it is verbal or visual, direct 
or indirect, and by the circumstances in which it takes place 
(whether, for example, in conditions of fear or of security, or with 
the possession of accurate information or on the basis of 
prejudice). 
Burton distinguishes between two types of political 
communication at interstate level. The first type is ~iplomacy'-
direct and indirect. Diplomacy takes place within a power frame-
work. The second type of interstate communication relates to 'the 
use of power and threats as a basis for communication.' This is an 
ancient method of communication, but; in Burton's opinion, one 
which is inefficient and which leads to misinformation. 
I 
The basic hypothesis that underlies Burton and his asso-
ciates' model of conflict resolution, and the notion of controlled 
communication,"is that conflict and ineffective co~unication are 
casually linked"(Burton, 1969:52). A corollary hypothesis is also 
advance, namely :'~ince the resolution of conflict depends upon 
effective communication, it can only come from the parties them-
selves"( Burton, 1969:55; Burton, 1972a:5-29). 
After this brief outline of the key hypotheses which 
underlie the technique of controlled communication, the technique 
for the establishment and control of such communication will now be 
analysed at some length. 
181 
The establishment of effective communication between 
conflicting parties may often be inhibited by fear that"the 
initiatives of one party will be perceived as an actual or implicit 
admission of weakness or defeat by the other party."The Burtonian 
model posits that some procedural means exist for overcoming some 
of these initial difficulties, and that these can be applied to 
third-party intervention and to formal and secret communication 
between contending parties (Burton, 1969:56). These include, in 
logical order: sending invitations to participants and informing 
officials about this; explanation of the technique of controlled 
communication to participants; personal visits to the decision-
maker(s) concerned. Available insights into the decision-making 
process are then utilised on a comparative basis,"especially with 
reference to information flow, information blockage, overloading, 
the role and influence of individual prejudice, stereo-types and 
mirror images
11
(Burton, 1969:59). [24] Propositions and questions 
can then be drafted and discussed in advance by the panel of 
experts. This will ensure that the greatest possible use is made of 
the exercise. 
Burton and his associates have been strongly influenced by 
the writings of Jervis on misperception and mirror images in 
international relations. [25] 
De Reuck (1974:64-80) provides a fairly detailed description 
of the establishment and control of communication. Burton himself 
(1969) supplies only a limited amount of information about these 
two processes. The discussion which follows is therefore based 
mainly on the work of De Reuck. In the two workshops,"the seating 
was deliberately unplanned as a gesture of informality, but the 
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contending parties seated themselves so as to avoid eye-to-eye 
contact with their rivals." The participants met for six hours of 
discussion each day, with breaks for coffee, lunch and tea, which 
the parties and panel took together. During these breaks, smaller 
groups could meet informally and this often resulted in a 
noticeable diminishment of tension. The panel met every night to 
review the day's proceedings. The parties retired to their 
respective embassies to do the same. 
From the outset'it was the intention to exploit all previous 
experience of unstructured meetings and to employ the insights of 
small group theory in conducting the proceedings." [ 26] For this 
reason, minimum guidance on procedure was given beforehand and no 
agenda or other papers were prepared - in order to raise as few 
expectations as possible in the participants. Because there were 
no direct precedents to guide them, the panel had no advantage over 
the parties when attempting to visualize the future course of 
events. They had to improvise and make the most of whatever. 
experience they gained as they went along. 
"An atmosphere of seclusion seemed desirable and so the 
meetings were made as intimate and informal as possible. The 
meeting opened with short greetings and assurances that the 
proceedings would be kept confidential and informal~ Each member 
in turn then introduced himself and his field of work or study. 
Each of the representative parties was then invited to present, 
"for however long he needed, an account of his people's perception 
of the situation."The remainder of each of the first two days was 
thereafter devoted to frank and detailed statements by the parties 




The panel offered no comments and intervened 
only to ask questions. The panel also never pressed for more 
information than participants were willing to give, but 
occasionally they attempted to elicit information which was not 
recognized by the parties as relevant"(De Reuck, 1974:67), 
The panel then became actively involved and at this point 
'the level of tension between the two parties immediately dropped.' 
The third day"was devoted to analytical reformulations and various 
aspects of the situation in the light of political and sociological 
theory. Without the use of academic jargon, and with minimal 
reference to the Cyprus dispute which was under discussion, the 
panel discussed such matters as misperception, stereotypes, tunnel 
vision and mirror images, cognitive dissonance, defensive reactions 
to perceived hostility, self-fulfilling prophecies, escalation, and 
the influence of reference groups, and all these concepts were 
illustrated by reference to a variety of other conflict situations. 
The parties accepted the relevance of this framework of ideas to 
the other conflicts cited, but insisted nevertheless on the unique 
characteristics of their own dispute." 
" By the fourth day, however, common perceptions, a shared 
vocabulary, and feelings of mutual confidence were becoming 
established."On the fifth day a problem-solving phase was entered 
"in which earnest efforts were made by the parties to consolidate 
their gains in understanding and to seek grounds of agreement" (De 
Reuck, 1974:67), 
Before discussing the procedures and tactics of control, 
some observations should be made about the role of third parties 
in Burton's case, a panel of political and social scientists. 
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A great deal has already been written about this subject, espe-
cially in the context of more traditional techniques of settlement. 
In his seminal study of third-party intervention, Oran Young (1967) 
analyses the various roles of third parties. These roles range from 
~ntervention'in order to enforce an agreement, to the'exercise of 
influence' on a problem. Young (1967) also outlines important 
functions of the third party in any mediation role, whether the 
dispute be industrial or international. He outlines functions that 
are especially relevant to international mediation, '\ncluding data 
collection and processing, and verification of statements"(Young, 
1967:47-79). Young's exposition of the functions and tactics 
required in the traditional role of the mediator seems to be 
most useful for the purposes of this discussion. 
The role of third-party intervention in controlled 
communication is different from the type of mediation described by 
Young. In one sense mediation in controlled communicaton is less 
active : '~ts function is not to persuade, .verify the accuracy of 
statements, or to be a judge of the reasonableness of any argument. 
But in another sense, it is far more active, and this is the 
distinctive difference:'The third-party in controlled communication 
is there to explain conflict, its origins, its escalation -
sometimes by reference to other conflicts, sometimes by analytical 
means, but always within the context of continuing discussion 
between the parties"(Burton, 1969:61-62). 
Burton (1969:62) writes 
"The main differencesin function of the third-party arise 
out of the difference in objective. Traditional mediation 
seeks agreement by compromises, or by persuading the parties 
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that their best interests would be served by ceasing 
violence and arriving at a settlement. It is a negotiated 
framework. Controlled communication on the other hand, 
endeavours to establish a condition in which the parties see 
their relationships as posing a problem to be solved. 
Neither side is more right than the other or wrong than the 
other .•• 
The role of the third party is to establish a condition in 
which all the parties join with it in defining, identifying 
and solving the problem". 
The above exposition of the role of the third party outlines 
certain specific requirements which must be fulfilled by the third 
party if it is to be effective in the context of controlled commu-
nication. Burton (1969:63-64) specifies four of these qualifica-
tions as follows 
(1) "Panel members should be ignorant of the situation in the 
sense of having made no prior study of the situation and 
having no partisan attitude towards the situation under 
discussion." 
Although there are well-founded psychological reasons why 
resolution of a conflict should come from the parties 
themselves and not be imposed or suggested by any third 
parties, there are also reasons which relate to analysis. 
"It is only the parties that can point to the relevant 
issues as they perceive them the conflict is at least in 
part a perceived relationship, and only the parties can 
describe and explain some aspects of it" (Burton, 1969:63). 
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(2) "Panel members should be political and social scientists who 
have worked extensively in the fields of conflict, including 
related areas of decision-making, perception, deterrence, 
escalation, and functionalism." 
Burton asserts somewhat unfairly that, diplomats, 
journalists, historians and others usually do not have this 
kind of academic background and can therefore make no 
effective contribution in this context. The role of the 
third party is to make available a corpus of specialized 
knowledge which is of practical use in the process of 
negotiation but of which the negotiators would normally be 
ignorant. 
(3) '~anel members who constitute the third party should neither 
impose theoretical explanations nor suggest political 
solutions." 
(4) '~anel members should possess the ability to empathize and 
identify with both parties. This is an essential 
requirement."Burton's experience has been that political 
scientists with a "systems perspective" find it easier to 
identify in this way. [27] 
Mitchell (1981:77) provides a useful summary of the 
functions of third parties in the context of a problem-solving 
workshop. He notes the following functions : 
(a) '~upportive, in that they require that the 'outsider' assist 
the client by offering sympathetic understanding towards the 
client's dilemma, and confidence in the latter's ability to 
find a solution eventually. 
\. 
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(b) Non-directive, in that the initiative for approaching the 
outside caseworker is often in the sole control of the 
client, and also in that the outsider does not impose any 
solution or 'cure', but assists the client to work out a 
desirable response according to the client's own perceived 
needs. 
(c) Non-condemnatory, in that the caseworker offers no reactions 
to the client's behaviour in terms of right and wrong, or of 
approval or disapproval according to moral standards. 
(d) Self-determinate, in that the search for acceptable 
solutions is largely in the hands of the client, the 
caseworker merely helping to bring about some adjustment 
between the client and his total environment, according to 
the perceived needs of the client, rather than the needs of 
the environment, some set of externally imposed rules or the 
caseworker himself. 
(e) Analytical, in that part of the basic case-work approach is 
the clarifying of the client's perception of his actual 
situation, by helping him to see more clearly the nature of 
'outer' reality and his own relationship to it. 11 
Before the actual process of controlled communication begins 
to take place, some preliminary arrangements are made. Burton and 
his associates found it useful to conduct a seminar before a 
workshop actually began with the academic panel and any other 
scholars who might be interested. Propositions were then formulated 
that appeared to be relevant to the situation: comparable conflict 
situations were discussed; and the main questions which needed to 
be asked were listed."The effectiveness of controlled communication 
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is frequently proportionate to the degree to which the panel can 
expose, bring to bear and utilize relevant knowledge in the 
presence of the negotiators, and so preparation along these lines. 
is essential. 
11 
Preliminary arrangements are also made with regard to 
seating. The party on the left of the chairman is often 
unconsciously perceived to be the one discriminated against. Both 
parties must be in a position to focus on the chairman or on active 
members of the panel and must also be able to avoid the 
embarrassment, in the early stages, of talking across the table to 
the opposing party. Yet both parties must be able to talk directly 
when they feel free to do so. 
"There is no agenda. The purpose of the meeting should be 
made clear in the invitation, and is then further clarified by the 
chairman's introductory remarks. The parties are invited at a very 
early stage in the proceedings to describe the conflict as they see 
it. Official presentations of the case, replete with accusations 
and counter-accusat~ons, then follow." 
After these expositions are complete (this normally takes up 
at least one day), questions are asked by panel members and by the 
parties (De Reuck, 1974:67; Mitchell, 1973:124), 
When these .important preliminary arrangements have been 
completed, the actual process of control of communication may 
begin. 
The strategies of control used in the Burtonian model 
'resemble those of the clinical psychoanalyst, the casewor.ker, the 
industrial psychologist and the family counsellor. They take for 
granted the existence of stereotypes and fixations."Burton 
(1969:68-69), comments as follows : 
"The experience of the caseworker, and the 'supportive' 
approach of the caseworker, are most relevant; caseworkers 
have had to face the problems involved when identification 
with a party is essential, when approval is necessary of 
actions within the context of their enactment, while still 
maintaining the objectivity that is needed to ask the 
appropriate question or to make the leading comment". 
For the effective control of communication, 'the inter-
national analyst requires many of the same techniques, especially 
those used for reducing the level of tension in the interviewee; 
for helping the respective parties to focus on the central issues; 
for assisting parties to make difficult admissions; for breaking 
down defence mechanisms; and for influencing the judgement of the 
parties involved." 
In the view of Burton and his associates,"clarification, 
the generation of insights into the position of each party by the 
opposing one, correction of perceptions, explanation of inter-
national processes of interactions, all seem to require the tech-
niques, skills and experience of the caseworker"(De Reuck, 1974: 
68-69). 
The techniques of psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, group 
therapy and resolution of conflict between parties to disputes all 
have much in common. One of the most important common factors in 
all these techniques is that the third party provides a frame of 
reference. Third parties should never indulge in evaluation of the 
various positions taken by the conflicting parties. For exampl~ "the 
panel should not make pronouncements as to whether behaviour is 
right or wrong, legal or illegal, just or unjust, defensive or 
aggressive"(Burton, 1969:70). 
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The entire concept of controlled communication rests on the 
assumption that conflict· is not an analogy of an economic struggle 
II 
for scarce resources, in which gain implies loss by another; rather 
it is based on the assumption that analysis will reveal, after 
perceptions have been duly corrected, that neither side may be 
required to compromise and that solutions may be found in terms 




The basic assumption is that a conflict relationship 
contains "alterable components" such as perception. 
The third party (in Burton's case a panel of social 
scientists), fulfil specific functions in situations of control-
led communication. 
These functions are : 
(1) to provide a framework for the analysis of conflict; 
(2) to supply theoretical inputs; and 
(3) to show (to the parties involved) that their particular 
conflict is not unique (and thus not less susceptible to 
analysis and resolution than has already been the case with 
other resolved conflicts)."The panel refers constantly to 
other situations that have similar characteristics, for 
example, long-standing communal conflicts, traditional 
antagonisms, colonial histories, and experiences that relate 
to third party intervention"(Burton, 1969:71). 
In the experience of Burton and his associates, the basic 
and most specific techniques of control for achieving their 
purposes are those calculated to promote abstract discussion of the 
concrete situation. '~bstract models help parties to observe the 
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basis of conflict and in particular to discern the processes and 
effects of escalation"(Burton, 1969:72) (author's own emphasis). 
One of the main objectives of controlled communication is to 
make the parties aware of the processes of perception and their 
relationship to conflict. De Reuck (1974:70) sees this as the 
rationale behind controlled communication when he writes 
"The proximate aim of controlled communication is to help 
the parties to redefine their situation so that both parties 
perceive it as a joint predicament, jointly to be solved, 
and to provide them with a common language for communication 
: it. is in short, to enable the parties to create for 
themselves a common universe of discourse". 
The chief means of control relate to an understanding of 
perception and to the establishment of "true" and "false" 
inferences. The exercise amounts to "reperception", 11 ••• and there 
can be no reperception in the absence of a realisation that 
different perceptions are possible" (Burton, 1969:73). 
Control depends to a large extent upon an understanding by 
the participants of the reasons for their attitudes and responses 
and upon the realisation that there is a possibility of harbouring 
false perception. If circumstances permit, some demonstration of 
visual perceptions is usually attempted. [28] The initial problem 
in controlled communication is to demonstrate that these mirror 
images exist (a favourable image of itself and unfavourable one of 
the other party)."The important point is that both sides must 
realize for themselves that their perceptions and interpretations 
may indeed be false"(Burton, 1969:74; De Reuck, 1974:70). 
Apart from the process of "reperception", the intensity of 
communication is gradually enhanced by introducing appropriate 
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models of the conflict being discussed at well-timed stages during 
the proceedings. 
_Models of this kind are utilized in order to suggest 
explanations and to imply possible solutions. A model of a communal 
conflict, for example, might suggest the need for a federal 
structure in which one legislature passes laws which provide for 
common needs while separate legislatures take care of the ethnic or 
group needs in a multi-ethnic community. Clearly, there is a danger 
inherent in this procedure : the panel might easily become both 
evaluative and prescriptive by making suggestions which ideally 
should emanate from the parties themselves. Burton (1969:84) 
stresses that model building should develop out of the discussion 
and should not be a forum in which the scholars present introduce 
their own preferred options, The need for just"the Pight mix of 
balance, flextbility and timing is vital since it is part of the 
function of panel members to introduce new information and ideas 
into the total situation."But the models should never be introduced 
in such a way that the conflicting parties sense that they are 
being pressurized by the panel."Solutions should always ultimately 
arise out of the discussions·themselves ''. 
Once control has been effectively established and once 
models have been proposed and discussed which explain important 
aspects of the conflict to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, 
then the next stage is to explore areas of functional and regional 
cooperation as a preliminary step towards a possible solution. 






'Functional cooperation'may be considered in three different 
I contexts.'~irst, there are those areas of investigation relevant to 
the analysis of conflict which require cooperation between the 
parties. Secondly, there are functional activities which are 
necessary if conflict is not to reoccur. These invariably relate to 
suspected sources or bases of conflict. In a communal conflict, for 
example, it is necessary to determine the critical levels of 
minorities, and where such minorities exist. It is also necessary 
to establish the relationship between ethnic conflict and levels of 
poverty. The third context in which functional cooperation is 
necessary is in the definition of common aims, the realization of 
alternative means of achieving existing objectives, and the 
evolution of institutional means of cooperation "(Burton, 1969: 90; 
Burton, 1972a:27), 
'Regional cooperation'offers a framework in which negotiation 
of functional cooperation may take place. By "regionalism", Burton 
(1969:95) means "cooperation, whether or not formally structured, 
between all states within a defined area (exluding any states 
outside that area) in all matters of inter-state interest". In 
Burton's opinion, SEATO and similar defence pacts are not regional 
arrangements : ,they include states which are outside the region and 
are essentially butward-looking'since their very raison d'etre is 
to oppose states in the same or in other regions. For Burton, 
regional arrangements must by definition be 'inward-looking;' they 
should only be concerned with the interests of the states in the 
region. 
Burton's views about regionalism have been strongly 
influenced by the writing of Russett (1967) (29], and Yalem. [30] 
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For Burton and his associates, both'functional'and'regional 
cooperation' provide a first step toward the eventual resolution or 
termination of conflict. The difference is between, on one hand, 
attempting to construct an imaginative compromise which will 
protect the interests of all the parties concerned, and, on the 
other hand, permitting parties to work together and so create 
whatever structure will be appropriate. As an example of this kind 
of cooperation Burton (1972a:27) cites the case of Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots who share common needs such as electricity, water 
supplies, communications, and so on. At the same time, they possess 
their own distinctive cultural identities and interests. Each 
group, therefore, has its own set of loyalties, but these separate 
loyalties are not an insuperable barrier to communal and political 
cooperation. 
Suggested "solutions" will always fail to determine an 
agreed line of demarcation since no obvious ones exist. But 
functional cooperation in areas such as education, tourism, and 
development are possible. The usual experience is that it i~ 
impossible to superimpose structures on different cultural and 
regional groups, but that the provision of common needs within a 
centralised administration is acceptable. At present, for example, 
most education planning done by Greeks takes little account of 
Turkish needs, while control of tourism and development are also in 
Greek hands. Nevertheless, divisions are being consolidated. 
In the Burtonian model, the promotion of functional 
cooperation is the positive step which is undertaken by the third 
party once the analysis has been completed, once, that is, 
conditions have become favourable to a functional approach. It is 
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not practical for the third party merely to leave the conflicting 
parties to their own devices in this regard. Their relationships 
are still actively influenced by mutual distrust:' There is, 
furthermore, an absence of legitimate machinery for consultation~' 
The role of the third party does not end after analysis has been 
completed and controlled communication is established : this stage 
is merely the precondition for further activities by means of which 
new relationships and institutions should emerge. 
Burton also pays limited attention to "conflict avoidance" 
which he describes as "a more challenging objective because it 
involves prediction" (Burton, 1969:100). Conflict avoidance is 
"of two different kinds : one refers to probable or anticipated 
conflicts; the other is concerned with the maintenance of harmo-
nious relationships between parties who are already cooperating in 
a close working relationship and who do not anticipate the 
emergence of new conflicts"(Burton, 1969:101). 
To conclude this part of the discussion, it should be 
stressed that the primary purpose of controlled communication is 
"to bring into high relief"the nature of relations existing between 
parties in conflict, and by this means, "to adduce an analogy to 
the state of world society"(Burton, 1969:131). For Burton, 
controlled communication may be construed as a 'logical paradigm' of 
approaches to the study of international relations, and secondly, 
"·to the appropriate handling and analysis of conflict in that 
sphere}'Controlled communication is therefore representative of 
one particular approach to the study of international relations 
among a variety of others such as the historical approach, the 
philosophical approach, the institutional/legal approach, the 
systems approach, and general theorising. 
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The philosophical basis of controlled communication posits 
that not all conflict necessarily eventuates in violence and. war. 
In addition, although it might be demonstrated that 'world society' 
always contains within itself the potential for war, it does not 
necessarily follow that world society'should remain in this 
condition. Indeed, it has been suggested [31] that a condition of 
"anarchy" is 'one common to every society before it evolves into a 
community in which common values are shared'! In this regard, Burton 
(1969:180) comments as follows : 
"The technique of controlled communication is a direct 
challenge to the assumption that international society is 
always in a condition of conflict because of irreconcilable 
differences in interests among states. The hypothesis is 
that conflict, like all relationships, is a subjective 
condition capable of alteration, and that avoidance and 
resolution of conflict are possible by wholly non-coercive 
means". 
Having outlined the domain assumptions which underlie the 
Burtonian model of controlled communication, the research setting 
within which the model was applied, as well as its methodology and 
procedures, we shall now attempt a critical assessment of its 
strengths and weaknesses. 
5 ,5 Critique 
From an analytical point of view, the basic procedural and 
methodological aspects of the Burtonian model of conflict 
resolution may be presented as follows : 
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BASIC METHODOLOGICAL STEPS IN BURTON'S MODEL 
Step 1 Identification of issues and parties. 
(Issues define the parties which need to be 
representative.) 
Step 2 Establishment of communication between parties. 
(Special techniques are applied.) 
·Step 3 Control of communication. 
(Modelling of conflict.) 
Step 4 Identification of areas of functional/regional 
cooperation. 
(This is done primarily by the parties themselves 
with the assistance of a third party.) 
Step 5 Conflict resolution. 
(Also conflict avoidance.) 
This schematic outline of the procedural and methodological 
. 
steps in the Burtonian model indicates some common features with 
the problem-solving workshop as previously discussed. As one finds 
in these workshops, Burton himself begins with a definition of the 
conflict. This is done with reference to the issues and parties 
involved. In his view, the issues define the parties. The behaviour 
of the parties is, above all, influenced by their perceptions of 
the interests and issues in dispute. 
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While the Burtonian model does not provide for a technical 
rating of conflict (as is the case with some other problem-solving 
workshops), it does provide for the definition of conflict in terms 
of the diagnosis of underlying causes or sources of conflict. 
Burton's first step therefore broadly corresponds to that of the 
problem-solving workshop. 
The second procedural step - the establishment of 
communication between parties - corresponds to the "gathering of 
information" phase in the model of Levi and Benjamin (1977). In 
both these models, the parties themselves provide the important 
information inputs. The role of the third party is essentially 
to facilitate the process by asking appropriate questions and to 
interpret the information to the parties with a view to 
establishing a common frame of reference. 
Step 3 (the "control of information") or, to use Burton's 
terminology, the "control of communication", is a more.elaborate 
and structured phase than its equivalent in the model of Levi and 
Benjamin. Their "influence attempts'.' correspond to Burton's concept 
of "control of communication". In both cases, the role of the third 
party is non-coercive and supportive. 
Step 4 in the Burtonian model - identification of areas of 
"functional/regional cooperation" - combines the processes of 
"deciding among options" and "creating new solutions" which one 
finds in the model of Levi and Benjamin. 
In both models, this process precedes the eventual 
resolution or termination of conflict while the functions of the 
third party at this stage are essentially similar. Both these 
models intend to arrive at a redefinition of the conflict by the 
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parties themselves so as to make the conflict more amenable to 
resolution. "Reperception" is the key phrase in the Burtonian 
model. 
The fifth and final step in Burton's model (conflict 
resolution), is also the last step in the model of Levi and 
Benjamin. Burton attempts to move beyond this so as to include 
the avoidance of conflict as a further objective. 
The Burtonian model has been criticized on both substantive 
and methodological grounds. Yalem (1971:263:273), for instance, 
criticized the model for its reliance on "subordinate officials" 
rather than on local community and national leaders. One feels, 
however, that Yalem misses the point which Burton frequently 
II 
emphasizes in his writings (Burton, 1969:40-48) : while these 
officials are subordinate to the head of state or local community 
leaders they are, nevertheless, sufficiently close to the top 
leadership and trusted by them to ensu~e that any insights and 
information gained during the controlled communication exercise 
will be referred directly back to national or communal leaders~ In 
adqition, the information so imparted will have maximum impact 
because it comes from a ~rusted sourc~!- a person or persons who 
have been delegated to act as representative of the top leadership 
for the duration of the discussions. The additional point should be 
made that controlled communication;' by virtue of its insistence on 
the academic, non-official, and non-committing nature of the 
discussions, never requires that representatives of any party 
occupy formal or official positions in the decision-making 
II 
machinery of that party. 
. 200 
Yalem (1971:263:266) also criticizes the fact that a party to a 
conflict is initially represented by a subordinate representative 
rather than a formal government or leadership group. But this .... 
naturally depends upon the level and type of conflict which is 
being discussed and analysed. Both communal and international 
conflicts are complex phenomena and involve many parties and issues 
as well as many interrelated patterns of interaction. It may well 
be the case that the relevant participants who are appropriate at 
one level of conflict are quite different from those who are needed 
to negotiate at another level. 
In view of Yalem's criticism, it should be emphasized that 
the technique of controlled communication should not be regarded as 
a substitute for traditional forms of negotiation and settlement. 
Mitchell (1973:124) comments 
"Indeed, the principles underlying the technique - that only 
the parties themselves can finally resolve the conflict -
would preclude such an attitude. Altering attitudes and 
perceptions towards both the conflict situation and the 
opposing party has always been regarded as a prior step to 
the two parties engaging in direct negotiation 'off their 
own bat', without any attempt to impose solutions by third 
parties. Hence, controlled communication is a preliminary to 
direct, two-party negotiations, and not a substitute for 
t,hem". 
Another substantive problem raised in Yalem's article is 
"that of ascertaining whether the new insights gained during the 
workshop are retained when the representatives return to their 
normal environment or whether the pressures on each individual make 
him/her revert to his/her original perceptions of the dispute and 







There is also an associated problem." Even if changed 
perceptions are indeed retained, can these be successfully and 
comprehensively communicated to relevant decision-making bodies and 
w~ll they have sufficient impact on these people to affect a 
solution to the dispute?" 
With regard to the first problem, Yalem makes the following 
acute observation : 
" ..• The problem of re-entry of the officials into their own 
societies was not discussed (in Conflict and Communication). 
It is possible that the clarifying effects of controlled 
communication could be negated by nationalist pressures 
after re-entry" (Yalem, 1971: 267). 
Moreover, the kind of political culture and ideology, for example, 
in democratic and socialist systems, may also influence the problem 
of re-entry. 
This whole problem of 1altered'individual attitudes so as to 
minimize personal stress in a given environment is an extremely 
complex one. The participants in controlled communication exercises 
are by no means immune to such tendencies. Doob (1970:107), writing 
about his own experience with problem-solving workshops, detected a 
marked shift in attitudes and positions back to those which had 
existed at the beginning of his discussion two or three days before 
the end of the group meetings. From this he hypothesized that this 
" took place in preparation for a return to the normal, conflict 
environment of the participants which was far removed from the 
"abnormal" environment of the problem-solving workshop." 
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One cannot deny that Yalem has drawn attention to one of the 
most serious'problems which affects any general use of controlled 
communication and its allied techniques. Anyone closely involved in 
a destructive conflict situation must be under strong psychological 
pressure to maintain a "perceptual and attitudinal status quo, or 
to revert to it once back in the environment which first called 
forth such a set of percepts" (Mitchell, 1973:125). 
One of the problems which still needs to be more fully 
investigated is the relative ease with which individuals from' 
different levels of the conflict (and presumably with quite 
different experiences) manage to change their perceptions about 
the conflict and about their opponents. It may be one thing for 
decision-makers, remote from the damage and loss caused by the 
"enemy", to admit that they have been mistaken about the opposing 
party's goals, motivations, and behaviour; it would, presumably, 
be quite another matter to attempt to bring about a similar change 
in people who have suffered deep personal loss or injury in the 
progress of the conflict. 
Another problem, frequently avoided in discussion about 
controlled communication is about the danger which faces 
participants in an exercise once they have returned home, and 
brought their changed perceptions with them. For example, in the 
case of Leonard Doob and his associates in the Stirling Workshop 
that concerned itself with the conflict in Northern Ireland, some 
participants were subjected to considerable intimidation and 
victimisation. 
A more basic and much more interesting problem, from a 
theoretical point of view, which has received hardly any attention, 
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is whether there are any crucial stages during a conflict inter-
action when controlled communication (or any other mediatory 
initiative) is sought and welcomed by the participants, and whether 
there is any particular stage when controlled communication is most 
effective in having a significant impact on the subsequent course 
of the conflict interaction. 
In the light of previous discussion;'such a stage (if it 
could ever be accurately established) would be likely to occur when 
the attitudes and perceptions of both parties are in the process of 
becoming less rigid and more open to change - a time when any new 
insights should-have the'maximum restructuring effect' and could be 
communicated with the least likely damage to those who are 
presenting them." (Personal communication by C.R. Mitchell) 
In Mitchell's view (1973:126), "the more fluid and uncertain 
the situation, the more likely it will be that controlled 
communication will be a welcome initiative." 
There are, as yet, even more fundamental criticisms of the 
assumptions which underly the technique of controlled 
communication. Both Yalem (1971:263-273) and Cot (1972:31-39) 
focused on two major problems. The first is the perennial one of 
the essential 'subjectivity' of conflict, and the precise meaning of 
the concept "subjective". The second problem"is the question of the 
validity of utilizing findings from other disciplines and fields of 
enquiry to validate the application of controlled communication and 
other problem-solving workshop techniques in the resolution of 
international conflict situations~ 
It is quite possible to oversimplify what is meant by 
conflict being essentially "subjective" rather than "objective". 
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Yalem (1971), for example, seems to share the common assumption 
that the use of the term "subjective" implies that conflicts are 
merely due to misperceptions which only need to be corrected for 
all problems to disappear before all concerned can be united in 
mutual admiration. Using this assumption, he makes the valid point 
thatJ 11 ••• if the subjective character of conflict is not accepted, 
then controlled communication must also be rejected; for if 
conflicts of interest are considered to be objective, the 
alteration of subjective perceptions and attitudes towards conflict 
may have little effect on conflict achievement" (YalemJ 1971:265). 
Later in this article, he further comments that, " •.• factors that 
precipitate conflict arise out of objective incompatibilities of 
interest, as well as subjective distortions and faulty images. An 
improvement in communication patterns may make states more rather 
than less aware of their differences" (Yalem, 1971:286). (Own 
emphasis.) 
Both Yalem (1971:263-265) and Cot (1972-31-39) have 
criticized Burton for assuming too readily that conflicts are 
"subjective" and that "objective" contradictions and structural 
bases of conflict are not important. 
In this context it might be valuable to examine 
precisely what conflict researchers - such as Burton - mean by 
II 
the term "subjective". It seems that they are saying something 
rather more than that violent or conflicting behaviour occurs 
because individuals, human groups, or nations misperceive 
both the situation itself as well as their adversaries. Of 
course it is true that most conflicts do contain elements of 
this false evaluation by one or both of the parties, and 
some may be de-escalated (in theory, at least) merely by 
205 
correcting a false impression of the actual long-term goals of an 
opposing party and its leadership. The public and private positions 
of decision-makers may well be at variance. All leaders, whether 
trade union, communal, political, or religious, are forced to 
accommodate the expectati?ns of different audiences while their 
most significant audience must always remain (in their estimation) 
that constituency from whom they obtain their most support and the 
legitimation of their leadership. Thus their public positions 
necessarily harmonize more frequently with the expectations of 
their supporters rather than with those of the leaders and 
followers of any opposing party~ It is for this reason that, in 
most conflicts, the likelihood of incorrect perceptions on the part 
of the people involved is very real. It becomes particularly 
difficult, for example, for one leadership group to demonstrate to 
the opposing party that its own goals has modified (or that they 
were never the ones attributed to them in the first place). As the 
conflict proceeds over a period of time, it becomes progressively 
more difficult for the leaders of one side to assess the actual 
long-term goals, the fundamental fears, the existing level of 
hostility, and the interpretations of the situation entertained by 
their opponents. Whatever the actual details in individual conflict 
are, there are in most cases at least elements of such false 
perceptions and incorrect assumptions, and in extreme (but probably 
rare) cases, the problem may be entirely based on misapprehensions 
about the opponent's goals, intentions, and motivations. It was, 
for example, extremely difficult for Turkish Cypriots to accept 
that Greek Cypriots had abandoned the idea of union with Greece 
(Enosis) by 1967 after they had, only a few years before, gained 
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Cypriot independence from British rule under the banner of that 
particular slogan. (Personal communication by C.R. Mitchell) 
Unfortunately, as Burton has remarked elsewhere, in most 
international and intercommunal conflicts, there are few 
opportunities for. "reality testing", and "controlled communication 
does, among other things, provide such an all-too-rare opportunity" 
(Mitchell, 1973:127). 
What about other more specific interpretations of the 
concept "subjective conflict"? There are at least three ways in 
which conflict may be regarded as being essentially subjective : 
11 (1) The conflict may be over values which are not in limited 
supply. Alternatively, it may be possible to redefine the 
nature of the conflict in such a way as to suggest 
alternative modes of non-conflicting behaviour.for both 
parties involved. A dispute over territory, for example, 
might appear to be wholly "objective", but if the long-term 
goal of both conflicting parties were a substantial increase 
in national wealth, this could be achieved by a collabora-
tive exploitation of the disputed territory. On the other 
hand, the territorial conflict may be based on a feeling 
entertained by both sides that their security is threatened. 
But "security" is not a commodity in a fixed supply. A 
satisfactory solution would, therefo're, be one in which both 
parties were to gain an increase in "security" without each 
side compromising the security of the other party .involved. 
(2) No goal for any party (however defined) can be assigned a 
fixed and immutable value. A consequence of this is that the 
relative value which a party attached to all goals in terms 
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of preference and importance might well change over a period 
of time. Such a change could lead to the devaluation of a 
particular goal which in the past had brought the party into 
conflict with its adversary. In such circumstances, the 
sacrifice of a goal might not be such sacrifice after all. 
It is, however, more often the case that multiple goals are 
pursued simultaneously, whilst the particular order of 
importance attached to the whole spectrum of goals may alter 
over a period of time or according to the wishes of whatever 
leadership faction happens to be in power. This means that 
the evaluation of a party's goals in the context of any 
conflict is essentially a matter of subjective calculation. 
(3) The reassessment of costs (or sacrifices) in relation to the 
realization of goals is again an essentially subjective 
phenomenon and depends upon variables internal to the 
parties themselves." (Personal-communication by C.R. Mitchell, 
London, September 1983) 
Mitchell (1973:128) persuasively argues the case for the 
subjective nature of conflict as follows : 
"If any single theme underlies all the above arguments, it 
is that, while a conflict may be objective at a particular 
point in time, changes in the parties' objectives, prefer-
ences, evaluations, and calculations that occur over a 
period of time render it a changeable and hence an intensely 
subjective phenomenon. Conflict may be described as 
subjective, in the sense that changes occur within the 
parties themselves (and in their orientations and percep-
tions to the dispute forming part of their environment), 
rather than in the "objective" situation, external to them 
from which the original mutually incompatible goals arose." 
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The most interesting point about the subjective approach is 
not that, all goals are subjective (and hence changeable over time), 
but that research suggests that some ~lasse~ of goals are easily 
changeable while others seem to be completely fixed even over long 
periods. It is in this regard that Burton's generalized statement 
that all goals are ultimately subjective is least satisfactory, 
since he fails to distinguish between those goals (and those 
attitudes and perceptions) which are more or less amenable to 
change and those which are static and intractable. It would, for 
example, be very difficult to change a sixty-year-old rural 
Afrikaner's perceptions of the nature and evils of interracial 
marriages - at least in a short space of time. To change a younger, 
urban Afrikaner's views with regard to a peripheral problem about 
which he has no strong opinions and little reliable information 
would, one presumes, be an easier task. 
Mitchell (1973:129) suggests that it may be possible to 
"arrange goals (as well as perceptions and attitudes) along a 
continuum, from those goal-types which can be easily altered at 
II 
one end to those which are"almost impossible to alter (over however 
long a period of time) and which would remain intractable in the 
face of the most severe threats, the most subtle bargaining, or 
even the most successful controlled communication exercise at the 
other end. " 
If such classification of goal-types could be developed,"it 
might enable an observer to predict with some success when con-
flicts are over rigid goals (which involve rigid perceptions and 
attitudes) and which are hence more likely to become more aggrava-
ted by an exponential accumulation of incompatibility over time, 
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or when conflicts are rooted in reasonably flexible goals which 
could easily be changed and become compatible with those of the 
other party so that the conflict process has a possibility of 
becoming beneficial with a resultant cessation of damaging conflict 
behaviour."To summarize this argument : it -seems that all goals 
(and hence all conflicts) are to some extent subjective, but that 
some are more subjective than others. 
In turning to the second problem - that of using analogous 
reasoning to support the use of controlled communication as a 
technique for the resolution of international conflict - we note 
that a number of points are relevant. Yalem (1971:263-266) 
II 11 • criticizes Burton's over-ready acceptance of this method of 
justifying the use of controlled communication because of the lack 
of significant and convincing data generated by statistically 
significant controlled communicaton exercises. Yalem (1971:268) 
asserts that it is " ••• highly dubious that validity may be 
established by means of generalizations adduced from data adduced 
from other fields of enquiry. Scientific method requires that the 
source of confirmation or disconfirmation of hypotheses be drawn 
from data generated within the subject matter under consideration". 
Any response to this criticism depends, in part, on which 
particular elements of controlled communication as a resolution 
technique are justified by resort to analogous reasoning. There 
are, in fact, two separate aspects of the technique supported by 
data drawn from outside the actual universe of controlled commu-
nication exercises. Burton tends to confuse these two aspects 
throughout Conflict and Communication, so that it is at times 
difficult to tell whether or not he is attempting to justify the 
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technique of controlled communication by the use of analogous 
examples. 
The two separate aspects of the technique of controlled 
communication are, firstly, its use as a technique for developing 
new insights into a conflict and for altering individual 
participants' perceptions of the nature of the conflict and of 
their opponents - thus providing a new input into the interaction 
pattern involved in the conflict; the second aspect is its use as 
a technique for resolving the conflict itself - peacefully and in 
a non-coercive fashion. 
In the first case, there seems to be some a priori justifi-
cation for accepting analogous reasoning as a valid and appropriate 
method. There is a considerable amount of evidence from the field 
of small group dynamics and social psychology about the probable 
effects of small group interactions structured in the same way as 
controlled communication workshops. The rules of the game are 
essentially similar in all these problem-solving exercises. 
Claims for the second case, however, need to be treated 
with considerable caution. Analogous reasoning may, indeed, not be 
appropriate in this case, but'~hat it cannot depend upon the 
contention that international conflicts (and the international 
environment in which they manifest themselves) are unique or are, 
at least, fundamentally different in nature from any other form of 
organised, violent (or even non-violent) conflict."[31] If one 
takes the contrary position on this issue, namely, that there are 
sufficient similarities between conflict situations and processes 
at different levels of interaction to render such a study a unified 
one, then the practice of analogous reasoning is seen to be less 
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problematic. Burton takes such a view of the inherent dynamic of 
conflict irrespective of the level of interaction where conflict is 
to be found. 
Mitchell (1973:130) differs strongly from Yalem's funda-
mental objection to the use of analogous reasoning in support of 
controlled communication. (Yalem's objection is that one cannot 
transfer findings from one "level" - the international - because 
these two levels are fundamentally different, and that this 
"fundamental" division is one generally recognised by political 
scientists.) Yalem (1971) cites Hans Morgenthau as being typical 
of those political scientists who uphold this distinction. However, 
more than a decade earlier, Alger (1962:414-420) argued that 
politics in an international setting is"not qualitatively different 
from that within the framework of national units~' 
Yalem more specifically argues that findings about conflict 
and its resolution which are obtained from the study of intra-
national disputes (religious, organisational, communal, indus-
trial, linguistic) can offer limited insights into conflicts at the 
international level. 
It may be argued, in response to Yalem's criticism, that 
many national and international disputes are so intertwined as to 
make separate analysis extremely difficult. One could, in addition, 
also pose the question as to whether this is in fact the case or 
not. 
II 
Yalem's other main point in justifying the fundamental 
hiatus between international and other kinds of political behaviour" 
is that the international system is 11 ••• still primarily dominated 
by intense rivalries of power and ideology, manifested in objective 
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conflicts of interest" (Yalem, 1971:271) so that any _analysis which 
" ••• seriously neglects the primacy of power and threat processes 
operative in the international system •.• " is both misleading and 
inaccurate (Yalem, 1971:268). 
It is not our purpose here to enter into an extended 
discussion of the nature of the international system, and whether 
or not it is fundamentally different in all respects from national 
or intra-nationalsystems, but it does seem appropriate to make the 
general point that there seems to be many processes in intra-
national politics (defining such a term as broadly as possible) 
that are equally characterised by power and threat processes. (One 
could cite many examples. Let me name only two : the Kurds' search 
for autonomy within an Arab-dominated Iraq, and the 1976 and most 
recent urban unrest in South Africa.) Similarly, one can refer to a 
sufficient number of examples of bollaborative behaviour
1
within the 
international system to raise, at least, the possibility that, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively international relationships may 
not be primarily dominated by rivalry or "objective" conflicts of 
interest 1ny more (or less) than are relationships within national 
societies '{Mitchell, 1973:130). 
Returning to Yalem's central argument - that of using 
analogous reasoning to support the use of controlled communication 
as a technique for the analysis and resolution of international 
conflict - research conducted by Burton and other scholars [33] 
reveals many parallells and analogies (as well as, not 
surprisingly, some differences) between some conflicts at the 
international level and some conflicts which take place within the 
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confines of ostensibly separate, sovereign and independent state 
entities. 
Cot (1972:35) is highly sceptical about"the systemati'c 
extrapolation to an international level of the results of the study 
of conflict in small groups." [ 34] In Cot's opinion, Burton 
underestimates the 'specificity'of the international system. 
Cot's disagreement about basic principles has consequences 
for the analysis of conflict resolution. One may recall the classic 
distinction between the control and resolution of conflicts. The 
control of a conflict limits the extent of hostility and the 
intensity of the conflict·. Cot cites the example of the UNFICYP (UN 
Peace-keeping Forces in Cyprus) which effectively limited the costs 
in human lives. One may note, however, that these actions were in 
no way intended to solve the conflict and may well eventually 
complicate it by, for example, maintaining the status quo of an 
essentially artificial situation. 
The distinction between 'crisis contror and 'conflict 
resolution'is at the basis of the separation of the authorities 
invested with peace-keeping functions and those asked to assist in 
solving the conflict. Cot finds Burton's criticism of this 
distinction difficult to understand. He comments (1972:35-36): 11 It 
seems to me that to entrust the mediator with executive functions 
would be to give him just that authority that Burton denies him." 
Cot finds himself in agreement with Burton's analysis on 
"systematic levels". A conflict is composed of a series of tensions 
at different systemic levels. Burton, however, seems to under-
estimate this fact in his analysis and he appears to be excessively 
optimistic when he states that an agreement at a local level will 
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be acceptable at the other levels. Cot argues that, for example, an 
agreement between Israelis and Palestinians will not automatically 
be satisfactory and acceptable to the other Arab states whose 
internal political balance may depend on the continuation of the 
conflict. Cot feels that, to make the proposition useful, one 
should reverse it and say that an agreement between Israelis and 
Palestinians is impossible so long as certain internal tensions in 
the other Arab states have not disappeared. The "spillover effects" 
which Burton talks about seem to be rather more important than he 
cares to admit (Cot, 1972:36). 
When writing about conditions of successful mediation, 
Burton examines questions of procedure (for examplel'Which 
I\T II mediator? now should he act? and so forth). He seems to imply that 
any mediation is liable to succeed if only it is well conceived. He 
tends to omit the importance of the time factor. Cot (1972) and 
various other scholars [35], are, on the contrary, of the opinion 
that time is an essential element in the mediation process. The 
balance of tensions between the different systemic levels is 
constantly changing and is, at different times, more or less 
favourable to conflict resolution.'~ mediator's art then would 
largely consist of being.able to grasp the crucial or favourable 
moment and crystallize the situation at the right moment in time." 
Unfortunately, the mediator can rarely choose his moment and is 
generally called in too late. Mediation often fails simply because 
it is usually impossible to synchronise the mediation with the 
conflict. 
As a general rule, the mediator has little influence on the 
parties and none whatsoever on the underlying causes of the 
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conflict. His contribution can only be a useful analysis of the 
conflictual process. If he feels that the moment has come to 
resolve the conflict, he should try to persuade the parties that 
such resolution is possible. But he cannot force the moment. 
Burton proposes a set of procedures which are an implicit 
criticism of more traditional means of mediation. Although these 
proposals are extremely interesting, they seem to be somewhat 
unrealistic because they separate mediation and conflict. Whether 
one likes it or not, the intervention of a third party in a 
conflict is a new element in the constellation of conflictual 
factors. It certainly would be preferable if both parties were to 
negotiate directly with the mediator. It would certainly also be 
preferable if both parties were to agree simply to overlook the 
problem of "status" or "recognition". 
Burton's procedural suggestions present the same 
difficulties. They seem to be technically correct, but difficult 
or even impossible to implement. In the Cyprus conflict, for 
example, it was very difficult to find one mediator acceptable to 
both parties. [36] A panel of such mediators would have been even 
more difficult to assemble. John Burton and his associates are 
rightly proud of the record of achievements attributable to them at 
the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict in London. But Cot wonders 
whether the various parties who were invited did not accept the 
invitation "because they knew it was a game, and not real" (Cot, 
1982:37). 
Burton's emphasis on procedures, especially during the 
phases of the "control of communication" and "resolution of 
conflict", serves a specific purpose, namely, to depersonalise 
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conflict, and hence to remove subjectivity. The underlying 
rationale is that subjective conflict has to be made more objective 
through the application of specific procedures so as to make it 
more amenable to resolution. 
As a social scientist, Burton follows procedures for the 
analysis and resolution of conflict which differ markedly from 
those of the legal profession. The emphasis in the Burtonian model, 
especially during the first stages of conflict analysis, is not on 
procedures as such but rather on'perceptions'and'images! Procedures 
become important - for the reason given above - during the latter 
stages of the exercise. Cot, however, has a point when he asserts 
that most successful mediation'culminates in some or other legal 
" agreement. 
Burton's general hostility towards "compromise" seems to be 
consonant with his general lack of confidence in law. One should 
eliminate rigid solutions and conflict should be resolved by 
~ooperation.' But Burton is not very persuasive on this point. It 
seems rather optimistic to believe that "functional cooperation" 
can effectively replace all legal guarantees or compromise in 
conflict resolution. One cannot transform hostility into trust 
overnight. Even if the negotiators themselves are convinced that 
cooperation is the only alternative, one has to persuade the 
broader population and such a process takes time. Legal safeguards 
seem useful - at least during an intermediary period. Most 
successful mediation usually culminates in some or other form of 
legal agreement based on compromise anyway. Burton's hostility 
towards compromise seems to be of theoretical rather than of 
practical value. In the real world compromise is an essential 
element of successful bargaining and of third-party intervention. 
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Like Yalem (1971), Cot's principal objection relates to 
Burton's conception of conflict. Communicat~on and perception are 
important dimensions of a conflict relationship. Distortions of 
perception and communication do explain many things. But these 
distortions themselves need to be explained. Cot argues in a 
different way that the subjective elements are the reflection of 
the objective elements of conflict. He cites the example of the two 
Cypriot communities : 'they may hate each other (subjective 
elements), but there are objective factors of antagonism (economic 
inequality, social differentiation, ownership of land by the 
Greeks, etc.) which underlie these subjective manifestations of the 
conflict 'tCot, 1972:34). 
Contrary to Burton, Cot believes that'~ne must accept the 
primacy of the objective factors of conflict : the economic, 
social, and political contradictions of the situation."In the case 
of Cyprus, Cot argues, any study should begin with an assessment of 
existing objective elements of conflict. One should also study the 
conflicts in the other interested countries (such as Greece and 
Turkey), and finally the international dimensions of the conflict. 
These contradictions balance each other, sometimes favouring the 
internal Cypriot system (the 1963 crisis), and sometimes favouring 
the international system (the London and Zurich agreements). None 
of these elements is, however, subjective (Cot, 1972:34). 
Burton's attempt to differentiate between what professional 
diplomats and the like think it takes to resolve a conflict; what 
members of academic disciplines such as political science think it 
takes; and what the empirical scientist thinks it takes, is useful 
because few of us consider entrenched disciplinary positions as to 
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be in the realm of 'folk belief'. He proposes a series of 
components and proceduresJ the sum total of which he believes will 
enable almost anyone at all to become a peacemaker. The only thing 
wrong with this idea as set forth, is that it does not adequately 
account for variations in types of conflict, in types of relation-
ships between conflicting parties, and in the cultural variable 
which affects each individual conflict. In one conflictJ mediation 
may be the way to termination; in another, legal undertakings may 
be more effective; in yet another, what Burton terms "functional 
cooperation" may be the most effective. 
In Nader's view (1972:54), if one intends to systematise or 
professionalise the role of a third party, it has to be the 
situation that defines the distinctive features to be used. This is 
different from saying that "no fixed procedures are possible". 
The general point to be made about Burton's position here 
is that, while he understands very well the importance of the 
perceptions of the parties, he has not adequately considered 
culture as a variable to be taken into account in working out any 
set of universal components of conflict resolution techniques. 
Nader (1972:55) comments : 
"He is aware of the structural differences between conflict 
such as Cyprus, the Middle East, the Vietnamese, and the 
USSR-Chinese situations, but here he is more concerned with 
sociological structure than cultural structure. In some 
cases, sociological variables such as the number of parties 
to a conflict will be an overriding factor; in other cases, 
the weight of attitudes about facing one's opponent, for 
example, will be crucial". 
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Returning to the assumptions underlying successful 
mediation, some of Burton's statements seem to be somewhat 
contradictory, as when, for example, he asserts : "An important 
principle of mediation is that the only source of information is 
the parties concerned" and where he states : "Propositions on 
conflict direct the attention of the third party to influences not 
otherwise apparent". We know from everyday experience that people 
do not necessarily verbalise what is in their minds. Nor can one 
discover only from listening to the parties what the relevant 
structural issues of a particular case may be. It is true that too 
much information (total information is in any case a logical 
impossibility) may confuse or confound the understanding of a third 
party; what is needed is a separation of the case as perceived by 
the parties from information gathered from other reliable sources. 
Burton's work, focusing on the cumulative insights of the 
Cyprus case, is encouraging for scholars who would like to see the 
I 
development of a life-history'approach to the study of different 
types of conflict situations - but it is the life history of the 
particular conflict that may well prove to be important to a more 
theoretical understanding of conflict as a social process. 
The efficacy of controlled communication as a technique for 
the analysis and resolution of conflict needs to be evaluated on 
two counts : 
"Firstly, problems which arise from the technique of 
controlled communication itself, and more specifically whether or 
not it works effectively in changing the attitudes and perceptions 
of those individuals who take part in the exercise, as well as 
factors which make for success (or failure) in bringing about such 
changes need to be evaluated. 
220 
Secondly, problems relating to the actual impact of a 
communication exercise on the substantive dispute and whether or 
not (and how) a successful exercise can contribute significantly 
(or even insignificantly) to bringing about a major change in the 
pattern of conflict interaction and the relations between the 
parties to that conflict, also needs to be evaluated"(Mitchell, 
1973: 123). 
On both of these counts, the success and outcome of Burton's 
workshop are difficult to assess. There are no detailed accounts of 
these discussions since no recordings or transcripts were made. The 
emphasis was on secrecy and the absence of official commitment so 
as to enhance the development of new and creative approaches to the 
conflict. There is therefore no official record or follow-up of 
these workshops. Kelman, who participated in the second (1966) 
workshop, provides some indication of the success (or failure) of 
controlled communication with reference to these two issues. With 
regard to the first (the changing of individual attitudes and 
perceptions), he comments : 
"The parties seem to have communicated to.each other some 
new and important facts about their respective goals and 
intentions. Some new insights about the origins and 
escalation of the conflict have apparently been developed. 
Certainly by the end of the sessions the parties were able 
to communicate with each other more freely and with a 
shared frame of reference (Kelman, 1972: 172)". 
Anthony De Reuck, a former associate of The Centre for the 
Analysis of Conflict at the University of London, and a participant 
in both the earlier pilot workshop and that of 1966, confidently 
II 
asserts that individual perceptions and attitudes had been changed 
positively '{ 1974: 70). 
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With reference to the second issue - the actual impact of a 
controlled communication exercise on the conflict - the assessment 
is far more speculative. For example, while Kelman argues that the 
"new information and insights acquired by the participants were 
transmitted to the top leaders of their own groups, because of the 
relationship of the participants to the decision-making process" 
(1972:172), he also states that, 11 ••• we can only speculate, 
however, about the extent to which and the way in which these 
entered into subsequent negotiations" (Kelman, passim.). 
Shortly after the exercise, communication between the two 
parties was resumed. It is quite likely that the exercise played 
some role in this development although we can never be certain. 
Kelman feels that, at the very least, it may have provided 'a 
mechanism for the parties to explore each others' feelings in 
a non-committal fashion and an opportunity to learn whether 
resumption of negotiations would be useful.' 
On this second count, it needs to be emphasised that Burton 
and his associates certainly do not present their approach to 
conflict and its resolution as a panacea for all conflictual ills, 
but rather as part of a more comprehensive process_toward conflict 
resolution (Burton, 1972:5-29; Burton, 1972b:41-52). Controlled 
II 
communication is essentially an exploration of relationships which 
aims at understanding the underlying causes and dynamic of 
conflict'. The aim of controlled communication is to assist the 
parties, firstly, to redefine their situation so that they perceive 
it as a 'joint predicament which may be cooperatively resolved and, 
secondly, to equip them with a common language for communication.' 
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"The process includes several interwoven strands. There is a 
negativ~ phase, in which the parties are assisted to divest 
themselves of their roles as opponents, to discard misperceptions 
of past events and to re-examine their own values and calculations 
of proposed solutions. The positive phase consists of correcting 
mutual misperceptions and a redefinition of the conflict so as to 
make it more amenable to resolution"(De Reuck, 1974:78). 
5.6 Conclusion 
In the opinion of one of the panelists who was involved in both the 
December 1965 and October 1966 meetings, the results were extremely 
encouraging. In his view "they provided the behavioural scientists 
with valuable theoretical and methodological insights, and the 
discussions themselves generated data of profound intrinsic 
interest and relevance to the continued evaluation of the conflicts 
concerned in their subsequent stages" (De Reuck, 1974:65). 
A final problem which should be mentioned concerns the 
notions of individual and collective rationality. Burton and his 
associates begin from the premise that man is rational and 
therefore capable of rational behaviour. The dynamic of their model 
is based on the assumption of collective rationality, and in this 
way it is essentially similar in its theoretical assumptions to 
game theory and simulation exercises. Collective rationality, 
especially in the processes of "control of communication", the 
identification of areas of functional cooperation, and conflict 
resolution, is made possible by following the "rules of the game" 
as suggested by the third party. This gives rise to two problems : 
223 
First, the model fails to explain how participants make the 
transition from a position of individual rationality to that of 
collective rationality. Secondly, it fails to justify how the panel 
or third party is in a position to propose the "rules of the game" 
in the first place. In practice, such a procedure implies that the 
panel or third party defines the ground rules for collective 
rationality. This may contradict Burton's view that resolution must 
ultimately come from the parties themselves. In this sense, the 
role of the third party is more than merely diagnostic : it becomes 
prescriptive as well, and of central importance for the functioning 
of the model. 
From the writings and discussions with scholars involved in 
the two workshops [37], it becomes clear that these meetings 
enabled the parties'to correct mutual misperceptions, redefine 
their situation, reassess the value of their objectives in relation 
to costs, and envisage new policy optiond~ The application of the 
technique of controlled communication thus seems to have served a 
primarily theoretical function in the sense that it provided the 
opportunity for the formulation of hypotheses about the nature and 
dynamic of conflict. In addition, these exercises served as a 
valuable learning experience for both panelists and parties alike. 
The application of the technique did not, however, result in 
the resolution of the conflict, while what impact the exercise had 
on the substantive conflict itself is uncertain. Anthony De Reuck 
(1974:65) is of the view that the controlled communication setting 
''enabled research findings to be made available to diplomats and 
decision-makers in contexts where they were relevant and in forms 
that they found to be acceptable.'' 
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Having assessed the strengths and weaknesses associated with 
the work of Burton and his associates, the next chapter attempts an 
analysis of the workshops organised under the direction of Leonard 
W. Doob, William Foltz, and their associates. This discussion will 
be on a comparative basis, with special emphasis on the similar-
ities and differences between the two approaches. 
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Endnotes to Chapter 5 
1. The Centre for the Analysis of Conflict was established in 
1966 in the University College, London. Burton's colleagues 
in the Centre included C.R. Mitchell, M.H. Banks, A.J.R. 
Groom, M.B. Nicholson and A.V.S. De Reuck. 
2. For the Fermeda workshop, the Yale group included Leonard 
W. Doob (psychology), William J. Foltz (political science), 
Robert B. Stevens (law), and a group of skilled and 
experienced T-group trainers : William J. Crockett, Charles 
K. Ferguson, Richard E. Walton, and Thomas A. Wickes. For 
the Stirling workshop, the group was limited to Doob and 
Foltz as organizers, five consultants, and two administra-
tors/deputies. 
3, The so-called Harvard Group included, at various times, the 
following individuals : Herbert C. Kelman (social psycho-
logist), Stephen P. Cohen (social psychologist), Frederick D 
Miller, and Bruce L, Smith. 
4. For a discussion of the domain assumptions about the nature 
of conflict and its resolution, see the previous chapter. 
5. These scholars are presently all attached to different 
academic institutions in the United Kingdom. Burton and 
Groom are, respectively, director and co-director of the 
Institute for the Study of Conflict, University of Kent, 
Canterbury. Michael Banks teachers international relations 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science. 
Chris Mitchell teaches international relations at the City 
University, London. Anthony De Reuck is attached to the 
University of Surrey in the United Kingdom. 
6. For Burton (1972b:45-46), conflict is "objective" only in 
relation to the interest elements involved. The element of 
scarcity, both in a positional and resource sense, provides 
the dynamic of "objective" conflict. 
7, The subjective element of perception (and misperception) by 
the conflicting parties is accompanied by another element, 
namely, the assessment of values sought in relation to 
costs. 
8. The notion of the functionality of conflict derives from the 
intellectual legacy of Lewis Coser, Georg Simmel, and 
Georges Sorel. Coser's The Functions of Social Conflict. 
(The Free Press, New York, 1954) provides a coherent 
discussion of this notion~ 
9, Examples in point would be conflicts that are regarded as 
just or functional by one or both of the parties. The 
notions of a "just" and "holy war" (as in the Middle Eastern 
arena) would fit such a categorisation. 
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10, For a first class discussion of the role of third parties 
in conflict see Mitchell, C.R. Peacemaking and the 
Consultant's Role, Gower, Westmead, 1981. 
11. From the point of view of conflict resolution, controlled 
communication is a therapeutic technique with much in common 
with T-group processes. The presence of the panel of experts· 
serves three key functions : (1) It acts as a neutral 
reference group with a supportive role, discharging tension, 
rewarding insight and promoting learning processes. 
(2) It makes available a relatively objective framework of 
reference - a set of conceptual tools for restructuring the 
accepted pattern of ideas about the conflict in the minds of 
the parties. (3) It therefore creates conditions for the 
emergence and examination of new solutions to the problem. 
The office of chairman is also akin to that of observer at 
a T-group session. It is to prevent the imposition of formal 
procedures : to steer the meeting from analysis to resolu-
tion and back again; and to be supportive of the meeting as 
a whole and of its outcome. 
12. The pilot workshop of December 1965 took place in the 
council room of a medical research foundation in London. The 
participants sat at an oval table. The numbers present 
varied between nine and sixteen; the panel always slightly 
outnumbered the parties. Seating was deliberately unplanned 
as a gesture of informality. The group met for six hours of 
discussion each day, with breaks for coffee, luncheon and 
tea, which the parties and panel took together. In these 
breaks smaller groups could talk and tension could be 
released. The panel met every night to take stock. The 
parties retired to their respective embassies to do the 
same. 
13, The concept, "conflict resolution", as used by Burton, is 
similar in meaning to the term "conflict termination". 
14, Apart from John Burton himself, the panel consisted of C.R. 
Mitchell, M.H. Banks, A.J.R. Groom, M.B. Nicholson, and 
A.v.s. De Reuck. 
15, George Simmel's original essay "Der Streit" was published in 
1928. 
16. See, Coser, Lewis A. The Functions of Social Conflict, (The 
Free Press, New York, 1954), and his Continuities in the 
Study of Conflict, (The Free Press, New York, 1967}. 
17, Campbell, D.T. and D. Levine (eds.). "Ethnocentric and other 
Altruistic Motives", in The Nebraska Symposium on 
Motivation. (Nebraska Press, 1965). 
18. Fairly influential have been the writings of Jervis, 
notably: Jervis, R. "Hypotheses on Misperception", World 
Politics, XX (3), 1968, pp.454~479; and his The Logiz-c;y-
Images in International Relations (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, N.J., 1970). 
227 
19, Burton and his associates plead for the institutionalisation 
of conflict resolution as an ongoing process. An integrative 
solution may evolve over time. 
20, Examples in point are Angola and Mozambique after the 
collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in these two countries. 
In both cases, the conflict has not been resolved at the 
local level, 
21, This statement applies to almost all states; Of the many 
examples, the crisis in Lebanon provides an appropriate 
example, 
22. Here one may refer to the outbreak of violence in Cyprus 
when a Turkish policeman was shot, or the outbreak of World· 
War I following the assassination of Ferdinand of Austria. 
23. This constitutes an intricate problem in any negotiation. 
For example, trade union officials may arrive at agreements 
with management that are later rejected by the rank and 
file. 
24, From the point of view of conflict analysis (as distinct 
from that of conflict resolution), controlled communication 
is a research tool allied to simulation techniques. The 
concepts "information flows", "overloading" and "mirror 
images" derive from cybernetics and communication theory. 
25. The particular sources in question are : Jervis, R, 
"Hypotheses on Misperception", World Politics, XX (3), 1968, 
pp,454-479; and his Logic of Images in International 
Relations (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 
1970). 
26. Anthony De Reuck, who acted as chairman, had considerable 
experience of small intergroup behaviour. A modified Bales 
Interaction Scale was used as well as subsequent tape 
recordings and transcripts of forty other meetings to 
provide a framework for controlled communication. Burton and 
his associates used the work of R. F. Bales on small group 
dynamics, notably his Interaction Process Analysis : A 
Method for the Study of Small Groups (Addison-Wesley Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1950); "Channels of Communication in 
Small Groups", American Sociological Review, 16, 1951, pp. 
461-468, and "How People Interact in Conferences", 
Scientific American, 192, 1955, pp,31-35, 
27, The basic argument here is that scholars with a "systems 
perspective" would be better placed to understand the 
interdependence between different levels of interaction 
within a conflict relationship and would take a holistic 
view of conflict. 
28. Burton uses illustrations and figures for this purpose. The 
participants are asked to describe what they see. Invariably 
they perceive the same figure differently. 
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29. Russett, B.M. International Regions and the Int.ernational 
System (Rand McNally, Chicago, 1967). 
30. Yalem, R. Regionalism and World Order (Public Affairs Pre~s, 
1965). 
31. For an elaboration of this view see : Deutsch, M. "Conflicts 
: Productive and Destructive" Journal of Social Issues, XXV 
(1), March 1969, pp.7~41. 
32. This assertion rests on the assumption that conflict as a 
social phenomenon displays essentially similar dynamics 
irrespective of the level at which it manifests itself. 
33. Apart from Burton's own work, notably his "The Analysis of 
Conflict by Case Work", Yearbook of World Affairs, Stevens, 
London, 1967), the research conducted by Alger, C.F. "A 
comparison of intra-national: and international politics", 
American Political Science Review, LVII, June 1962, pp.414-
420, is especially useful here. 
34. For two excellent discussions of the so-called "level-of-
analysis problem" in international relations, see Singer·, 
J.D. "The level-of-analysis problem in international 
relations", World Politics, October 1961, pp.77-82, and 
Berkowitz, Bruce D. "Levels of Analysis Problems in 
International Studies", International Interactions, vol. 12, 
no. 3, 1986, pp.199-227. 
35. Of the many examples, the following may be cited in support 
of this view: Lall, A. Modern International Negotiation : 
Principles and Practice. (Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1966); Young, Oran. The Intermediaries : Third Parties 
in International Crises. (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1967); and Cot, J.P. International Conciliation. 
(Stevens, London, 1972). 
36. Mr Rolz-Benett, the UN Secretary General's first choice, was 
rejected by one of the parties. 
37. The author was fortunate enough to have spent some time in 
the United Kingdom during September and October of 1983. 
During this period extended discussions were held with, 
among others, John Burton, John Groom, Clive Mitchell and 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE WORK OF LEONARD DOOB AND HIS ASSOCIATES 
6.1 Introduction 
The intention of this chapter is to analyse the conflict resolution 
workshops developed by Leonard Doob and his associates, with 
specific reference to the Fermeda and Stirling workshops, and to 
examine these on a comparative basis so as to contrast and compare 
them with the work of John Burton and his colleagues. The over-
riding objectives of this chapter are to explore the overall 
conception, underlying assumptions, procedures and methodology, 
results, strengths and limitations of the work of Doob and his 
associates. The research of Herbert Kelman of Harvard informs the 
comparative analysis. [1] 
Two different types of workshops have been selected for 
analysis, namely, Fermeda [2] held in August 1969, and Stirling 
[3], held in August 1972. The inclusion of both of these is 
justified because it illustrates the two main usages of the work-
shop idea, namely, conflict resolution (as in the case of Fermeda), 
and as an analytical and learning exercise, conflict analysis (as 
in the case of Stirling). On theoretical and historical grounds, 
the Fermeda workshop will be analysed first, followed by a 
discussion of the Stirling workshop. A third ten-day workshop on 
the Cyprus conflict, involving twelve Greek and twelve Turkish 
Cypriots, was planned to assemble at the Hotel Fermeda in July 
1974. It was necessary to abandon the workshop due to the success-
ful coup against the government of Archbishop Makarios, and the 
subsequent military involvement in Cyprus by the Turkish military. 
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Consequently, this chapter concerns itself only with the Fermeda 
and Stirling workshops.'. However, Doob did publish two short 
articles on the projected Cyprus workshop. These are listed in the 
references at the end of the chapter. 
6.2 Fermeda - resolving border conflict in Africa 
Working independently of the London group, Leonard Doob and William 
Foltz of Yale University, developed their techniques for conflict 
analysis and resolution out of their concern regarding a long-
standing border conflict in Africa, that between Somalia, Kenya and 
Ethiopia. By his own admission, Doob initially proposed the use of 
sensitivity training as a technique for conflict resolution in 
1966, but saw this as something of a "wild idea".[4] For the next 
three years, the "wild idea" was kept alive. Specific assumptions 
about the nature of conflict and about its resolution were 
formulated and efforts were undertaken to see if the ideas might 
actually be feasible. In 1968, a workshop was planned but it had to 
be cancelled following the withdrawal of consent by the Somalian 
government. Finally, in August 1969, the Fermeda workshop was able 
to commence. However, before an analysis of this workshop is 
attempted, the key domain assumptions that support this and other 
research efforts are outlined. 
6.2.1 Domain assumptions 
A careful reading and analysis of the relevant publications by Doob 
and his associates, reveal the following as~ key domain assump-
tions that inform their research on conflict. 
The first, and arguably most basic assumption, is that 
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conflicts are "inevitable because resources and time are limited or 
because alternative courses of action are usually numerous" (Doob, 
1983:1). Thus conflict is not explained with reference to human 
nature or to "inner man", but rather with reference to scarcity of 
resources and rational choice. Doob and his associates share this 
assumption with numerous other scholars, among them John Burton. 
A second assumption - also shared by various other scholars, 
notably Coser, Simmel and Burton - is that not all conflicts are 
'undesirable' or'destructive.' Doob and his associates concur with 
Lewis Coser (1956:20), when he writes 11 ••• the spice they 
(conflicts) add to living provides an incentive to achieve personal 
or group goals". However, many, perhaps most conflicts are ulti-
mately 'painful' or 'non-productive', hence conflict resolution is 
consciously or unconsciously pursued. The desire at conflict 
resolution implies an explicit value judgment : a person or persons 
in conflict seek a 'favourable' resolution. Most conflicts are 
assumed to be resolvable. 
A third assumption is that conflict resolution results 
'either from an external constraint, imposed by another party, or 
from a prolonged interaction between competing parties or 
individuals:' Doob and his associates show a preference for the 
latter type of resolution. However, a conflict between two parties 
seeking an advantage only one of them can attain, may result in a 
compromise or a zero-sum solution with a winner and a loser. 
A fourth assumption is that the way in which parties to a 
conflict articulate demands, interests and issues does not 
necessarily reflect the real interests and issues in conflict. 
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6.2.2 Background to the conflict 
In this short introduction to the Fermeda workshop, an outline of 
the conflicts between Kenya and Somalia and between Ethiopia and 
Somalia in broad terms is attempted. Additional background material 
on these conflicts is available in ~any other publications. [6] 
The Republic of Somalia, composed of what were formerly 
Italian and British Somaliland, gained its independence in 1960. 
Somalia, unlike any other sub-Saharan state, is virtually 
homogeneous, for almost its entire population belong to a Somali 
culture, and speak essentially the same language. [7] For 
historical, nationalistic and political reasons, Somalia seeks to 
"unite all those Somalis now living in French Somaliland, the 
Ogaden and other Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia, and in the 
Northern Frontier Territories of Kenya" (Doob (ed.) 1970:3), 
French Somaliland does not feature directly in the conflicts 
analysed here except that its ultimate political status is 
obviously of practical and symbolic importance to Ethiopia, since, 
Djibouti, its capital, is the terminus of the railway. line from 
Addis Ababa and hence that country's only outlet to the sea. 
The disputed areas in question are the Ogaden, the Haud, and 
the North Eastern Province of Kenya (formerly known as the Northern 
Frontier District). According to the Somali definition, the Somalis 
constitute the majority in all these areas. Somali nomads still use, 
and have been using, the areas in dispute as grazing lands for 
their cattle and that far greater numbers migrate back and forth in 
territory held by Ethiopia than that held by Kenya. Occasional 
armed conflict breaks out along the borders and inside the disputed 
areas. All three countries spend a not inconsiderable part of their 
237 
budgets on both defensive and small offensive operations by their 
armed forces. 
Like so many conflicts, this particular border conflict has 
to be seen against the backdrop of a wider historical canvas. The 
Somalis were occupying the northern part of what is now the Somali 
Republic in the 10th century, and were soon converted to Islam by 
teachers from Arabia. In the following centuries the Somalis 
migrated southwards, conquering and absorbing other peoples such as 
the Galla. 
On the coast of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden were 
several ancient harbour towns which played a pivotal role in 
regional trade. This trade was the basis of several states such as 
Adal, which under Ahmed Gran in the 16th century led a religious or 
holy war against Ethiopia. Ahmed Gran's forces conquered much of 
Ethiopia but were eventually driven out in 1543, when the legendary 
Ahmed Gran was killed. 
The important Somali ports of Kismayu and Mogadishu were 
controlled during most of the 18th and 19th centuries by Ara~s and 
the Ottoman Empire. Late in the 19th century European influence 
grew, and in 1884 Britain established the Somaliland Protectorate 
in the northern regions in order to protect its colonial interests 
in neighbouring Kenya and trade routes in this part of Africa. 
Italy took control of the southern regions, partly by treaty and 
partly by force, between 1882 and 1937. Somali territory in the 
west was colonised by the French, and became known as the Territory 
of the Afars and Issas. 
There was considerable resistance led by Muhammad Abdille 
Hassan, who declared a 'jihad' (holy war) against the colonial 
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rulers. The fighting lasted for twenty years, until Hassan was 
finally defeated. However, this did not mean the end of Somali 
nationalism. 1he latter continued with renewed vigour under the 
direction of the Somali Youth League, founded in 1934, and grew 
int~ a political movement that demanded unity for the different 
parts of Somali territory. When Italy was defeated in the Second 
World War (1939-45), its administration of a part of Somaliland 
did not come to an end. It continued to administer its former 
colony from 1950 by United Nations Mandate. Both British and 
Italian areas achieved self-rule, and in 1960 the regions joined 
to form the independent Somali Republic. 
Since 1960 there have been various efforts to bring the 
French Territory, and part of the neighbouring countries inhabited 
by Somalis, into the Somali Republic. There were also internal 
factional conflicts, which led to a military takeover of the 
government in 1969, when General Siad Barre became head of state. 
After the military takeover in Somalia in 1969 and the 
military overthrow of the Ethiopian Emperor in 1974, the Somali 
Government led by General Siyad Barreh sought to reopen the Ogaden 
question in a diplomatic initiative towards Ethiopia. However, the 
new Ethiopian government showed itself no less intent than its 
imperial predecessor on retaining possession of the Ogaden. Under 
these circumstances, the Government of Somalia in 1977 ceased its 
attempts to restrain the militant irredentism of Ogaden Somali 
groups, principal of which was the Western Somalia Liberation Front 
(WSLF), together with the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF). 
Guerrilla violence in the Ogaden escalated in mid-1977 to 
the point of direct confrontation, with heavy casualties on both 
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sides. An initial phase of the war was characterised by Somali 
successes, including notably the capture of the town of Jijiga in 
September 1977 and an advance as far as Harar by November of that 
year. A successful Ethiopian counter-offensive was launched in 
January 1978 with the backing of Soviet and Cuban forces. (The 
Soviet Union having in 1977 reversed its former policy of providing 
military aid to the Somali Government). Ethiopian forces recaptured 
Jijiga in March 1978 and regained control of strategic points in 
the region. However, despite the maintenance of Ethiopian troops in 
the Ogaden area, Somali-backed guerrilla forces remained active in 
the area. 
In 1980 there was renewed tension between Ethiopia and 
Somalia. Ethiopia restated its position in a joint Ethiopian-Kenyan 
communique of December 1980. The communique emphasized cooperation 
against what was termed "Somali expansionism" and called on Somalia 
to "renounce publicly and unconditionally all claims to the 
territories of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti". The communique 
referred to the intention of the Kenyan and Ethopian Governments 
of eliminating "the root cause of tension and insecurity in the 
region" and called on all countries to cease military assistance to 
Somalia. In the latter context, the United States and Somalia had 
negotiated an agreement in August 1980 allowing the United States 
use of Somali base facilities. The implementation of this agreement 
which provided for US military assistance to Somalia for the 
purchase of "defensive weapons and equipment", was delayed until 
January 1981, the Congress having insisted that the State Depart-
ment should first provide "verified assurances" that there were no 
Samali forces in the Ogaden area. 
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The Somali Government responded to the Ethiopian-Kenyan 
communique, which it termed "provocative" and "threatening", by 
urging all Somalis "wherever they are" to be ready to defend their 
national sovereignty. 
The apparently intractable nature of the conflict has meant 
that there has been little prospect of successful resolution during 
the period of twenty years since Somalia attained independence. An 
eight-member OAU "Good Offices" committee was established in 1973, 
at a time when the conflict was in a less violent phase. In 1980 
the OAU reaffirmed its desire for the resolution of border 
disputes. Although both Ethiopia and Somalia claimed this to be a 
vindication of their own position, it has widely been seen as the 
failure of Somalia to win support for changing the status of the 
Ogaden. Meanwhile, it must be noted that the ethnic composition of 
the Ogaden population, notably the Galla and the Danakil, is being 
affected by the displacement of people caused by the conflict, and 
by an Ethiopian policy to promote new settlement in the area (Day, 
1982: 118-119). 
6.2.3 Basic positions and perceptions of the parties 
Against the background of the conflict outlined above, how did the 
three major contending parties to the conflict articulate their 
basic positions and perceptions? Leonard Doob (1970:4-?) provides a 
useful summary which serves as a basis here. 
Somalia 
"Most of the inhabitants of the Ogaden, the Haud, and the 
North Eastern Province of Kenya, are Somalis. The only 
reason they are now separated from Somalia is that these 
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areas were given to Ethiopia and Kenya by the former 
colonial powers. Secondly, Somalia insisted that the people 
in the disputed areas should be allowed to decide their own 
future. Thirdly, Somalia needs the disputed territory for 
their nomadic people, whose herds should be allowed to 
migrate across the present borders according to the seasonal 
availability of water and grazing. Finally, both Ethiopia 
and Kenya act like imperialist powers, in the sense that 
they prevent the disputed areas from being reunited with the 
Somali Republic" (Doob, 1970:4). 
Ethiopia 
"The Ethiopian Government argues that it has legc!,l and 
historical rights to occupy the areas it controls. The 
boundaries of Ethiopia were established with the Italians 
for their part of Somalia according to various treaties, 
especially those of 1897 and 1908, and with the British for 
their part, also according to various treaties, notably that 
of 1897. Like Eritrea (now part of Ethiopia), the Ogaden and 
the Haud as well as most of Somalia previously belonged to 
Ethiopia in ancient times. Secondly, Ethiopia is an 
independent, multiracial state, and nationality need not be 
determined by language or culture. The Somalis in the Ogaden 
and the Haud belong to Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government 
treat them well, they identify with Ethiopia, and intermarry 
with Ethiopians" (Doob, 1970:4-5). 
The two disputed areas are economically important to 
Ethiopia; 'if only Somalia would cooperate in developing these areas 
to the mutual benefit of both states:'Geography makes for a special 
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interdependent relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia. Finally, 
the Somalis are a threat to the security of Ethiopia. Not only do 
they settle "troublemakers disguised as nomads" into the Ogaden, 
"but their own government is receiving military assistance from the 
Soviet Union!' [ 8] 
The Kenyan Government advanced four arguments in support of 
its land claims. First, "that Kenya is a multiracial state in 
which different peoples live in harmony with one another. Kenya is 
not prepared to give away parts of its territory (especially not 
the North Eastern Province, which covers more than one-half of the 
country's land area). The presence of Somalis in the North Eastern 
Province does not justify Somalia's claim to its sovereignty. 
Secondly, if the Somalis living in the North Eastern Province of 
Kenya wish to join Somalia, they should be allowed to do so. 
However, the reality is that they have not expressed any such 
desire. Thirdly, the British created the idea of 'Greater Somalia' 
in the first place and stirred up trouble in the North Eastern 
Province in accordance with their 'policy of divide and rule'. 
Finally, Somalia caused conflict in the North Eastern Province 
through the Somali shifta (a word coming from the English 
"shifter", which has acquired the connotation of bandit) who had 
settled in the area" (D b 1970 5) 00 , : • 
The conflict between the nomadic tradition of the Somalis 
and the fixed boundaries based on the colonial legacy have kept the 
Horn of Africa in a state of turmoil for decades. Efforts have been 
made to resolve the border conflicts through diplomacy and the good 
offices of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity 
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ever since Somalia's independence in 1960, but so far without 
lasting success. For example, in May 1961 the African governments 
at the Monrovia Conference called upon Ethiopia and Somalia to 
resolve their differences. In August 1963 representatives of 
Britain, Kenya and Somalia met in Rome and tried unsuccessfully to 
reach agreement concerning the North Eastern Province. During 1964 
these border conflicts were discussed at Dar es Salaam, Lagos and 
Cairo meetings of the Organization of African Unity, and resolu-
tions called upon the countries to resolve their disputes peace-
fully were passed, again fruitlessly (Day, 1982:117), At Accra in 
1965 Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to refrain from 'hostile propa-
ganda' against each other. During the same year a series of 
consultations between Somalia and Kenya, largely instigated by 
President Nyerere of Tanzania, ended in a deadlock, and serious 
guerrilla warfare broke out in the disputed areas. 
Having outlined the background to the conflicts, introduced 
the points of departure of the major contending parties, the focus 
now shifts to the planning of and research setting of the Fermeda 
workshop. 
6,3 Planning and research setting 
In April 1966 officials of one of the Governments in East Africa 
approached Leonard Doob and William Foltz at Yale University 
through the American Field Service, with a request to organise a 
research team to investigate the feasibility of a federation of the 
East African Horn, Leonard Doob and his colleague Robert Stevens, 
discussed the request with some of their colleagues and rejected 
it. The research seemed too 'policy-oriented' and too 'unrealistic'. 
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During their conversations the idea of 'a workshop' was proposed as 
a technique that might be used to facilitate communication about 
the border conflicts. 11 At this point the theoretical and practical 
advice of Chris ArgyrisJ an experienced trainer of YaleJ proved 
most helpful" (DoobJ 1970:9). 
The idea ofa'workshop'was attractiveJ because workshops have 
been employed in the West by industryJ the corporate sectorJ 
laboratoriesJ and other institutions to improve their functioning 
and communication. More recentlyJ governments have also used the 
workshop approach in their attempts to make key personnel more 
sensitive to some of their own leadership problems. SignificantlyJ 
workshops have also been employed in the African context. [9] 
Doob also felt that the workshop as such offered certain 
unique advantages as a learning experience. In this respectJ he 
writes 
11lt provides an opportunity for individuals to have close 
and prolonged contact with one another and thusJ minimallyJ 
at least to perceive diverse viewpoints. It offers a 
stimulating and intense experience in which the participants 
learn more about themselvesJ about their relations to other 
personsJ and hence about their own behaviour and roles in 
real life" (Doob J 1970: 11). 
In additionJ the workshop approach lends itself to the application 
of a variety of techniques/'such as lecturesJ role playing exer-
cises (simulation)J and brainstorming. It also has the additional 
advantage of almost immediate feedback through prolonged contact in 
a context of direct interaction and communication" (Doob,passim.) 
After deciding upon the technique of the workshopJ the other 
elements of the research setting fell into place. Doob and his 
associates decided upon six representatives from each of the three 
relevant countries. The figure of six was chosenJ because then 
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there would be two T-groups of nine participants each, and during 
other phases in the research all the participants could form a 
bigger group for 'less rigorous purposes.' It was also decided to 
meet in a neutral country, on the ground that this would facilitate 
more openness and flexibility on the part of the participants. 
However, at the outset it was made clear to the participants that 
the border conflict would not be prejudged in terms of a Federation 
of the East African Horn.' 
The consultants and academics of Yale University acted in 
their private capacities, not wedded to particular aspects of the 
workshop technique but prepared to consider and introduce any kind 
of research setting that might stimulate creativity and enhance 
learning. The research was conceived to be undertaken in two broad 
phases. During the first phase, planned to last about a week, the 
participants would have an opportunity to learn to communicate more 
effectively with one another in a general way before turning to the 
specifics of the border disputes that would occupy the second phase 
and last another week. Toward the end of the second phase, it was 
foreseen that the participants would discuss and be given some 
instruction concerning the difficulties they would experience upon 
"re-entry" into their respective countries and communities (Doob, 
1970: 13), 
It was decided to involve academics of standing. Academics, 
it was thought, would have the 'psychological attributes' that 
would make'creative problem-solving'more likely. They would also 
not officially represent their respective governments and hence 
would not be constrained to uphold a view or position previously 
expressed by the political spokesmen of their respective countries. 
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On this point, Doob and his associates have much in common with 
Burton's earlier efforts. Both Burton and Doob emphasise the 
importance of the informal nature of their workshops, and the 
advantage to involve participants that are not themselves principal 
decision-makers, but rather persons that enjoy credibility with, 
and have access to, national decision-makers. However, because of 
this methodological requirement, workshops generally face the 
problem of 're-entry'. In the case of the Fermeda workshop, Doob 
and his associates also decided in favour of African academics on 
the ground of their ability to communicate in English. 
As already stated, the initiator of the workshop idea was 
Leonard Doob, professor of social psychology at the University of 
Yale. He obtained the assistance of two colleagues, Robert B. 
Stevens, a lawyer who had been involved in legal issues facing East 
African countries in establishing a viable economic community, and 
William J. Foltz, a political scientist who had a special interest 
in the possibilities and viability of federation in Africa. These 
three academics liaised with another Yale colleague, Chris Argyris, 
a student of social change. Together they developed the concept 
early in 1966 which was finally to be implemented at Fermeda in 
1969. 
Numerous obstacles faced the raising of the necessary 
financial support and in securing the cooperation of all three 
governments. Doob (1970:175-182), provides a graphic description of 
all their "tribulations" in each of the three countries in their 
attempts to set up the workshop. 
The participants from Ethiopia and Kenya were drawn from 
local universities, including from the faculties of law, political 
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science, history, geography, anthropology, engineering, mathe-
matics, philosophy, and education. The six participants from 
Somalia, which does not have a major university, included a member 
of the opposition in parliament, a teacher, a newspaper editor, and 
officials in the Institute of Public Administration, the Ministry 
of Education and the Ministry of Planning (Walton, 1970:457). 
The staff of consultants and organisers assembled in Rome on 
1 August 1969 for the last preplanning session. The consulting team 
·comprised the following: William J. Crockett, Charles K. Ferguson, 
Thomas A. Wickes and Richard E. Walton, all associated with the 
National Training Laboratory (NTL) Institute for Applied 
Behavioural Science. 
In this preplanning session attention was given to specific 
issues, namely, phasing (two phases were decided upon); activities 
(methodologies - included stiinulation, theory seminars, and 
critiques of meetings). It was also decided that a typical 'work 
schedule
1
would involve two morning sessions, an early afternoon 
session, an afternoon break followed by a ~ocial hour~ and an 
evening session. It was also decided to have a two-day break in the 
middle of the workshop. Finally, attention was given to groupings 
(working groups), and the formulation of an operational goal. The 
latter was modestly formulated as follows: 11 ••• to achieve a 
consensus for some proposal to solve the border dispute" (Walton, 
1970: 458-459) . 
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For the sake of completeness, and to guide the reader 
through the details of the workshop, the Fermeda schedule for the 
first and the second week is reproduced below. 
CHART 1 - THE FERMEDA DESIGN FIRST WEEK 
Chart I. The Fermeda Design-First Week 
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CHART 2 - THE FERMEDA DESIGN SECOND WEEK 
Chart 2. The Fermeda Design-Second Week 
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An important element of the composition and methodology of 
II II 
the workshop was the working groups. For the purposes of the 
Fermeda workshop, the composition of the working groups was as 
follows : 
COMPOSITION OF THE WORKING GROUPS 
Working Group I Working Group II 
---- -
Somali participants Sl S2 I S3 S4 SS S6 
Kenyan participants El K2 K3 K4 , KS K6 
Ethiopian participants El E2 E3 E4 ES E6 
American organizers 01 02 I 03 
American consultants Cl I C2 C3 , C4 --- - - - - --· 
Legend Source Walton (1970:459) 
s Somali 






1 Committee - - ____ , 
A O American organizers 
A C American consultants 
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These two working groups were intentionally unstructured in 
two important respects. First, the consultants who announced the 
group assignments and scheduled time for them did not specify any 
substantive agenda or indeed any mechanism for deciding upon such 
an agenda. Secondly, the consultants did not make provision for any 
chairmanship for discussions. Instead the consultants emphasized 
that the time allocated to the working groups could be used in any 
way each group saw fit; but that, however they decided to use their 
time, "they were urged periodically to discuss their individual 
reactions and perceptions and assessments of the group process in 
order to sharpen their skills in the diagnostic process and to 
improve upon the functioning of their respective groups." The 
consultants, however, "provided examples and illustrations of 
process analysis and generally facilitated the establislunent of 
constructive communication and positive relations among the 
participants" (Walton, 1970:460). 
Like the Burtonian model special emphasis was placed on the 
absence of a fixed agenda, on the basis that this would facilitate 
flexibility and openness on the part of the participants. Likewise, 
there was a preference for social scientists as panel members and 
as consultants. However Doob and his associates differed from Burton 
who lists as one of his qualifications of a panel member "ignorance 
of the situation in the sense of having made no prior study of the 
situation" (Burton, 1969:63). In terms of the role of the consul-
tants, there was also similarity between the models of Doob and 
Burton. In both cases, their role was defined as 'supportive' and 
'analytical'. However, as will be shown later, the application of 
different analytical and intervention techniques in the models of 
Burton and Doob had implications for the role of the consultants. 
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6.4 Methodology and procedures 
Within the context of the workshop, the emphasis upon working 
groups served two essential purposes. First.,. to improve 
communication between the two groups and to enhance the coherence 
of inter-group discussions. Secondly, to increase awareness, 
tolerance and respect for individual differences, The process of 
group discussion at first centred on the role of the Organisation 
( ) f I I of African Unity OAU in the con lict. The group process was 
designed to facilitate more effective group interaction, and to 
establish group and individual differences.[10] 
During the first phase of the workshop, the basic two 
Training or T-groups were subjected to three different simulation 
exercises, each of which lasted between one and one-and-a-half 
hours. The first simulation involved 'alternative group leadership 
styles and their effects on group members'. The two remaining 
simulation exercises structured a situation in which participants 
were offered the choices of either competing or cooperating with 
other participants in striving towards common goals. Walton 
(1970:464) remarks: "These simulation exercises allowed the entire 
workshop community (participants, consultant and organisers) to 
explore useful analytical ideas such as interdependence, recipro-
city, perceptions, expectations, options - to mention a few". 
Thus, these simulation exercises combined with a modified 
form of sensitivity training [11], were designed to fulfil two 
overriding purposes, namely: (a) "to help improve the process of 
managing interpersonal conflict and of building collaboration 
within the two working groups, and (b) to provide diagnostic 
concepts relevant to the border disputes" (Walton, 1970:464), 
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In addition, because these simulation exercises involved subgroups 
comprised of at least one Ethiopian, one Somali, and one Kenyan 
(and usually one American),"they had the intended effect of 
strengthening inter-personal ties across national boundaries"(Doob, 
1971:93). 
In the case of the Fermeda workshop, the first phase that 
lasted one week, was almost entirely taken up by the application of 
socio-psychological techniques such as sensitivity training and 
simulation (both role and reverse role playing). It was .only in the 
second phase, that specific tasks were assigned to the participants. 
[12] The strong emphasis upon the application of techniques, 
notably of a socio-psychological nature, is in marked contrast to 
the Burtonian model which emphasises a more basic methodology, 
namely, the identification of issues and parties, the establishment 
of communication between parties and the ~ontrol' of communication. 
At this point it is important to emphasize that workshops 
should not be fully equated with T-groups or sensitivity training 
even though they may draw on some insights derived from these 
techniques, as in the case of the Fermeda workshop. The overriding 
objective of the workshop approach is not to increase 'personal 
sensitivity' (although this may be a consequence of the workshop), 
II 
or even to produce inter-personal trust and mutual understanding 
among the participants as ends in themselves. Rather, the workshops 
are designed to promote trust and communication'~s a means toward 
the development of an atmosphere in which "creative problem-
solving" becomes possible. "Ultimately, the focus is not on the 
inter-personal relationships between the participants, but on the 
conflict between their national groups'.' Therefore, "the real test 
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of the value of workshops is the extent to which solutions achieved 
in the group have an impact on the policy process" (Kelman & Cohen, 
1976 :80). 
To recap the procedures and methodology followed during the 
first phase of Fermeda : from the outset the participants were 
divided into two T-groups, each including three Somalis, three 
Kenyans, three Ethiopians, and one or two of the organisers. 
During the first three days, the T-groups followed standard T-
group procedures, aimed at the stimulation of 'self-awareness' 
and 'constructive communication' among the participants. The 
consultants did not structure or lead the discussions, but 
f • d 1f · 1 · I d I. I f h I I unct1one as ac1 1tators an interpreters o t e group process. 
The T-groups selected their own chairmen. During the first phase 
there were also various meetings of the total group in which 
theoretical notions about leadership styles and about ~o-operative' 
and ~ompetitive strategies'were introduced by the consultants and 
illustrated by means of simulation exercises. The three simulation 
II 
exercises were designed both to facilitate the working process 
within the two T-groups and to provide theoretical concepts that 
could be utilised in later discussions of the actual border 
disputes."The organisers and consultants did not initiate or 
control discussions. The participants themselves decided on the 
agenda for discussion. However, the consultants did facilitate the 
group process by the introduction of theoretical concepts and 
techniques. 
Thus, during the first phase, the respective meetings did 
not address any of the substantive issues relating to the border 
disputes. They focused on individual and group dynamics instead. 
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During the second phase, the workshop turned specifically to the 
border disputes. In this phase, the consultants had assigned 
specific tasks to the two T-groups. These tasks included: 
Task 1 (Tl) 
"As individual Somalis, Kenyans, Ethiopians list on news-
1 print (large sheets of paper) key grievances or disputes· 
your people have with each of the other countries", and 
Task II ( TII) 
"On a second sheet of newsprint list your predictions of 
the grievances or disputes that the indiv.iduals from each 
,• 
of the other two countries will bring regarding your 
country" (Walton, 1970:465). 
First, participants met in their three separate national 
groups. As outlined above, each group was asked to list its own 
grievances and the grievances of the two other national groups, as 
they perceived them, and to present these lists to the total group. 
The procedure did not function satisfactorily, since.two of the 
national groups failed to engage in the required role reversal. 
Failure was caused largely "because insufficient time was allocated· 
to work through the conflict and process problems necessary in the 
phases of.group growth to develop a useful vehicle out of the total 
group" (Doob, 1970:129). 
In general, the total group made limited progress at this 
point, and the planning committee (composed of participants, which 
had since been formed) decided to revert to the original two T-
groups to propose ~oncrete,solutions.' During the second phase, the 
general assembly was used for the presentation and practice of 
brainstorming techniques and for reports of the activities of the 
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two T-groups. The written lists after having been discussed and 
completed within the two T-groups, were then brought to a ~iag-
nostic general meeting'in the main conference room of the Hotel 
Fermeda. Each of the three national groups had a representative who 
reported on and clarified their lists. Following these clarifica-
tions, the Planning Committee devised an agenda for discussion by 
the total assembly. This agenda is reproduced below. For this 
purpose, the assembly was divided into five smaller 'diagnostic 
groups' (the composition of which was not made clear). 
AGENDA AND ISSUES DISCUSSED BY THE ASSEMBLY 
Substantive issues discussed 
"Diagnostic Group I: A. What is: 
1. a nation?. 
2. a nation-state? 
3, the principle of self-determination? 
B. What is the nature of the problem? 
C. What are the implications of redrawing 
the map of North East Africa? 
Diagnostic Group II: How do these disputes hinder: 
A. Internal development? 
B. Regional development? 
Diagnostic Group III: External influences on these disputes: 
A. Role of the "great" powers. 
B. Role of other nations. 
Diagnostic Group IV: What is the significance of the disputed 
areas to the parties concerned? 
Diagnostic Group V: Summary of solution and possible actions!' 
Source: Walton (1970:467) 
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The various conclusions and possible solutions reached 
within the five diagnostic working groups were discussed at length 
by the general assembly. 
Though the workshop did not arrive at a joint proposal, it 
did have some positive outcomes. These will now be briefly 
examined. 
6.5. Outcomes 
In Walton's view (1970:475), Fermeda represented "technical success 
as well as failures". While the methods employed have "significant 
potential", and "because the stakes of war versus peace are so 
high, any plausible approach deserves a good try." 
The overriding purpose of the workshop was to have some 
"positive influence on the resolution of the border disputes among 
" Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. Defined in these terms, the success of 
the workshop cannot be determined in the short run, and can only 
loosely be inferred in the longer run if and when such accommoda-
tion is reached among the three governments. 
There were also clear limitations associated with the 
Fermeda workshop, especially in terms of two criteria for measuring 
the immediate effectiveness of the workshop. First, the workshop 
was unable to reach consensus about a proposed solution. 
Secondly, the workshop participants did not transfer to the 
assembly the trust, confidence and problem-solving process it had 
developed earlier in the two working groups. The participants did 
not transfer to the assembly the insights and trust gained earlier 
in the two working groups largely due to the fact that insufficient 
time was allocated to process and methodological issues in the 
assembly. One of the trainers, Charles Ferguson, remarked that it 
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was doubtful whether the African participants fully understood the 
complex methodology and techniques used in Fermedal' In addition, he 
remarks that, "hindsight tells us that we should have known that 
the success of the two small groups and commitment by each to its 
product would make the integration of the two products and the two 
groups into one group that much more difficult" (Doob, 1970:129-
130). "However, within the Training groups, some level of trust and 
openness of communication developed. These yielded, in each of the 
three national groups, a proposal for resolving the conflict that 
enjoyed broad support by all group members" (Kelman, 1972:1973). 
There were further positive outcomes reported by partici-
pants in a follow-up questionnaire designed to help evaluate 
aspects of the workshop. The questionnaire was administered on the 
last evening of the workshop and it was to be returned completed, 
but unsigned, to the organisers not later than the following 
morning. Fourteen of the eighteen participants responded. [12] 
The questionnaires yielded the following interesting results 
The participants indicated that they had acquired new 'insight' and 
knowledge about the cultures and problems of the other parties' 
perceptions of the dispute, and that they were more 'flexible' to 
alternative solutions. However, the participants felt that the 
workshop did not yield many 'innovative ideas'for solving the border 
disputes. 
As far as the process and learning dimensions of the 
workshop were concerned, the questionnaires showed that 
(a) Learning 
The substantive discussion during the first week which 
included various cross-cultural comparisons, proved 
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especially educational. Participants were asked, "To what 
extent have you become better acquainted with the culture 
and internal problems of the other countries participating 
in the workshop?" Of the fourteen respondents, five scored 
their own learning as "moderate", five as "large", and four 
as "very large". None of the respondents scored the two 
lower categories, namely, "small extent" or "none at all" 
(Walton, 1970:476). 
Learning was also evident in. enhancing understanding 
of the views and perceptions of the other parties. The 
questionnaire asked, "To what extent have you gained a 
better understanding of the views of the other countries 
toward the dispute?" All fourteen respondents attested to a 
"very large" or "large" extent. The three lower categories 
on the questionnaire were not used. 
(b) Openness toward solutions 
The respondents were asked, "To what extent do you 
believe members of the workshop have developed more open 
attitudes toward possible solutions of the dispute?" 
The responses were well distributed on the five point 
scale ranging from "very large extent" to "not at all". The 
median response indicated t'hat a "moderate increase in the 
amount of openness toward alternative solutions had been 
achieved" (Walton, 1970 :476). 
The respondents expressed mixed and varied opinions on 
the question as to what extent the workshop produced 
~nnovative ideas'about the solution of the border conflicts. 
Seven of the fourteen respondents reported "small extent", 
260 
while four reported "moderate extent". Each of the other 
possible responses - "very large extent", "large extent", 
and "not at all" - was checked by one respondent each. 
(c) Insights into process dimensions 
Participants were also asked to what extent the workshop 
process improved their communication skills. The results 
indicated a "moderate extent" response, with the majority of 
the respondents indicating that they have benefitted from 
the experience. 
Roughly a year after the workshop, Doob carried out follow-
up interviews with thirteen of the eighteen African participants to 
gain some impressions of the impact the workshop had on them and on 
their respective countries. Published in 1971 [13], this follow-up 
research indicated that their personal experiences (and in some 
cases to the workshop techniques) were reasonably positive. The 
majority of the respondents felt 'closer'to the other participants 
than before the workshop, regardless of nationality, and expressed 
an eagerness to remain in contact with them. Significantly, most of 
"the participants showed an understanding of the intense emotional 
meanings that their respective positions had for each of the 
parties'.' On the other hand, their own perceptions and attitudes on 
how best to resolve the conflicts "were not appreciably affected". 
As far as the problem of transfer was concerned, the research 
indicated that news of the workshop reached important officials in 
each of the three governments, "although most of the participants 
indicated that they did not make extensive efforts to transfer and 
communicate their experiences" (Doob, 1971:91-101). 
On reflection, it seems that the Fermeda workshop no,t unlike 
" 
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the experiences of Burton and his associates, failed to resolve the 
problem of transfer. Unless the insights gained in the workshop 
setting can be transferred to the policy-process, the impact of 
such an exercise remains limited. This also underscores the view 
that to be of real value, workshops have to be part of a more 
comprehensive process towards conflict resolution. Workshops are 
essentially exploratory exercises, aimed at an understanding of the 
underlying dynamic and causes of conflict. 
6.6 Strengths and weaknesses 
Commenting on the strengths and limitations of the Fermeda 
workshop, Wedge (1970:494-496) claims that it was important "from 
an experimental/methodological point of view". Fermeda demonstrated 
"that propositional and laboratory types of behavioural science can 
be brought directly to bear on the concrete realities of human 
relations at a new and important level, relations between national 
states" (Wedge, 1970:495), However, Fermeda also demonstrated what 
a long way applied behavioural science will have to go before it 
can hope to find operational utility and application in interna-
tional conflict resolution." 
In posing the question: "What was proved by Fermeda?" 
Wedge (1970:494) answers "Only one major proposition", namely 
11 ••• that the small-group processes of the experimental 
sensitivity workshop are virtually identical whether the 
participants are representatives of national societies in 
conflict with one another or are members of the same 
national society". 
In Wedge's view this is an "enormously powerful 
proposition", for it shows that the small-group encounter can 
provide a social process capable of challenging "the grip of the 
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dominant systems of social authority on the attitudes and beliefs 
of their members, however temporarily or partially". One of the 
participants in the workshop put his finger on the essence of the 
issue when he remarked; •. !'Our problems are with our own governments" 
(Doob, 1970:91). 
In an interesting and useful analysis of the Fermeda work-
" shop, John Harr (1970:490-492), pleads for more Fermeda's to test 
alternative approaches and research designs'. In his view, more 
experimentation with techniques, notably with role-playing exer-
cises, would prove to be useful in this sort of group. 
While criticising Walton (1970:453-489) for "incomplete-
ness," especially as far as the actual meaning of "simulation" and 
"brainstorming" in the workshop context is concerned, he argues 
that the technique of the listing of grievances that the members of 
each of the three national groups have, holds considerable promise. 
A similar technique is also proposed by Anatol Rapoport, John 
Cohen, Roger Fisher and other scholars as a useful approach to 
conflict resolution. 
Walton, one of the academic consultants in the workshop, 
remarked that the time allocated for the workshop was "unrealistic" 
in terms of the objectives set for the workshop. Considerably more 
time was required to develop working relations, trust and open 
communication amongst the participants. The other side of the 
argument, however, would be that a sense of time pressure may well 
facilitate discussion of central issues and of open communication. 
In Walton's view, the Fermeda workshop was too short of time 
for at least four activities, namely 
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"(i) developing relations within the three national groups; 
(ii) developing the total community (assembly) into a well-
functioning group; 
(iii) "sleeping on" the tentative proposed solutions by the two 
working groups before they were seen as firm and submitted 
to the assembly; and 
(iv) "retreating from impasses, for example, over the principle 
of self-determination in order to break the individual 
mental sets and the polarized social dynamics and thereby 
allow for new approaches" (Walton, 1970:481). 
The assembly itself was characterised by ineffectiveness 
and failure. In an interview conducted with Leonard Doob [14], the 
chief initiator of the workshop idea, he gave the following reasons 
for the failure of the asembly. Firstly, the disruptive actions of 
one participant, "who attended the various sessions with the 
express purpose to disrupt proceedings and who was intoxicated most 
of the time". Secondly, considerable "group rivalry and identity 
conflict in interpersonal relationships across the two working 
groups." Thirdly, the existence of divisive tensions within the 
three national groups (this became apparent during the second 
phase of the workshop, when alternative solutions were explored); 
and finally, "the difference in spontaneity between the more 
individualised working groups and the more politicised general 
assembly." 
As far as the choice of location - the ski Hotel Fermeda 
in the mountains of northern Italy - was concerned, both Doob and 
Walton expressed the view that this was a 'favourable'one. In 
political terms Italy was neutral territory. Secondly, it was 
' 
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sufficiently isolated in that there were few family or professional 
work distractions. Both Doob and Walton favour insularity - the 
idea of a "cultural island", which on their analyses encourages 
participants "to challenge long-held assumptions, undermine 
traditional thought processes, and modify attitudes" (Walton, 
1970:482). However, as argued elsewhere, the setting of a "cultural 
island" does nothing to enhance the problems of transfer and re-
entry. The paradox is that while the notion of a "cultural island" 
may be conducive to openness and flexibility, it is essentially 
artificial and may exacerbate the problem of re-entry, especially 
when the participants return to their own 'hostile' communities. 
While Fermeda was acknowledged as a relatively useful 
experiment in "informal diplomacy," the outcomes of the exercise 
were not directly transferred to the policy-makers in the three 
respective countries. The border conflicts themselves also remained 
unresolved. However, as an exercise in 'social intervention' based 
on the ideas and techniques developed by the behavioural sciences, 
it provided the basis for the improvement and extension of the 
notion of a workshop. In particular, it proved a valuable learning 
experience for participants and consultants alike. Doob, for 
example, maintains that he and his associates in the project have 
learnt a great deal about "the composition of participant groups, 
duration, location and goals in organising future workshops". [15] 
The results of the Fermeda workshop were mixed. No actual 
solution to the conflict was achieved, partly due to the failure of 
the general assembly. However, it did register some success in the 
following areas : learning (especially in cross-cultural 
comparisons), understanding the views of the other parties, 
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openness toward solutions, and insight into the process dimensions 
of the model. Various problems were also identified, among these 
(1) time duration - there was not enough time to develop the 
various aspects of the training process; (2) the unity of the 
parties - a great deal of conflict existed within the three 
national groups; and (3) lack of enforcement - one individual was 
disruptive while others displayed a lack of commitment to the 
process. However, "the exact nature and extent of the impact of the 
workshop could not be conclusively determined" (Hill, 1982:123), 
Perhaps the Fermeda exercise was over-ambitious within the 
time-frame allocated for it. The reliance on Eurocentric techniques 
and worldviews limited the chances of success of the experiment, 
for as Bozeman (1976:15) remarks, " ..• the inclusion of all the 
world's nations in one Occidental web of hopes and anxieties has 
only served to confirm the tendency to think of conflicts, their 
causes, and their chances of resolution in the context of prevalent 
Western susceptibilities rather than in those implied from case to 
case by the realities of the actual foreign situation". 
On Bozeman's analysis analogous reasoning has long been 
evident in "certain politically crucial" academic discipines. 
"Too many of the norms, models, and social laws for which 
absolute validity is being claimed in the ranks of 
sociologists, political scientists, economists, 
psychologists, and lawyers, are actually abstractions of 
exclusively Western patterns of thought and lif.e." 
(Bozeman, 1976:15), 
Far too few of these "general truths" have been critically examined 
and tested in the light of Third World reality."The presumption of 
a universal accord on values related to conflict - largely 
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uncontested in the mid-twentieth century - has done much to obfus-
cate our understanding of conflict and its dynamics in non-Western 
contexts." 
Subsequently, Doob and Foltz organised a second workshop, 
known as Stirling, to investigate the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
In the.remaining part of this chapter, the Stirling workshop will 
be critically examined. 
6. 7 Stirling - analysing conflict in Northern Ireland 
The Stirling workshop, held in August 1972, at the University of 
Stirling in Scotland, to analyse the conflict in Northern Ireland, 
was not based on a model akin to the one used earlier in Fermeda. 
Here, the attempt was not to intervene centrally in the conflict in 
the sense of an attempt at conflict resolution, but rather at 
conflict analysis. 
In the case of Stirling, fifty-six Protestant and Catholic 
residents of Belfast assisted by a team of American social 
scientists met in Stirling, Scotland, for a ten-day workshop. [16] 
The Stirling workshop has generated lively debate both on the 
scientific merits of the techniques used and on the ethical issues 
involved in analysing ongoing violent conflicts. 
"Utilizing an intervention design which combined Tavistock 
and National Training laboratory group dynamics approaches, a panel 
of seven Am·erican social scientists attempted to assist the 
residents of Belfast to learn about their behaviour in organized 
groups and to improve their understanding of their political 
opponent's position". [17] The workshop also attempted "to provide 
a relatively protected framework wherein participants might explore 
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modes of inter-communal communication and co-operation that could 
later be tried in Belfast" (Doob & Foltz, 1973:489). 
This part of the chapter attempts to introduce the back-
ground to the conflict, describe the rationale behind the interven-
tion, and to analyse the methods employed and the difficulties 
encountered in the enterprise. It also offers an indication on what 
was accomplished. 
6.7.1 Background to the conflict 
The conflict in Northern Ireland has been typified as "peculiarly 
destructive and apparently intractable" (Rose, 1971:S). Basically 
it stems from a "society divided by a cumulative dichotomy 
involving religion, politics, culture, and ever-recent history" 
(Doob & Foltz, 1973:489). Though they constitute 65 per cent of 
Northern Ireland's total population, the Protestant majority feels 
itself a minority on-the island as a whole with an uncertain border 
as its only protection against the permanent minority status which 
the Catholic population now endure as a direct consequence of that 
border (Rose, 1976; Harris, 1972). 
Under the Northern Ireland government at Stormont, 
established in 1920, the Catholic minority has been subjected to 
both symbolic and real discrimination. However, at the same time, 
many Protestants have expressed the fear that any basic changes in 
the structure of authority could result in calling "the border" 
into question, and in doing so, challenge the legitimacy of the 
government. "Furthermore, this view is regularly reaffirmed by 
Catholic nationalist sentiment asserting that such, indeed, is 
the only realistic solution to the present conflict" (Doob & Foltz, 
1973:490). 
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Despite this dominant bi-polar conflict, neither side is 
homogenous. The Protestants are fragmented into various religious 
groupings and sects. This religious competition finds special 
expression in the Orange Order, symbol of United Protestant 
opposition to Roman Catholism. The Order itself, however, makes 
for another cleavage within the Protestant community. Although 
Protestants have traditionally voted overwhelmingly for the 
Unionist Party, the Party itself has fallen prey to fractional 
ideological competition. More recently, political organisations 
such as that of the Rev. Ian Paisley.and paramilitary formations 
such as the Ulster Defense Association and the Ulster Volunteer 
Force rendered Protestant politics more competitive than co-
operative. On the Catholic side, religion has proved less 
fractional, but political and economic competition between various 
strands of socialism, nationalism, and republicanism, now clearly 
visible in the split of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) into 
'Official' and 'Provisional' wings, has rivalled the Protestants in 
fervour and complexity. 
"social class divisions intersect religious cleavages and 
reflect the industrialised economy to which Northern Ireland 
belongs. Both trade union membership and class awareness are high 
by British and West European standards. Class cleavages have 
contributed to and· exacerbated both factionalism and distrust 
within the two dominant groupings' (Harris, 1972: 5-10); Hull, 1976; 
Hepburn, 1980 and Gallagher, 1974), 
Attempts by the Civil Rights Movements of the mid-1960s to 
forge an alliance between the Protestant and Catholic groupings, 
proved largely unsuccessful. While the Alliance Party has managed 
to attract an inter-denominational following of middle-class 
269 
intellectuals, it has been denounced "as a band of traitors" by 
working-class Protestants and by Catholic republicans alike (Doob & 
Foltz, 1973:491-2). 
The British government's suspension of the separate Northern 
Ireland government in 1972, if anything, exacerbated fragmentation 
on each side and resulted in the fact that the initiative went over 
to more extreme groupings and individuals such as the Rev. Ian 
Paisley and the two wings of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The 
conflict iself became more serious with banditry as well as a 
series of seemingly random and sectarian killings. These killings 
provided a source of continuing concern for both Catholic and 
Protestant groupings, which have been no more able than the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary to bring them under control. With growing 
internecine conflict, the British Government intervened militarily 
in Northern Ireland, while political control reverted back to 
Westminster (Hull, 1976:16; Magee, 1974). 
6.8 Research setting 
In designing the Stirling workshop, Doob and his associates sought 
to profit from both John Burton's Cyprus workshop (1969) and from 
their own Fermeda workshop (1970). Based on their and Burton's 
previous experience, it became clear to them that "no single 
technique or combinaton of techniques is suitable or even relevant 
in all situations; the selection must be made by considering the 
objective of the workshop as well as the participant's background" 
(Doob & Foltz, 1973:492). 
In June 1971, Doob ~nd Foltz left for Belfast, where they 
interviewed a number of people occupying different positions in the 
society and representing various shades of political opinion. 
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Because neither Doob nor Foltz have had any previous experience in 
Northern Ireland, they established contact by way of intermedia-
ries. One of John Burton's former graduate students was especially 
helpful, because he was conducting research in Belfast. In addi-
tion, Doob and Foltz also made use of the services and advice of 
local clergymen from both sides of the political divide, colleagues 
at Yale, a native of Ulster, various academics attached to Queens 
University in Belfast, and others in the medical and psychiatric 
professions. 
namely 
The objective .of the workshop was a fairly modest one, 
11 ••• To bring together persons of influence in two of the 
strife-torn neighbourhoods in order to have them establish 
some degree of mutual trust and then to develop plans for 
establishing or improving relations between them" (Doob & 
Foltz, 1973:492). 
The approach and strategy pursued was, therefore, a 
'decentralised one' which did not attempt to influence national 
decision-makers, nor to produce a 'manifesto' which could affect 
public opinion. The primary goal of the workshop was conflict 
analysis rather than conflict resolution. Stirling was meant to 
be a learning exercise, both for the individual participants and 
for the group as a whole. 
During the academic year of 1971-1972, Doob and Foltz 
succeeded in getting financial support from two private foundations 
and a private donor. The remainder of the funds came from Yale 
University. They then formed a planning group at Yale and, thus, 
unlike their first East African workshop, they could decide upon 
details in advance among colleagues conveniently based at the same 
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institution. The planning group consisted of Doob, Foltz and two 
clinical psychologists based at Yale, Edward B. Klein and James C. 
Miller. 
In June 1972, amidst continuing.conflict, Doob, Foltz, Klein 
and Miller returned to Belfast on the advice of their local 
observers. They put forward three criteria for the recruitment of 
participants to the workshop, First, participants had to be 
influential within the Belfast community at grass-roots level. 
(Membership in established interest organisations such as those 
concerned with community development, housing, labour, playgrounds, 
education and politics served as criterium here). Secondly, parti-
cipants had to be interested in cooperating with the other side, 
and finally, "seemingly emotionally stable and capable of a basic 
flexibility" (Doob & Foltz, 1973:494). 
Doob and his associates encountered problems to recruit 
suitable participants. In this they obtained the support of a 
department at Queens University (so that the eventual sponsors 
became Yale "in association with" that department and numerous 
established religious and community leaders). They also prepared a 
document entitled a "Preliminary Announcement of a Training 
conference" which was to be given to all potential participants. 
Its opening paragraph under the heading of "Purpose" read as 
follows:-
"People meet in groups and larger communities to accomplish 
most important everyday tasks. Such groups may either help 
or prevent them from achieving their goals. We propose to 
give from 40 to 60 citizens of Belfast 
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(1) The experience of learning what happens and what can 
happen when they participate in groups which they 
themselves form or which are formed before their own 
eyes. 
(2) An opportunity to explore whether they can then 
create for themselves ways of working in groups that 
will aid them in achieving goals of their own choice 
relating to the conflict in Belfast. 
(3) Whatever aid we can offer over several months in 
working out concrete, practical projects back home" 
(Doob & Foltz, 1973:495). 
The said document also informed prospective participants 
that the workshop would take place at Stirling University in 
Scotland from 19 to 28 August, 1972, and that the transport and 
accommodation costs would be covered from private sources in the 
United States. 
Stirling University was selected for practical as well as 
theoretical reasons. Practically, Scotland was acceptable to 
everyone as 'neutral territory'. Theoretically, Stirling provided 
an environment for the participants to detach themselves from the 
conflict. Stirling could be reached by ferry and, hence, travel 
expenses would be low, and participants were not required to obtain 
travel documents which would have been needed on the continent. The 
proposed design of the workshop was also included in the document, 
and explained in operational (practical), non-technical terms. 
In the course of the next two months, the two chief 
consultants, Klein and Miller, recruited participants in terms of 
their previously agreed upon criteria. They also explained the 
nature of the workshop to the participants. They emphasized the 
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confidential nature of the entire exercise. It was decided not to 
reveal the identities of the participants. In addition, there would 
be no publicity given to the workshop in the mass media. 
6.8.1 Domain assumptions 
As pointed out earlier, Stirling was not ba~ed on .,a model 
akin to the one used earlier in the Fermeda workshop. Stirling did 
not intervene centrally in the sense of an attempt at conflict 
resolution or termination. Rather, the Stirling workshop was 
informed by the following assumptions : (a) That "any long-term 
resolution of the conflict would necessitate various local groups 
and individuals taking more rather than less control over the 
circumstances of their own lives", (b) That "self-knowledge and 
knowledge of circumstance" can be beneficial to bring about this 
control, and (c) That "direct communication between the parties 
most directly involved in the conflict is bound to produce the 
most broadly supported solution" (Alevy et al., 1974:277). 
6.8.2 Composition 
Fifty six participants eventually participated in the Stirling 
workshop. With one exception the participants were all well-known 
community leaders in Belfast. Several belonged to what the 
participants themselves called "activist organisations" on both 
sides of the divide. Although none was a political figure of 
standing, one had earlier held political office and six were 
relatively well-known public figures in Belfast and Northern 
Ireland by virtue of their positions in trade unions, religious 
and community organisations. Six held positions in the civil 
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service. Roughly a quarter might loosely be described as "middle-
class in social background and life style"; the rest of the 
participants were workers or workers' wives and children, several 
of them unemployed. Slightly over half of the them were Protes-
tants, the rest Catholics. The male-female ratio was 5 to 3, while 
the approximate age range was from 16 to 60. 
Apart from Klein and Miller, the two chief consultants, 
three other consultants from the United States participated, Daniel 
I, Alevy, Barbara B, Bunker, and Nancy French. The number of 
consultants was determined by the size of the group from Belfast 
(Doob & Foltz, 1973:496). 
6.8.3 Methodology and process dimensions 
The first half of the workshop (the first five days) was used to 
familiarise the participants with the Tavistock technique, "The 
essence of which is to increase learning about the ways in which 
people interact in organised groups" (Miller & Rice, 1967), The 
participants were asked to confront directly the ways in which they 
respond to authority and the challenges of co-operative team work. 
During the first five days, the consultants deliberately maintained 
a low profile both in formal and informal settings. 
The Tavistock technique, however, was modified first by 
assigning participants to "introductory groups". These groups were 
first constituted on the basis of sex, followed by religion and 
age. These "introductory groups" discussed issues "that brought 
home the importance of role play in the genesis and functioning of 
conflict relationships". After an explanatory exposition by Klein, 
the director of this phase, the participants were assigned to small 
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working groups, each of which contained a cross-section of the 
participants and one of the consultants. 
These small working groups met on five occasions. They had 
no fixed agenda or expressed purpose except "to study the group's 
behaviour". The consultants only intervened to explain and 
interpret some aspect of group behaviour. During the Tavistock 
phase, the participants came together three times in a large group, 
whose agenda was similarly unstructu~ed. During these three 
meetings, the entire staff was present. Again the consultants 
intervened and interpreted to the participants what was going on. 
In the'big intergroup exercise; all the participants first 
assembled in a single room and were instructed to form whatever 
smaller working groups they wished in order'to study and analyse 
group dynamics.' Five additional sessions allowed the working groups 
to develop internal cohesion and to interact with other groups. 
Finally, as a transition to the second phase of the workshop, 
"application groups" were formed on the basis of the neighbourhoods 
in Belfast from which the participants came. Clearly, then, the 
overriding purpose of the first phase of the workshop was to enable 
the participants to learn more about group dynamics and behaviour. 
"This proces,s was facilitated by the establishment of smaller 
working gr;tips, and by constantly changing the composition of these 
groupd' (Doob & Foltz, 1973:497). 
The second phase of the workshop, which lasted four days, 
conformed more or less to the methodology and process associated 
with the National Training Laboratories or the Bethel approach 
(Bradford, et al., 1964). The aim of the second phase of the 
workshop, was to give participants an opportunity "to plan back 
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home activities in some detail and to both develop and practice 
specific skills which might aid in the realization of these plans" 
(Doob & Foltz, 1973:498). 
During this phase, specific planning groups were formed on 
the basis of problems identified by the participants themselves. 
Various exercises were conducted in these planning groups, 
including some role-playing and a simulation exercise in the form 
of a game (the 'Money Tree Game') which reflected the strµggle 
between the "have's" and the "have-nots". After a review on the 
last day of the workshop, the "application groups" from the first 
phase of the workshop were reconstituted for a single session so 
.that previously formulated projects for Belfast could be examined 
again. During this session special emphasis was placed on the 
problem of re-entry. 
The Stirling workshop operated on a tight schedule. Each of 
the smaller or larger group sessions lasted approximately an hour-
and-a-half. Two such sessions were held in the morning, two in the 
afternoon, and one in the evening. The participants were subjected 
to constant pressure. Only four breaks during the duration of the 
workshop were provided for. 
Copious notes were kept by the two chief organisers, Doob 
and Foltz, especially of the first phase of the workshop. 
Discussions by the entire staff of all sessions were recorded on 
tape. The participants were asked to give their opinions of the 
workshop to a series of questions handed to each participant on the 
return journey. No recording was done during the actual sessions of 
the working groups. 
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6.9 Outcomes 
In contrast with the Fermeda workshop, where participants analysed 
group dynamics in order to facilitate a resolution of the conflict, 
at Stirling "process" itself was studied for its own sake. 
Therefore, Stirling provided for four types of learning, namely 
(a) 'Learning about process,' (b) 'Learning about individual 
behaviour,' (c) 'Learning about others,'and_ (d) 'Learning about 
projects.'Each of these four types of learning will now be briefly 
examined. 
(a) Learning about process 
Much of the learning involved the issues of 'autho-
rity,''power', and 'leadership'. The Tavistock technique 
was selected primarily because it is designed to enable 
participants to confront these issues. Doob and his 
associates selected Tavistock, because they had concluded 
that these issues had to be confronted in the Belfast 
situation. 
"At the outset the participants were forced into an 
ambiguous authority situationi' They were subjected to an 
immutable time schedule and told that "members are free to 
do whatever they want". The consultants issued no direc-
tives, they never addressed the group on an individual 
basis, but always as a whole. 
In the view of Doob and Foltz, the assumption of the need 
for legitimate authority "came so naturally to participants 
that its exposure in the sessions became a powerful learning 
aid" (Doob & Foltz, 1973:500). 
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In addition to authority and power issues, the workshop 
participants had to confront the fact and reality of 
conflict and the way they traditionally dealt with it. In 
this context, one of the major difficulties encountered in 
the workshop was that of the "externalisation" of conflict. 
Many of the participants externalised responsibility for it, 
by arguing that "they were all victims", and on account of 
this, they could not be held responsible for their actions 
or those of the other parties. This liexternalisation" of the 
conflict seriously undermined the learning process. 
In addition to "authority" and "conflict", participants 
also had to confront the complex problems of 'group 
loyalty', 'identity', and 'boundaries'. "Throughout the 
entire duration of the workshop, the participants perceived 
themselves as being divided into two religious groupings. 
Socio-economic cleavages based on profession, social class, 
place of residence, political activism, and organizational 
competence asserted themselves, though they never complete-
ly submerged the dominant religious cleavage" (Doob & Foltz, 
1973:503). Consequently;' the participants never developed a 
sense of group cohesion necessary for joint co-operation and 
. " action. 
(b) Learning about individual behaviour 
The workshop provided an informal setting in which 
participants could learn about their own individual beha-
viour. In the opinion of the organisers of the workshop, 
"it taught the individual participants that it is possible 
to have multiple identities and to interact in different 
roles at different times" (Alevy, et al., 1974:279). 
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(c) Learning about others 
One of the objectives of the workshop was to expose 
participants to the views of "the other side", to facili-
tate both inter- and intra-group communication. While the 
workshop did not'adequately provide for inter- and intra-
group learning and communication: largely due to the 
problems of 'externalisation'and leadership, some learning 
was shared. When it became clear to the participants that 
they shared doubts, frustrations, fears and weaknesses, 
this provided an incentive for mutual learning. 
(d) Learning about projects 
The Stirling workshop further attempted to assist 
participants in developing practical projects among 
themselves that they might be able to implement in their 
respective Belfast communities. The various planning groups, 
formed during the second phase of the workshop, with both 
Protestant and Catholic members, considered various areas of 
functional cooperation. These included :"community centre 
development; joint housing rehabilitation and joint develop-
ment of a playground area to be used by children from both 
. " religious groupings (Alevy, et al.,1974:279-280). 
In addition, a working group generally referred to as the 
"politicals" was established to work out some areas of common 
interest and concern to both sides of the divide. However, no real 
progress was made, especially as the workshop was constantly under 
pressure and stress. A major source of stress was the constant 
stream of disturbing news reports of events in Belfast, where the 
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conflict took a turn for the worst. Moreoever, many participants 
reported some degree of 'disorientation', especially during the 
Tavistock phase of the workshop. The consultants also complained 
about constant 'pressure' and 'stress'. 
Given these limitations and the fact that the results were 
at best uncertain, should the project have been undertaken? Doob 
and his associates answer strongly in the affirmative. Noting -
rather controversially, that "from the point of view of scholarly 
ethics, only one position to the Northern Ireland conflict totally 
avoids criticism: to do nothing". 
Doob and his associates were also criticized for undertaking 
the workshop "as foreigners". To this criticism, they responded as 
follows : "Firstly, no one in Belfast was attempting anything of 
the sort, and the few local scholars indicated that their institu-
tional affiliations precluded such an enterprise". Secondly, the 
fact that they were foreigners assisted in a number of ways. "They 
were neither Catholics nor Protestants, they were Americans and 
their neutrality was unquestioned" (Doob & Foltz,1973: 510). 
Nine months after the Stirling workshop, Doob and Foltz 
interviewed 40 of the original 56 participants to determine the 
outcome and impact of the exercise. Emphasis was placed ~pon the 
changes they had observed within themselves, upon the cooperative 
projects they had planned during the workshop, and upon their own 
general effectiveness in their own communities (Doob & Foltz, 
1974:237-256). By their own admission, the results were largely 
'inconclusive,' although some of the interviewees indicated that they 
had benefitted personally from the exercise. 
However, these interviews did not yield systematic informa-
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tion on the impact of the workshop. Doob and Foltz only had the 
names and addresses of the participants, and arranged for the 
interviews telephonically. Most of the interviews took place in 
the individuals' homes. Six interviews were conducted in the hotel 
were Doob and Faltz stayed, and in three cases the place of work 
was selected. 
Among the 40 participants interviewed, "all but one were 
able to recall vividly and systematically details of the exercises 
during the workshop. They could recall specific incidents, while 
some of the National Training Laboratory (NTL) exercises, notably 
the so-called "Money Tree Game", was mentioned repeatedly. 
Generally, the role of the consultants impressed those interviewed. 
'~11 40 also recalled their own actions, thoughts and feelings 
' 
during the workshop" (Doob & Foltz, 1974:243). 
In the opinion of Doob and Foltz (1974:244), "the partici-
pant's recall demonstrated that whatever else Stirling might have 
been for them it was not an insignificant event". Most of the 
participants assessed the overall experience of the workshop in 
positive terms. An unspecified small number assessed the workshop as 
(a) "having good and bad elements balanced", (b) "bad elements 
outweighing the good", and (c) "as an overall bad idea or an expe-
rience they regret". 
The results of these interviews indicated that the workshop 
was seriously flawed in respect of the objectives and nature of the 
exercise. Most participants had the impression that they would be 
attending a conventional conference on Northern Ireland. Moreover, 
the majority felt that they had no frame of reference to help them 
to assess the usefulness and outcome of the workshop. 
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Most of the participants interviewed indicated that the 
workshop generated "considerable stress". However, most also agreed 
that the stress was useful to the learning process, because they 
became more conscious of "the hostility and cruelty within 
themselves". 
Based on these interviews,. it became clear that some signi-
ficant personal learning did take place. First 1 • many reported 
''increased self-confidence.'' Secondly, an unspecified number reported 
"greater awareness of self and of one's own potentialities". 
Finally, a few reported "substantial personal changes" (Doob & 
Foltz, 1974:248). As far as social learning and group behaviour 
were concerned, the workshop had rather more limited impact. Some 
participants, however, reported some change in political alle-
giance, and indicated that the workshop strengthened "moderation" 
in their political views (Doob & Foltz, 1974:249). 
For a variety of reasons - notably the nature of the 
conflict in Northern Ireland itself and its impact upon workshop 
proceedings - few definitive conclusions can be drawn concerning 
the outcome and the impact of the Stirling workshop. The stress 
generated in the Tavistock phase of the workshop proved to be 
emotionally destabilising for most of the participants, although it 
also stimulated learning amongst others. Stirling only marginally 
increased the analytical and practical skills of the participants, 
although it did improve personal contacts and provided for personal 
learning. 
Having examined the research setting, rationale, process, 
methodology and outcomes of the Stirling workshop, the focus now 
moves to a critique of the workshop. 
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6 .10 Critique 
The Stirling workshop was criticized on both substantive and 
methodol.ogical grounds. But unlike Fermeda or Burton's earlier 
workshops, the issue of the ethics of social intervention itself 
became of central concern because of the harmful impact of the 
workshop on some of the participants. 
In a critical review of the Stirling workshop, Boehringer 
et al., (1974:257-276) assessed the methodology, process, and 
subsequent social and political impact of the workshop. On their 
analysis, the goals of the workshop were "ill-defined and mutually 
contradictory". The goal to "give the participants greater know-
ledge of how groups and organizations function", contradicted with 
the objective "to enhance self-knowledge and greater competence in 
own behaviour" (Boehringer, et al., 1974:258). Boehringer et al., 
argued that manifest antagonism on the part of the participants 
towards the idea of a workshop, and the fact that the organis.ers 
failed to clarify the goals and workings of the workshop, "meant 
that the workshop was ineffective in its own terms and harmful to 
many of the participants" (Boehringer, et al., 1974:274). This 
latter criticism was born out by some interviews conducted with 
40 participants some nine months after the workshop (Doob & Foltz, 
1974: 246). 
A related but more serious problem, is that of whether Doob 
and his associates should have intervened at that particular stage 
in the internecine conflict? Given the antagonism towards them and 
their project, and the seriousness and destructiveness of the 
conflict itself, the usefulness of social scientific research, 
notably of an interventionist kind, seems rather limited. Doob and 
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his associates argue that they have been sensitive about ~his 
question, and "therefore followed procedures adapted to the problem 
and circumstances at hand" (Alevy et al., 1974:278). However, this 
does not address, let alone resolve, the deeper problem of the 
ethics of social intervention. It remains an open, and to some 
extent, an unresolved question whether it is desirable for social 
scientists (in this case foreign social scientists) to intervene in 
a conflict noted for its intractable and destructive nature? At the 
very least,it seems that the prospects of workshops of the Stirling 
variety to enhance both conflict analysis and resolution, under 
such circumstances as those that prevailed in Northern Ireland at 
the time, are inherently limited. The application of social 
psychological techniques such as brainstorming and Tavistock may 
well have increased the personal and collective trauma and 
disorientation of the participants. [18] 
Stirling was also criticized for its "experimental" and 
"artificial" nature. While an isolated context was selected so that 
learning could take place without the distractions of Belfast, this 
did not benefit the problem of transfer or "re-entry". The problem 
of sustaining the learning acquired within the context of the 
workshop and transferring it to the respective communities remained 
an unresolved problem at Stirling. As far as learning itself is. 
concerned, the Stirling workshop did not enhance the group process 
in the sense of providing for 'co-operative ventures'. Learning was 
essentially confined to individual participants, while changes in 
individual perceptions and values were not shared by the group as. a 
'whole. 
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Doob and his associates were also criticized for their use 
of "experimental techniques" such as Tavistock and techniques 
devised by the National Training Laboratory (NTL) in the United 
States. To this, they reply that the justification for the use of 
a combination of Tavistock and NTL training dates back more than 
twenty years, when Bennis and Shepard (1956) developed a variety of 
techniques while working at Bethel, Maine, at the.National Training 
Laboratories. Bennis and Shepard noted that when groups met, the 
first issue which had to be addressed for effective training 
purposes was the authority of the leader." Once the authority 
structure was established, it was possible for the individual 
participants to improve their own interpersonal relations" (Bennis 
& Shepard, 1956:415-437). Bennis and Shepard's pioneering work has 
been further developed at Yale University, in theory by Klein and 
Astrachan (1971), research (Harrow et al., 1971), and application 
(Klein and Gould, 1973). (19] 
Doob and his associates defend and justify their use of 
Tavistock and NTL techniques on the ground th~t both are "experien-
tal methods that enable participants to learn about psychological 
processes". Thousands have participated in events of this nature, 
notably in the United States of America. Moreover, Klein and all 
the other consultants in the Stirling workshop had experience with 
both of these techniques of social intervention. However, none of 
the consultants had previously used the combination of Tavistock 
and NTL techniques in conflict situations as destructive and 
intense as Nothern Ireland. While the workshop design was inten-
tionally modified in response to local conditions, for example, 
"introductory groups" were established at the beginning of the 
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workshop rather than immediately starting with group process;' none-
theless the combination of these techniques generated considerable 
stress in the participants. 
The Stirling workshop also underlined the risks and dangers 
which face participants in an exercise once they have returned to 
their respective constituencies. In the case of Stirling, one of 
the participants was killed for participating in the workshop. 
A more fundamental and interesting problem, from a 
theoretical point of view, which has been ignored by Doob and his 
associates, is whether there are any crucial stages during a 
conflict interaction when Tavistock (or any other mediatory 
attempt) is sought and welcomed by the participants, and whether 
there is any particular stage when Tavistock or NTL techniques are 
most effective in having a significant impact on the subsequent 
course of the conflict interaction? 
In the light of the Stirling worksopJ' such a stage (if it 
could ever be accurately determined) would be likely to occur when 
the attitudes and perceptions of both parties are in the proceess 
of becoming less rigid and more open to change - a time when any 
new insights should have maximum effect and could be communicated 
with the least likely damage to those who are presenting them-" 
(Private communication by C.R. Mitchell, London, 1983). 
By their own admission, Stirling was too concerned with 
'methodological and technical issues'. Time allocated for inter-
group learning was too limited in relation to the total schedule of 
the workshop. In fact, the time allocated for the workshop proved 
to be insufficient to allow for learning within the bigger 
assembly. While on the issue of time, Doob admitted in an interview 
that in retrospect, their intervention at Stirling was 'highly 
inappropriate.' [20] 
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Another substantive problem relating to the Stirling work-
shop is that of ascertaining whether the new insights gained during 
the workshop were retained when the participants returned to their 
respective communities, or whether the considerable pressures on 
each individual made him/her revert to his/her original perceptions 
of the conflict and of the other party involved? There is an 
associated problem here. Even if changed perceptions were indeed 
retained, were these successfully communicated to relevant 
decision-makers? The follow-up research conducted by Doob and Foltz 
(1974:237-257) fails to shed light upon these questions. 
Finally, the efficacy of the workshop approach as a tech-
nique for the analysis and resolution of conflict needs to be 
evaluated on two counts. First., · problems which arise from the 
techniques used in the workshop. Morespecifically, whether or not 
these worked effectively in changing the attitudes and perceptions 
of those individuals that participated in the exercise. Secondly, 
problems relating to the actual impact of the workshop on the 
substantive conflict. 
On both of these counts the success and outcome of the 
Stirling workshop were mixed. Follow-up research indicated that 
both Tavistock and National Training Techniques (NT) proved to be 
traumatic and thus harmful to the participants. With reference to 
the second queston, it needs to be poin:ted. out that Stirling was 
not intended as an attempt at conflict resolution. The goal of the 
workshop was 'conflict analysis'. However, as argued previously, it 
has had limited impact upon the substantive conflict. 
Having considered the research setting, methodology and 
process(dimensions of the Stirling workshop, the chapter concludes 
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with a comparison of the workshops of Burton and Doob and their 
associates. 
6.11 The two approaches compared 
In comparing the two approaches - and particularly in examining the 
differences between them - it is important to remember that neither 
one represents a set of rigidly worked out procedures. Both 
approaches are seen by their initiators as "exploratory", as open 
to further refinement and improvement!' The two approaches reflect 
different points of departure and experiences!' 
On the analysis of Kelman (1972:168-204), there 11 is every 
reason to assume that the two approaches can borrow from each other 
and be combined in various ways". Kelman, treat them as "two 
variants of a more general model, each applicable to a specific set 
of problems and circumstances". 
The models of Burton and Doob share some common features as 
well as differences. First, we examine the common features, and 
then proceed to discuss the differences between the two approaches. 
6.11.1 Common features 
Kelman (1972:168-204), identifies six common featuresshared by the 
two approaches. Each of these will now be briefly outlined. 
(1) Setting 
In both approaches, "workshops take place in settings 
isolated from political and diplomatic environments. 11 The 
Fermeda workshop took palce in a physically-isolated setting 
~ a ski-resort in the mountains of Northern Italy. 
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The Stirling workshop was held in an academic setting. 
Burton's London exercise took place in an academic setting, 
removed from the pressures and publicity normally associated 
with official negotiations. 
"The rationale behind an isolated setting is that it 
facilitates the process of learning, and enables the 
participants to explore issues relatively free from the 
pressures and constraints of their respective constituen-
cies."However, as pointed out earlier, the notion of "a 
cultural island" may well complicate the problem of trans-
fer. 
(2) Sponsorship 
Both types of workshops were sponsored by academic 
organisations, independent of governmental or inter-
governmental agencies. The governments concerned were in 
every case informed and consulted and, in fact, gave their 
approval of the workshops, but the workshops enjoyed no 
official status. The planning and organisation of the 
Fermeda workshop were greatly aided, however, by the United 
National Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). 
(3) Participants 
Although the two approaches differed markedly in the 
criteria for selecting participants, the respective 
participants shared two common features. First~ they were 
all members of standing within their respective communities, 
who at least potentially (in the London exercise quite 
clearly and, indeed, by the nature of their selection) had 
access to decision-makers. Secondly, they participated in 
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the workshops as private citizens who spoke on nobody else's 
behalf. 'The respective participants are not official, 
instructed delegates, but private individuals'. This has 
both advantages and disadvantages for workshop dynamics. It 
had the advantage that participants, at least theoretically, 
were more flexible because they did not constitute decision-
makers themselves. However, it did complicate the problem 
of transfer, and resulted in an 'experimental' rather 
than a 'practical' exercise. 
(4) Interpersonal atmosphere 
In the respective workshops the discussions and research 
settings were designed to create an informal atmosphere in 
which participants would be free to express their views 
openly and to get to know and respect each other as 
individuals. This atmosphere of informality fostered mutual 
trust, a sense of shared values, and in some cases, a 
commitment to a common goal. However, as far as the latter 
aspect was concerned, Stirling failed to formulate a common 
task capable of transcending religious and communal 
cleavages •. 
(5) Discussion format 
The resp~ctive workshops of Burton and Doob provided for 
direct, face-to-face communication among the conflicting 
parties. In all cases the agenda was relatively 
unstructured. The initiative for introducing issues, or for 
pursuing inputs made by the third parties, were largely left 
to the participants themselves. On the whole, third parties 
refrained from imposing their definitions of the respective 
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conflicts on the participants; rather, they encouraged 
participants to speak for themselves - to articulate their 
motives and perceptions, express their own hopes and fears. 
"In particular, the workshops operated on the premise that 
solutions must be generated within the group discussions, 
rather than be imposed from the outside (Kelman, 1972:176)." 
(6) Role of third parties 
The various research attempts of Burton and Doob were 
under the overall direction of third parties. "These were 
defined in terms of their professional skills and knowledge 
as theoretical or applied behavioural scientists rather than 
in terms of some official capacity as mediators". Though the 
third parties participated in the proceedings,'~heir primary 
task was to provide useful theoretical tools that the 
participants could use in their discussions and analyses, to 
introduce relevant information and suggest interpretations, 
and to facilitate group dynamics in other ways. In short, 
they played a role akin to that of the psychotherapist. And 
like psychotherapists, they tried to maintain 'analytical' 
rather than 'evaluative' and 'prescriptive' attitudes 
towards the participant's judgements." · 
In the above view of Kelman (1972:177), these common characteris-
tics of the two approaches were essentially designed to achieve two 
objectives. "First, and most importantly, they are designed to give 
participants the freedom, opportunity, and the motivation to move 
away from official positions and from attempts to justify their own 
sides and "score points against the other side". Instead, the 
objective is for the participants to absorbe new information, 
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explore new ideas, revise their perceptions, reassess their 
attitudes, and participate in a process of creative problem-
solving. The isolated setting, the academic sponsorship, the 
deliberate encouragement of self-expression and of an .analytical 
orientation, and the inputs of the third party all are aimed at 
facilitating these processes" (Kelman, 1972:177). 
Secondly, "some common characteristics of both approaches 
are designed to enhance the prospect that the new information and 
ideas, the changed perceptions and attitudes, and the proposals 
for solution generated by the workshop will be fed into the policy 
process. The selection of potentially influential participants, 
the co-ordination with their governments, and the format of the 
workshops are geared to achieving this objective. Both approaches 
are more effectively designed to produce changes in individual 
perceptions and attitudes than to feed such changes into the policy 
process - although the balance between these two objectives is one 
respect in which the two approaches differ from each other." 
Having concerned ourselves with the similarities between the 
two approaches, the focus now moves to the differences between the 
work of Burton and Doob. 
6.11.2 Differences between the two approaches 
In terms of the six elements used to outline common features of the 
two approaches, various useful distinctions can be drawn. The 
following six distinctions seem especially useful 
(1) The Fermeda workshop, held in a physically isolated setting, 
placed greater emphasis on creating a "cultural islandH and 
on the'psychological insulation' of the participants, than 
either Stirling or the London workshop. 
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(2) The London workshop was sponsored by a research centre 
concerned with international relations theory, diplomacy, 
and the analysis of conflict, representing a research 
project within that centre's ongoing research programme. 
In contrast, the Fermeda workshop was supported by social 
scientists interested in African studies and assisted by 
specialists in small group dynamics. Both Fermeda and Stir-
ling represented "an experimental application of a group 
training laboratory to conflict resolution." 
(3) Participants in the London workshop were considerably closer 
to the process of foreign policy-making and came as a team. 
Participants in both Fermeda and Stirling were further 
removed from the foreign policy process and came as indivi-
duals,"thus reflecting greater division, fractiousness and 
diversity within the respective national groupings." 
(4) Compared to the other workshops (London and Stirling), the 
Fermeda exercise, placed more emphasis on the creation of 
cross-cultural and cross-national unity within the working 
group. 
(5) To establish communication between the participants and 
discussion of the substantive issues in conflict, the London 
workshop made greater use of theoretical models of conflict. 
"In contrast, the Fermeda and Stirling workshops focused more 
centrally on the ongoing group process and on inter-personal 
behaviour."In the discussion of the substantive issues them-
selves, the Fermeda workshop placed greater emphasis upon an 
agreed-upon proposal for the resolution of the confict than 
both Stirling or the London workshop. 
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(6) The extent and nature of the theoretical inputs from the 
social scientists also differed in the various workshops. In 
the London workshop, the social scientist made "more theore-
) 
tical inputs, both in their own presentations and in their 
interventions." In both the Fermeda and Stirling workshops, 
the social scientists provided more inputs in the form of 
feedback based on their observation and interpretation of 
the group process. The social scientists were also more 
active in organising the workshop activities "in setting the 
tasks to which the participants were to devote their ener-
gies 11 (Kelman, 1972: 177-178). 
These differences in operation and detail reflect certain 
underlying differences between the two approaches, both in their 
conception of the exercise as well as in their definition of the 
workshop task. They differ in their views of the workshop's rela-
tionship to the larger and more comprehensive process of conflict 
resolution, and in their views of what ought to be done within the 
workshop iself. Our exposition of these differences may be overtly 
sharp, but it should be useful in underlining the unique qualities 
of each approach. 
How do these approaches differ, first, in their conceptions 
of the ex~rcise? 'Both are concerned with creating an atmosphere in 
which change - in the form of altered perceptions and attitudes and 
creative solutions - can take place, in the hope that these changes 
can be fed into the political process of conflict resolutiod! 
However, the two approaches seem to differ in their conceptions of 
precisely where the workshop fits into these political processes. 
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In Burton's conception, the workshop is much more closely 
linked to national and international political processes. The 
concept of 'controlled communication' flows from a theoretical 
orientation toward international relations, containing such 
propositions as the following: that "international conflict is a 
spillover from internal or communal strife" (Burton, 1969:17); 
1984:3-15); that "the starting point in analysis and resolution of 
conflict is at the systems level of highest interaction" (Burton, 
1969:19), and that "since the resolution of conflict depends upon 
effective communication, it can come only from the parties them-
selves. Processes are required that alter perceptions, and promote 
the points of view of the parties, and not of third parties" (Bur-
ton, 1969:55). In Burton's view, then, procedures like those of 
controlled communication represent key preparatory steps in the 
resolution of conflict. 
In keeping with this conception, Burton's workshops are co-
ordinated with the relevant decision-makers. The participants are 
individuals who are aware of the positions of these decision-
makers. Though they need not be officials themselves (and they do 
not attend in any official capacity), they are nominated by the 
relevant decision-makers and maintain contact with them before and 
after the exercise. 11Burton himself, both before and after the work-
shop tries to establish and maintain contact with .the relevant 
governmental and inter-governmental agencies. The Burtonian work-
shops also last much longer than those organised by Doob and his 
associates 11 (Kelman, 1972:179). 
Both the Stirling and Fermeda workshops were further removed 
from the political process. Though Doob and his associates communi-
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cated with the governments concerned, their purpose was to inform 
the governments and get their approval, rather than to co-ordinate 
directly with decision-makers themselves. 
Both Burton and Doob attempted to hold their respective 
workshops in settings isolated from political and diplomatic pres-
sures, but Doob placed greater emphasis on separating the workshop 
exercise from the political process. 
"In Doob's conception, a workshop can contribute to conflict 
resolution by generating certain outcomes that can then be fed into 
the policy process. The workshop itself is not directly linked to 
national decision-making or diplomatic efforts at conflict resolu-
tion" (Kelman, 1972-180). 
The difference between Burton's and Doob's conceptions of 
the workshop exercise thus has important implications for what the 
workshop is intended to accomplish. Kelman (1972:180-181), comments 
succinctly: 
"For Doob, it is a more self-contained exercise, failing or 
succeeding in terms of its own goals and procedures. There 
is, therefore, more emphasis on the personal learning of the 
participants. There is also more emphasis on producing an 
agreed-upon solution, in the form of a document that can 
serve as an input into the policy process. For Burton, too, 
it is significant to produce changes in the participants and 
to promote problem-solving. However, these effects are 
viewed as steps in the process of conflict resolution more 
than as ends in themselves. There is less emphasis on the 
personal learning of the participants, except insofar as it 
influences the new information and insights that can be fed 
into the policy process. Similarly, there is less emphasis 
on the reaching of agreed-upon agreements within the work-
shop itself. The view of Burton is that the actual working 
out of solutions must happen elsewhere; the workshop will 
have made its contribution if it has brought some possibi-
lities for solutions to the attention of the respective 
decision-makers." 
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If we analyse the two overriding objectives of the workshop 
encounter that are central to both approaches - creating an atmos-
phere in which perceptions can change, and communicating new 
information and insights into the policy process - we can say, at 
the risk of oversimplification, that Doob's conception places rela-
tively more emphasis on creating the conditions for change, while 
Burton places relatively more emphasis on creating and establishing 
the conditions for transfer. 
Given these somewhat distinct conceptions of the workshop 
exercise, how does each approach define the task of the workshop 
itself? What are the means by which the workshop brings about the 
desired changes, and what roles do the participants and the social 
scientists have to fulfil if these changes are to take place? 
Both approaches are designed to create the conditions for 
effective and creative problem-solving. To this end, participants 
must learn to communicate with each other in different and new 
ways, to revise perceptions distorted by a history of conflict, 
and, in Burton's words, to view "the conflict as a problem to be 
solved and not as a contest to be won" (Burton, 1969:157). In 
relation to each other, they must change from the role of 'antago-
nist' engaged in a zero-sum game, to that of 'collaborator' search-
ing for a positive-sum outcome to a common problem. The role of the 
third party is to enhance this process. However, the two approaches 
differ on how this process comes about. 
In the Burtonian model, the primary mediating process is the 
'behavioural'and 'systemic analysis'of conflict. The workshop setting 
is designed to involve the participants in this process of conflict 
analysis together with the panel of social scientists. In a percep-
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tive contribution, Anthony de Reuck, a former member of the Centre 
for the Analysis of Conflict in London, has identified three roles 
that participants may play in a workshop situation: "combatant 
representative", "conflict analyst", and "cooperative·representa-
tive". On this point, de Reuck comments as follows :-
"An essential part of the controlled communication technique 
is to divest the parties of their roles and inhibitions as 
combatant representatives, and to offer them alternative 
roles, first as conflict analysts and later as cooperative 
representatives. In their roles as combatant representa-
tives, the parties' reference group is that physically 
present around the conference table. At first, no doubt, it 
comprises only the academic panel, but as the meeting 
proceeds, I believe it could be shown to expand to include 
also the opponent party" (de Reuck, 1970). 
The role of 'conflict analyst', enhanced by the definition 
of the situation, gradually transforms into that of 'cooperative 
representative'. It also remains available as an alternative when 
the'cooperative process'generates too much stress; participants can 
"retreat into the more intellectual role of general conflict 
analyst'! 
The role of 'conflict analyst' is readily available insofar 
as the workshop is presented - as was the case in the London work-
shop - as a research project. In a more general sense, the research 
context, can facilitate entry into the process of communication and 
broaden the content of what is communicated. 
Thus, when research serves as the context of the workshop, 
it becomes possible to involve conflicting parties who previously 
refused to communicate, because to do so would have meant to take 
unacceptably high risks!' The research context permits communication 
with mininum commitment and risk, Similarly, the research context 
enables participants to express views and to discuss issues that 
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they would have to avoid if they were speaking in their official 
capacities. The combination of research with conflict resolution 
thus makes for an ambiquity that may greatly facilitate the process 
of communication" (Burton, 1969:43), 
In short, the research context can overcome some of the 
barriers to communication that characterise the relationship of 
conflicting parties, provided that both the organisers of the 
workshop and the participants are genuinely interested in conflict 
research and not just using it as a means to bring the parties 
together. Thus the research context not only creates a readiness to 
engage in communication, but also provides for a 'crucial step' in 
conflict resolution itself, Kelman (1972:183) elaborates 
"Furthermore, insofar as both parties are working with the 
social scientist panel in a research effort, they can more 
readily come to regard each other as collaborators in a 
common enterprise". 
Given Burton's conception of the workshop task, the essen-
tial role of the social scientist is ''to inject into discussion new 
information, not about the dispute in question, but about conflict, 
its origins and processes drawn from theoretical analyses and empi-
rical studies" (Burton, 1969:157), At a later stage in the work-
shop, when 'solutions' are under consideration, the social scien-
tists also contribute information designed to extend the rang·e of 
'integrative mechanism'and possibilities for'functional cooperation' 
that participants can consider. The panel of social scientists, and 
especially the discussion chairman, are constantly aware of the 
workings of the 'group process.' They try to enhance movement away 
from the role of "combatant representative" and toward the role of 
"conflict analyst" and increasingly toward that of "cooperative 
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representative". But in the Burtonian model, the key professional 
input of the social scientists is at the l.evel of theory and rele-
vant empirical findings. 
In both the Fermeda and Stirling workshops, the primary 
mediating process was "sensitization" of participants to their 
'interpersonal behaviour' and to'group process.' Both of these work-
shops attempted training in the skills of communication through the 
use of the laboratory or experimental approach to learning. The 
trainers explain the process of individual learning by an ongoing 
analysis of group interaction by means of demonstration, exposi-
tion, and the use of special exercises, and they involve the parti-
cipants in this process of learning. Thomas Wickes (1970:26), one 
of the trainers at the Fermeda workshop comments 
11 ••• The basic feature of this approach is that participants 
learn through analysis of, and generalizations from, their 
own experience and that of others with whom they interact. 
Laboratory participants, in different words, must first 
participate (interact, behave); then they are encouraged to 
reflect upon the meaning and impact of that behaviour in 
relation to both themselves and others". 
Adoption of the 'process analyst role' by the participants 
is facilitated by defining the workshop as essentially a'learning 
experience - a training laboratory.' In this context, participants 
seem more willing to experiment with various psychological tech-
niques such as simulation, brainstorming, and National Training 
exercises. Even so, it needs to be kept in mind that some partici-
pants in both the Fermeda and Stirling workshops resented proce-
dures that had no clear and immedate relationship to the objective 
of the exercise. 
Similarly, the context of a training laboratory~ like the 
context of a research project in the Burtonian model - permits 
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communication with relatively little commitment and risk. In this 
insulated setting, the individual participants are encouraged to 
articulate ideas that would be unacceptable in other more formal 
contexts. However, in both Fermeda and Stirling,"it is noteworthy 
that when the smaller T-groups came together in the general 
assembly and participants were exposed to fellow nationals, with 
whom they had not shared the common T-group experience~ they tended 
to revert to previously held'nationalistic positions.' The learning 
context was in both cases 'overwhelmed'by the reality of the 
conflicts in question. However, in the opinion of Kelman (1972:185) 
"for as long as the learning context is maintained, the freedom to 
explore with a minimal sense of risk can greatly facilitate the 
process of creative problem-solving." 
In line with the Fermeda and Stirling workshops' definition 
of their tasks, the primary roles of the social scientists are to 
encourage the development of sensitivity to'group process'and 
~ffective communication'patterns among the participants._As the 
participants engage in efforts at problem-solving, the role of the 
social scientist is to enhance the process - to assist the group to 
identify problems when the process seems to break down and to deve-
lop strategies that would keep it going. In both the training and 
problem-solving phases (which need to be separated for analytical 
purposes), they assist the participants in observing and understan-
ding their own interactions. As in Burton's exercises, the social 
scientists may introduce relevant theoretical and empirical mate-
rial, but "their primary inputs in the Doobian model consist of 
observations and interpretations of the ongoing group process" 
(Kelman, 1972:186). 
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. 6.12 Conclusion 
The differences between the approaches of Burton and that of Doob 
are mostly differences in emphasis. Despite their different 
origins, both approaches rest upon a set of surprisingly similar 
assumptions and insights about the use of "clinical" procedures to 
enhance 'creative problem-solving' among conflicting parties, and 
about the potential contributions of these procedures to conflict 
resolution at the political level. Both approaches are concerned 
with producing 'altered perceptions', and with the feedback of such 
changed perceptions to national decision-makers. To enhance and 
facilitate such change, both rely on insights from conflict theory 
and from small group dynamics. They differ essentially in their 
application of scientific techniques to enhance both conflict 
analysis and resolution and on the question of the locus of the 
workshop in relation to decision-makers. 
In the following chapter the focus shifts to certain guide-
lines which may facilitate the development of a more empirically-
based theory of conflict resolution. Some possible areas for 
further investigation and research will be tentatively explored. 
303 
End notes to Chapter 6 
1. Of the many articles and contributions by Herbert C. Kelman, 
the following are especially useful : 
Kelman, Herbert C. and Cohen, Stephen P. "The Problem-
Solving Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to.the 
Resolution of International Conflicts", (1976) Journal of 
Peace Research, vol. XIII, no. 2, p. 79-90; and "The 
problem-solving workshop in conflict resolution" (1972), 
pp.168-204 in Richard L. Merritt (ed.). Communication in 
International Politics, Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press. 
2. The proceedings of the Fermeda Workshop have been published 
in Doob, Leonard W. (ed.). Resolving Conflict in Africa -
The Fermeda Workshop, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1970. The Fermeda workshop took place from 2 August to 14 
August 1969 in a ski resort (Hotel Fermeda) in the mountains 
of Northern Italy. 
3. For an outline and critique of the Stirling Workshop, see: 
Doob, Leonard W. & Foltz, William J. "The Belfast Workshop -
An Application of Group Techniques to a Destructive 
Conflict," (1973) Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 18, 
no. 2, pp.276-284; Doob, Leonard W. and Foltz, William J. 
"The Impact of a Workshop upon Grass-Roots Leaders in 
Belfast" (1974) Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 18, no. 
2, pp.237-256, and Boehringer, G.H., V. Zeroulis, J. Bayley 
and K. Boehringer (1974) "Stirling : The Destructive 
Application of Group Techniques to a Conflict", Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, vol. 18, no. 2, pp.257-276. 
4. Interview with Leonard Doob, in the Holiday Inn, Pretoria, 
17 September 1985. Conducted by the author in the presence 
of Mrs Doob. 
5. Prof. Doob has, however, revised his views on the usefulness 
of brainstorming and sensitivity training as techniques for 
conflict resolution. He now considers these potentially 
destructive to the parties, in the sense of generating too 
much "emotive energy and frustration". Vide, Interview 
conducted with Prof. Doob, Pretoria, 17 September 1985. 
6. Some of the relevant sources include: Lewis, I.M. The Modern 
History of Somaliland, Praeger, New York, 1965; Mariam, M.W. 
The Background of the Ethio-Somalia Boundary Dispute, 
Berhanena Selam, Addis Ababa, 1964, and Touval, Saadia, 
Somali Nationalism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1963. 
7. Touval, Saadia, Somali Nationalism, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MASS., 1963, p.12. 
Approximately 90 per cent of the Somali population belongs 
to the Galla ethnic grouping. Eight per cent is Arabian. The 
remaining two per cent is made up of Europeans, Indians and 
Pakistanis. 
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8. The Soviet Union has since reversed its military support for 
Somalia in 1977, and redirected it to the military govern-
ment of neighbouring Ethiopia. 
9. For details of these workshops, see Doob, Leonard (ed.). 
Resolving Conflict in Africa - The Fermeda Workshop, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, Appendix 2, pp.183-192. 
10. The basic configuration or unit for this kind of learning is 
the training group, or T-group. Participants are assigned to 
T-groups, normally made up of heterogeneous groupings, and 
meet regularly therein throughout the extent of the work-
shop. The T-group is the core learning unit. 
11. A modified form of sensitivity training was used in Fermeda. 
The purpose of combining simulation exercises with sensiti-
vity training was to facilitate the process of learning and 
to enhance the 'group process.' These techniques assisted the 
"participants to learn how to identify with each othe·r, how 
to find and explore their essential humanity, their simila-
Fities, and their superordinate goals as human beings~ 
12. These smaller diagnostic groups, composed of representatives 
from the three national groups, engaged in conflict analy-
sis. In the case of the Fermeda workshop, various problems 
were encountered when these smaller diagnostic groups 
reported back to the general assembly. In the general assem-
bly, many participants reverted back to their previously 
held nationalistic positions. 
13. The results of this research are published in Doob, Leonard 
W. "The Impact of the Fermeda Workshop on the Conflicts in 
the Horn of Africa", International Journal of Group 
Tensions, vol. 1, no. 1, 1971, pp.91-101. 
14. Interview with Leonard Doob, in the Holiday Inn, Pretoria, 
17 September 1985. 
15. Interview with Leonard Doob, ih the Holiday Inn, Pretoria, 
17 September 1985. 
16. The American social scientists included, Daniel I. Alevy, 
B.B. Bunker, Leonard W. Doob, William Foltz, N. French, E.B. 
Klein and J.C. Miller. 
17. The primary tasks of the social scientists were to encourage 
the development of sensitivity to 'group process' and effec-
tive communication patterns among the participants. The 
planning group consisted of Leonard Doob together with 
Edward B. Klein and James C. Miller, both clinical psycholo-
gists. 
18. This point is well argued by Boehringer, G.H., V. Zeruolis, 
J. Bayley and K. Boehringer. "Stirling: The Destructive 
Application of Group Techniques to a Conflict", Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, vol. 18, no. 2, June 1974, pp.257-276. 
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19, The relevant sources are: Bennis, W.G. and H.A. Shepard 
(1956). "A Theory of Group Development", Human Relations, 
no. 4, pp,415-437; Harrow, M,, B.M. Astrachan, G.J.Tucker, 
E.B. Klein, and J.C. Miller (1971), "The T-group and study 
group laboratory experience", Journal of Social Psychology, 
85, pp.225-237; Klein, E.B., and B.M. Astrachan (1971), 
"Learning in groups: a comparison of study groups and T-
groups", Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 7, pp.659-
693, and Klein, E.B., C.S. Thomas, and E. Bellis (1971) 
"When warring groups meet: the use of a group approach in 
police-Black community relations", Social Psychiatry, 6, 
. pp. 93-99, 
20, Interview conducted by the author with Leonard Doob in the 
Holiday Inn, Pretoria, 17 September 1985. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FROM PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOPS TO EMPIRICAL THEORY - SOME POSSIBLE 
GUIDELINES 
7.1 Introduction 
The concern of this chapter is to explore certain guidelines which 
may facilitate the development of a more empirically-based theory 
of conflict resolution. Some possible avenues for further investi-
gation and research will be suggested, notably with reference to 
the role and limitations associated with third party in_tervention; 
the structure of the discussion format; the time sequence; and the 
composition of the warring parties. Insights culled from appro-
priate case studies and from the realities of conflict relation-
ships, especially in present-day South Africa, will be used to 
illustrate points and to substantiate arguments. 
7.2 Stating the problem 
While an extensive body of knowledge exists on the sources of 
conflict, on various typologies of conflict and on the history of 
conflict research, "the practice of third party intervention and 
the problems associated with it, has only very recently been stu-
died systematically" (Bercovitch, 1984:2). In most cases,"scholars 
hardly looked beyond detailed descriptions of single cases inter-
ventiod'. Thus, studies aimed at a deeper and comprehensive under-
standing of the strengths and weaknesses of problem-solving work-
shops and of third party intervention in such workshops, are hard 
to find. With the exception of the work by Mitchell (1981), 
Bercovitch (1984), Nierenberg (1973) and Zartman (1978), most of 
the many other studies do not make use of a comparative perspective 
310 
in analysing conflict intervention, but focus instead on detailed 
analyses of specific conflicts. 
More comprehensive approaches to conflict such as those of 
Burton (1969); Curle (1971); Deutsch (1973); Gurr (1971); Haas 
(1974) and Wright (1964), to name but a few, are not predominantly 
concerned with the practice of conflict intervention. Thus, these 
and other sources, are not particularly helpful in providing 
possible guidelines for a more empirically-based theory of conflict 
intervention. 
However, before specific issues and problems are examined 
and some exploratory guidelines for their resolution are offered, 
two important theoretical issues need to be introduced, namely, 
first, the perennial question whether conflicts are primarily 
subjective (i.e. perceptual) or objective in nature. This question 
is theoretically relevant, because it has implications for the 
process and practice of conflict intervention. 
The view that conflicts are primarily subjective (i.e. 
perceptual) is tenable when we accept that "disputed values are 
not absolute or in fixed supply." To put it differently, that such 
values may be changed, redefined, or altered in the process of 
conflict intervention. Bercovitch (1984:5), comments as follows 
11 ••• If conflicting parties could somehow be brought, through 
a third party perhaps, to a greater awareness of their 
perceptions and predispositions, then opposed values may 
well change to collaborative values". 
Thus, subjective approaches to conflict (such as those 
discussed in this study) are primarily concerned with the subjec-
tive orientations of the warring parties and with devising strate-
gies and creating conditions for rectifying conflict-producing 
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"misperceptions". Given this approach, a situation may be' seen as a 
conflict situation if, and only if, all the parties concerned 
perceive that they are in conflict. Therefore, from a concern with 
underlying structural conditions, the analyst moves to a concern 
with the parties' awareness and perceptual definition of a situa-
tion. 
Opposed to this subjective approach is the view that asserts 
that conflicts exist wherever there are incompatible interests and 
values, irrespective of whether or not the actors .are aware of 
these interests and values. Where subjective approaches to conflict 
stress motivational, psychological and attitudinal factors, objec-
tive approaches emphasize structural and interest factors. 
With a different understanding of conflict, it follows that 
each approach offers its own mode of conflict resolution. "The 
former approach sees conflict termination as entailing a change in 
perceptions, the'latter argues for a restructuring of social condi-
tions" (Schmid, 1968). 
The second theoretical issue that needs to be examined is 
primarily of a conceptual nature and relates to the distinction 
between 'conflict management' and 'conflict resolution'. The former 
concept is primarily concerned with regulating the expansion and 
escalation of conflict with a view towards creating the conditions 
conducive to resolution. Conflict resolution, however, implies 
"removing the sources of a conflict relationship" (Burton, 1969:233 
-235). Whether this is achieved by changing perceptions or altering 
behaviour is immaterial. What seems to be more important is that 
both conflict management and resolution, and indeed third party 
intervention, may be 'attitude-oriented', or 'behaviour-oriented', 
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or both; "each.type of intervention will, presumably, call for 
different strategies of intervention, and different third party 
roles" (Bercovitch, 1984:9). 
Another distinction between two basic types of conflict 
intervention is that between endogenous and exogenous intervention. 
The former refers to intervention undertaken by the parties to a 
conflict themselves, and implies direct communication and negotia-
tions. The latter refers to efforts undertaken by an outside inter-
mediary. On Bercovitch's analysis (1984:11), exogenous intervention 
can be further subdivided into (a) "binding", and (b) "voluntary" 
modes of intervention. Binding intervention refers to processes 
remarkably similar to arbitration and adjudication. The voluntary 
mode descibes a process of intervention where the third party 
facilitates the interchange between warring parties and plays an 
"analytical", "supportive" but "non-evaluative" role, to paraphrase 
Mitchell (1981). It is the latter form of third party intervention 
which is the concern of this study. 
To recap: the earlier theoretical distinction - a conflict 
is "managed" or "settled" when destructive behaviour has been 
reduced and hostile attitudes have been lessened. In contrast, a 
conflict is said to be resolved when "the basic structure of the 
situation giving rise to destructive behaviour arid hostile 
attitudes have been altered or reperceived by the participants in 
conflict" (Mitchell, 1981: 15). 
Conflict intervention, such as third party intermediation, 
can, therefore, be directed at conflict settlement (management), 
or it can be directed at achieving the more complex, outcome of 
conflict resolution. Bercovitch (1984:11), presents these two basic 
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There is general agreement in the literature that for both 
of the above two modes of conflict management to work effectively, 
or even to intervene in a conflict in order to influence its out-
come, the intermediary must have some understanding of the causes 
of the conflict in question. For different conceptions of the 
causes of conflict will dictate (at least to some extent) different 
approaches to conflict settlement and resolution. 
While the causes of conflict need not concern us here, it is 
worth emphasizing the point that these may generate patterns of 
interaction that may favour some modes of intervention as opposed 
to others. For example, if the causes of a conflict are perceived 
to be primarily embedded in incompatible interests and values, as 
opposed to hostile attitudes and feelings, or misperceptions, this 
may require a different approach to conflict settlement and resolu-
tion. 
Following Bercovitch (1984),'manifest conflict'may require 
bargaining and negotiaton to be settled. In contrast, conflict at a 
more latent level may be resolved through the intervention of a 
third-party or the application of 'creative problem-solving'. 
7,3 The basis of third party intervention 
Before addressing some of the theoretical and empirical concerns 
relating to third party intervention, it seems in order to clarify 
what is meant by' the term "third party"? Basically, a third party 
is, as the term implies,"someone who is external to a certain 
conflict and who interposes between the conflicting parties in 
order to assist them in the process of conflict analysis and 
resolution " (Mitchell, 1981: 57). 
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Third party intervention normally occurs under certain 
conditions such as the following: (a) In the event of a protracted 
and complex conflict; (b) in a situation where the parties are 
deadlocked; (c) perpetuation of conflict is seen by both sides as 
costly and potentially increasingly negative in its implications; 
and (d) there exists some level of communication or limited 
potential for cooperation between the parties (Mitchell, 1981). 
Third party intervention is not a neutral process and can 
have some important structural and ethical implications for both 
conflict settlement and resolution. It may even create distinct 
possibilities for the exacerbation of conflict, as was indeed the 
case in the Stirling workshop of August 1972 conducted by Leonard 
Doob and his associates. It may result in "coalition formation" 
between the conflicting parties at the exclusion of a third party. 
This outcome is well documented in industrial and labour disputes. 
(See among the many sources, Cartwright & Zander, 1976; Hare, 1976; 
Robbins, 1974, and Blake & Mouton, 1964.) Finally, it may act as a 
catalyst in changing the destructive relationship between parties 
to a more cooperative one. In all of these cases the effect of 
third party intervention is to some extent to modify the nature cf 
interactions between the parties in conflict. 
Harbottle (1979/80:120) offers a useful description of the 
process of third party intervention, when he writes : 
11 ••• the intervention into a dispute of a person or agency 
whose purpose is to act as an instrument for bringing about 
a peaceful settlement to that dispute, while creating 
structures whereby the foundations of a lasting settlement 
may be laid". 
Young (1967:34) in his classical study on third party 
intermediation, defines it as 
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" .•• any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party 
to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or 
more problems in the bargaining relationship and, therefore, 
to facilitate the termination of the conflict itself". 
The basis of third party intervention is voluntary. This type of 
intervention, moreover, is of an ad hoc nature and its influence is 
supposed to be beneficial to both parties. The overriding purpose 
of third party intervention is to modify the basic structure of 
conflict so as to make it more amenable to resolution. 
"A third party is not neutral or ultimately entirely 'objec-
tive' - it brings with it certain ideas, knowledge, assumptions, 
values and interests - all of which do influence the prospects and 
process of achieving termination'! (Mitchell,1981: 65). 
When analysed closely and systematically, the relationship 
between a third party and the conflicting parties may be seen as 
having the following features 
(1) Third party intervention is a voluntary relationship; 
(2) It is designed to influence and regulate the interactions 
amongst conflicting parties; 
(3) "It is a relationship between an outsider offering help and 
a conflict system requiring help" (Bercovitch, 1984:14); 
(4) While third parties can offer a wide range of useful 
suggestions, they have, though no authority to impose a 
particular solution or outcome; and 
(5) The relationship is seen by all concerned as a temporary 
one. 
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The reasons for the involvement of third parties in conflict 
are many and varied. These range from being invited by one or both 
parties, or requested to intervene by other interested parties 
(such as the United Nations or regional organisations). A third 
party may also intervene on its own accord when it perceives that 
its basic interests may be adversely affected. Intervention may 
also be guided by a desire to preserve established relationships 
(such as trade and economic relations), especially if such relat-
ionships are perceived to be under threat. Finally, third party 
intervention may be seen as relatively inexpensive as opposed to 
other modes of intervention such as military intervention or econo-
mic punitive measures. 
Despite a vast, and growing body of literature on third 
party intervention, such as the study by Walton (1969), with 
reference to interpersonal conflict and the research of Douglas 
(1962) which deals extensively with the role of third parties in 
industrial conflict, third party intervention has - perhaps some-
what surprisingly - been discussed in isolation of other disci-
plines. This observation holds despite the fine studies of Young 
(1967), Garrow (1978), Ott (1972), and Rubin (1981). 
The major omission of most of the studies listed above, 
"is to view third party intervention as a separate, autonomous 
process, rather than considering it as an integral part of a more 
comprehensive process of conflict settlement and resolution" 
(Bercovitch, 1984:15). A small number of studies share Bercovitch's 
concern, notably that by Carl Stevens (1963) and Schelling (1960). 
In this respect, Stevens (1963:123) comments 
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"An analysis of mediation is not possible except 1.n the 
context of a general analysis of bargaining negotiations". 
(Own emphasis. 
The various workshop approaches analysed in this study, 
share this limitation. They are simply not comprehensive enough 
in their analysis of third party intermediation, and are in most 
cases, not integrated with a more comprehensive process of negotia-
tion and bargaining. 
Following Bercovitch (1984:15), the actual process of third 
party intervention may be presented as follows : 
THE PROCESS OF THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION 
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The above diagram represents a problem-solving approach to 
third party intervention, where the latter acts as a facilitator 
between two warring parties. The diagram emphasises the need for a 
comprehensive approach, which includes an unde~standing of the 
wider conflict environment and its constituent elements such as the 
respective interests, values, objectives and perceptions of the 
warring parties. 
Most of the more traditional appr0aches to conflict 
resolution are characterised by a combination of the following 
features : 
(1) 11 Disagreement over means (for example, 'my way of resolving 
conflict versus your way'). 
(2) A clear 'us-them' distinction between the warring parties. 
(3) Each party views the conflict from its point of view and 
interests only. 
(4) Conflicts are often intensely personalised. 
(5) Invariably, disagreements rather than potential agreements 
are stressed. 
(6) Normally negative stereotypes become all pervasive"(Blake _& 
Mouton, 1961': 18-33). 
In contrast to these orientations, the problem-solving 
approach to conflict settlement and resolution purports to alter 
the "win-lose" orientation to one where both parties can accomplish 
positive gains and address the underlying causes of their particu-
lar conflict. It is an approach which aims to resolve a conflict 
not merely to settle it. Roger Fisher of Harvard University's 
phrase of a "win-win proposition" encaptulates the basic idea. 
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To be effective, the practice of third party intervention must be 
directed to the attitudinal and situational components of a con-
flict relationship, not merely at its behavioural manifestations. 
Thus, it is an approach which must involve the following processes 
and be informed by the following assumptions : 
(a) The primary focus of all the participants (including the 
third party) must be on ways of how to resolve the conflict, 
rather than on 'defeating the other side.' 
(b) Basically, the parties should avoid voting on issues, and 
should steer clear from adjudication or a search for 
compromise merely for the sake of compromise. 
(c) The phenomenon of conflict must be accepted as natural, even 
beneficial. (This assumption rests upon the adjunct of 
the 1 functionality'of conflict under certain conditions). 
(d) All parties should display an attitude away from 'fixed 
solutions' to goals, interests and motives. 
(e) A collective responsibility for the quality and acceptance 
of the outcome must be established and respected by all 
concerned. 
(f) The actions of the third party should be of a non-evaluative 
n~ture (meaning that the third party should not pass judge-
ment on any of the participants), while the legitimacy of 
the third party and that of the parties themselves should be 
unchallenged. 
The above exposition implies that third party intervention 
of this kind is designed to resolve (as distinct from settling a 
conflict). In practical terms, third party intervention can do so 
by a combination of some or all of the following techniques 
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(a) Helping the conflicting parties discover the issues 
/interests that are in conflict. A third party's inter-
vention starts with an attempt to discover the real issues 
/interests that are in conflict. For, as Burton (1969) has 
shown, these are often concealed or inadequately articulated 
by the parties themselves. 
In practical terms, "a third party can help to discover 
the real issues/interests in conflict (with the assistance 
of the parties themselves), by listening; by asking relevant 
questions; by extracting responses; by asking for and 
gathering additional information, and more generally assis-
ting each side to go beyond formal positions and demands"· 
(Bercovitch, 1984:67), 
(b) Identifying the conflict relationship: Once the issues/inte-
rests in conflict and the objectives of each party become 
clear, then the third party should assist the parties to 
relate to each other. This can be done by playing'an analy-
tical role'by, for example, pointing out the increasing 
costs of a conflict, or by emphasising the advantages of 
resolution over continued conflict. 
"Moreover, a third party should attempt to learn about 
past relationships, conflicts, expectations, and any other 
relevant aspects of their earlier relationship. In some 
cases there may be a long-established pattern of coopera-
tion, in others a long history of conflict and acrimonious 
interaction'! Knowledge of the actual conflict relationship, 
322 
both past and present, between the conflicting parties is an 
important factor determining the role and possibilities of 
third party intervention. 
(c) Third parties should respect and maintain the privacy of 
their interactions with the warring parties. In a practical 
sense, a third party can, and should, assure that public 
statements are kept to a minimum, and that both sides can 
enjoy the freedom that confidentiality brings. "The practice 
of third party intervention suggests that privacy takes away 
some of the structural pressures associated with conflict 
settlement and resolution" (Blake & Mouton, 1964:12)~ 
(d) The third party should also identify "representative-
constituent relationships" (Bercovitch, 1984:67). 
The actual parties and their representatives have 
different relationships to their respective constituents. 
Some may be highly influenced or constrained by their 
constituents. Others may have more room for manoeuvre, 
Clearly, some representatives have more power over their 
constituents, while some may be in a 'symbolic relationshp' 
to their cons~ituents. 
The third party should inform himself of the precise 
relationship between the representative and his/her 
constituency, "by identifying the lines of responsibility 
and communication between negotiators and constituents." 
(e) A third party should assist in discovering the causes of 
a conflict relationship. This observation is vitally 
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important, for a third party's behaviour is often deter-
mined by the causes specific to a particular conflict. These 
causes may be related to a variety of issues such as the 
following: 
(i) unrealistic expectations; 
(ii) negative interpersonal relationships; 
(iii) irreconcilable interests; and 
(iv) mutual hostile perceptions. 
In this context, the distinction between conflicts of 
'values' and conflicts of 'interests' is an important one 
which constantly needs to be kept in mind by the third 
party. 
(f) All of the above roles of a third party can be accomplished 
by the application of specific techniques of intervention, 
such as the following 
(i) "patient listening, controlling hostility, and 
deliberately strengthening expectations that an 
agreement will be reached; 
(ii) deliberately encouraging both parties to air their 
differences; 
(iii) separating or bringing the parties together, as the 
need arises; 
(iv) getting the parties to see and experience their 
conflict as a shared dilemma; and 
(v) separating the 'people from the problem'"(Fischer, & 
Ury, 1981). 
This means that the third party must assist the parties in 
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11changing their perceptions, redefining their goals and 
critically reassessing their values~' Thus, third party 
intervention should go beyond a marginal change in the 
attitudes, perceptions and values of the parties; it should 
attempt a fundamental change in each party's concerns, and 
promote a "collaborative conflict resolution process". 
(Burton, 1969; 1972(b); de Reuck, 1974; Mitchell, 1981; 
Hill, 1982). 
On Burton's analysis (1972(b):46), conflict resolution as a 
result of third party intervention, demands that the parties should 
abandon power-oriented strategie~ which treat symptons only, and 
embrace "a participatory, analytical, and non-coercive approach 
which provides for the release of pent-up feelings and brings to 
surface underlying values, motives, and perceptions". 
However, being such a complex and demanding process, the 
problem-solving approach demands special qualities from third 
parties. 
Following Mitchell (1981:xvi), the most important attributes 
and qualities for successful third party intervention include, 
among others, the following 
(i) ''A basic sense of fairness, independence, and 
impartiality. 
(ii) A basic diagnostic ability!' 
All these attributes and qualities are being achieved by 
being "facilitative, non-coercive, diagnostic, non-directive, and 
non-evaluative". 
In addition to these attributes and qualities, Fisher 
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(1972:67-94), emphasises a capacity to "regulate interaction 
between the parties", and to "improve communication between the 
parties in conflict". 
Having concerned ourselves with the basis and attributes for 
successful third party intervention, the actual process of thir.d 
party intervention needs to be more fully discussed and analysed. 
In this respect, some mention will be made of the South African 
context and the prospects and problems associated with third party 
intervention there. 
7,4 The process of third party intervention 
While many traditional approaches to third party intervention have 
operated on a number of normative assumptions, such as that a third 
party constitutes something of a "miracle worker", "capable of 
resolving any kind of conflict", or that a third party is generally 
unwelcome or an "unwanted intruder" (Bercovitch, 1984:120), this 
chapter will address two issues of central importance to third 
party intervention, namely: (a) the process and modes of actual 
third party intervention, and (b) situational factors which affect 
the relationship between a third party and the conflicting parties. 
(a) Process and modes .of third party intervention 
The process and particular mode of third party intervention 
depend, to a considerable extent, on the character, context 
and participants in a conflict situation. Broadly speaking, a 
useful distincti.an between tw.a basic modes of intervention may 
be drawn, namely : 
(i) 'Process interventions', and 
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(ii) 'Instrumental interventions' (Bartunek et al., 1975; 
Lipshitz & Sherwood, 1978). 
Process interventions are comprehensive in nature, aiming to 
be inclusive of all the major political and social forma-
tions. in society. Their scope and impact are extensive. They 
are meant to affect the entire system of interactions and 
produce an acceptable termination of the conflict. Instru-
mental interventions, on the other hand, are more limited in 
scope. They are characterized by the absence of major par-
ties and groupings to the conflict, and have limited impact 
on the general outcome and dynamic of a conflict relation-
ship. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the mode and 
procedures associated with process intervention will be 
analysed. While it is true that'~rocess intervention may be 
more or less active, complex, open or difficult to institu-
tionalize,"this mode of intervention shares some common 
features. Bercovitch (1984:121), comments as follows :-
" ..• Process intervention focuses on the social, 
attitudinal, and interpersonal dimensions of a 
conflict relationship". 
Process intervention attempts to improve communication 
amongst the parties by directing attention toward the nature 
and meaning of a relationship and instil a realistic assess-
ment of the costs associated with continued conflict. As 
such, process intervention combines a variety of approaches 
and techniques to deal with some real problems associated 
with conflict. These include the problems of emotion, hos-
tile perceptions and communication. Each of these problems 
327 
will now be briefly discussed within the context of process 
intervention. 
Emotions 
By their very nature, conflict relationships generate 
considerable emotional energy. Many of the emotions gene-
rated, notably anger, frustration, fear and aversion do in 
fact complicate the process of third party intervention and 
of resolution. 
In process intervention a third party acts in a 
"supportive, facilitative, analytical, non-condemnatory and 
non-directive manner" (Mitchell, 1981:77) in attempting to 
address these emotional problems. In addition, the third 
party generates new information (negative emotions can be 
related to limited or unreliable information), and should 
encourage parties to express their feelings and emotions. To 
allow such an exchange to materialise, it demands from the 
third party considerable diagnostic skills, a basic ability 
to understand and reassure each party, and a capacity to 
create flexible structures for interaction. On Burton's 
(1967:20-36) analysis, it involves assisting each party to 
define the situation as it perceives it, 'clarifying 
positions' and 'generating options for mutual cooperation'. 
However, as Bercovitch (1984:121-122) points out, 
this strategy of intervention may work well "at some levels 
of analysis; it does not seem particularly helpful to 
participants in, for instance, protracted international 
conflicts". Conflicts such as those in the Middle East, 
South Africa or in parts of Latin America are "high-
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intensity" conflicts between diverse socio-political and 
cultural formations, 11 some of whom perceive a threat to their 
existence or vital interests; many of whom interact in a 
highly-charged environment where cohesion, trust, openness, 
and mutual support are low': A third party, intervening in 
such a conflict, where there is a clear 'us versus them' 
distinction faces a formidable task. In such a context, 
where conflicting parties are often prevented from deve-
loping 'consensual' or 'integrative solutions,' the third party 
intermediary has to play a more limited role. Most scholars 
agree that the "emotional hang-ups" will have to be worked 
through to some extent by the parties themselves, before 
process intervention can take place. (See, for example, 
Schein, 1969, and French et al., 1978.) The underlying role 
of a third party in such a context is to "assist" the 
parties by getting them to explore, express and (hopefully) 
modify their negative and hostile emotions so as to alter 
their attitudes and behaviour. 
In this context, the 'case-work method', suggested as 
early as 1949 by Hollis (1949:294-9), may offer some useful 
applications. Hollis argues the case for what he terms, 
'psychological support', which involves providing the 
parties with a "sympathetic hearing, understanding of their 
feelings and emotions, and confidence in their ability to 
overcome their mutual problem". Moreover, the third party 
must engage in 'clarification', where the parties are 
encouraged in the exploration and understanding of their 
environment and its problems and in 'insight', which 
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involves "pushing the client towards a deeper understanding 
of his own actions and emotions". 
Perceptions 
The other aspect that is significant to process intervention 
concerns the problem of perception. Parties in conflict have 
different - and often mutually exclusive - perceptions of 
their situation. It is important to remember that the 
perceptions of parties reflect not only an objective 
situation of incompatibility, but also each other's self-
image and prejudices. To the extent that perceptions are 
inaccurate, or even faulty, conflict can escalate and become 
more destructive. In principle, no party is immune to this 
process. Thus a third party in process intervention is also 
expressly concerned with this psychological dimension of 
conflict. On this point Bercovitch (1984:122), comments as 
follows : 
" ..• Its efforts are designed to discover the hidden 
needs and unravel the unconscious dispositions of the 
parties. Its general strategy is to deal with values 
and concepts which can aid misperception and adjust 
individual perception by reality testing". 
The various techniques which a third party can 
utilise to realise these objectives include, among others, 
assisting the parties to be as explicit and honest about 
their perceptions (for example, asking them to write them 
down in some order) and testing the relevance of partisan 
and common perceptions. Other techniques which have been 
utilised suggest that encouraging the free expression of 
feelings, perceptions as well as issues, without one party 
blaming the other, and analysing each party's perceptions 
openly, can enhance the prospect of arriving at a mutually 
acceptable outcome. 
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The real significant point, however, is that a third 
party in process intervention should ensure that parties do 
not perceive only two mutually exclusive solutions or out-
comes to a conflict, namely, 'winning' or 'losing'. Percep-
tions of 'total victory' such as those that inform the views 
of the present South African Government and the African 
National Congress (ANC) militate against negotiations. 
Therefore a third party should ask questions and elicit 
information in order to increase awareness of a common pre-
dicament. 
One of the most important dimensions in successful 
third party intervention is the ability to understand the 
perceptions, expectations and choices of the respective 
warring parties. In a more gen er.al sense, a third party can 
assist in reducing mutually exclusive perceptions by insis-
ting on "summarizing issues, restating positions, and dis-
seminating relevant information". All these techniques may 
result in parties perceiving their relationship not as 'us 
versus them', but as 'us versus the conflict'. 
On Bercovitch's analysis (1984:123), the possibili-
ties of such a perceptual shift "are contingent upon open-
ness, understanding, free and unrestricted information, 
trust, and interpersonal competence". Adding that third 
party intervention of the process mode can, however, only 
achieve this if, "(a) the number of parties permits 
participation by everyone involved, and (b) those involved 
exchange their~ perceptions, rather than those of their 
referrent groups". Process intervention is effective only 
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when a third party has direct access to the conflicting 
parties. 
Communication 
Open and reliable communication between conflicting parties 
is wisely seen as a prerequisite to cooperation and success-
ful conflict resolution. A third party involved in process 
intervention is more than 'go-between' parties. A third 
party provides not only the 1context•and1opportunity,to 
communicate,"but also the opportunity to review the content 
of communication and to ensure that each is able to under-
stand the other side'! 
The relevant techniques that a third party can employ 
to assist in this vital problem,11 range from summing up posi-
tions, clarifying points of departure, restating key argu-
ments (if and when necessary), and providing information in-
puts:'Following the precepts of the Burtonian model to con-
flict resolution, resolution itself is a product of 'direct, 
reliable and undistorted communication'. 
Burton (1967:14) himself operates on the assumption 
that an increase in communication alone may enhance the 
tendency of parties to cooperate and to subject their 
conflict to att~mpts to resolve it. Bercovitch (1984:123-
124), however, adds the caveat that this may be true of 
process intervention only; it does not hold for instrumental 
intervention. Moreover, in some situations such as those 
characterised by intense conflict of interests, increasing 
communication, or the opportunities to communicate may 
actually result in heightened conflict. 
332 
In process intervention, third parties can influence 
the way information is being collected and presented so that 
it is optimally useful to the phases of diagnosis, analysis 
and resolution. However, it needs to be stressed that pro-
cess intervention, with its emphasis on 'openness' and 
'communication', does not in itself produce a decrease in 
intergroup or international conflict. 
Process intervention is designed with a view to im-
proving intra and inter-personal skills and competence. 
Like the problem-solving workshops previously discussed, its 
most significant impact·occurs in terms of changes in indi-
vidual perception and behaviour. Thus, a third party can 
assist in achieving by engaging in the following activi-
ties 
(i) Diagnosis 
Essentially third party intervention in this phase 
includes the gathering of relevant information, 
discussing assumptions and perceptions, defining the 
problem and assisting with the development of a 
framework for communication and interaction. 
(ii) Analysis 
Third party activities in this phase include assis-
ting the parties with ways of thinking about con-
flicts, involving the parties in exploring issues 
and alternatives, and improving their under-
standing. 
(iii) Conflict resolution 
During this phase the third party assists the parties 
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to find a soiution based on 'mutual benefit' and 'joint 
action'. 
Process intervention as discussed here has, as its 
overriding objective, the improvement of the parties' use of 
their capabilities and resources to achieve creative problem 
-solving.' Based on Mitchell's analysis (1981:77), third 
party interventions are based on the assumption that in a 
conflict relationship, a third party"(a) generates 
information, (b) provides analytical resources, and (c) acts 
in a supportive manner by assisting the parties to come to 
terms with their conflict!' Ideally, a third party should 
exclude its own values and interests from the conflict 
relationship. However, any third party intervention in the 
type of social conflict that concerns this study involves a 
triadic system of two parties in conflict and an inter-
mediary third party. This implies that the process of third 
party intervention is not as neutral as is often assumed. 
7.5 Variables affecting process intervention 
In each conflict relationship there are specific variables and 
conditions that affect the dynamic of a conflict and the potential 
role and limitations of third party intervention.On Buckingham's 
analysis (1982), the variables that seem to matter most are : 
(a) the nature of the issues in dispute, (b) the nature of the 
parties, (c) the nature of their relationship, and (d) their expe-
rience with conflict settlement and resolution. 
As a more general observation, it needs to be emphasized 
that, trying to isolate the variables conducive to joint problem-
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solving, is by no means a simple matter. For each conflict has its 
own peculiar set of circumstances and dynamic that may either 
favour third party resolution or be opposed to it. A review of 
successful cases of third party intervention of the process 
variety, seem to suggest the following as some important variables 
or conditions in undertaking this kind of intervention. 
(i) Situational variables 
Process intervention is affected by such situational 
variables as a 'supportive or participative climate' (which 
enhances creativity) versus 'an authoritarian climate' 
(which discourages it). It is influenced by "spatial 
arrangements and degree of informality". Other situational 
variables that are important include :"the absence of time 
pressure and the availability of and access to reliable 
information. ·Finally, process interventions are more likely 
to succeed when conflict parties are roughly equal in size, 
have much the same experience and when they can be creative, 
free and open" (Bercovitch, 1984:125). 
(ii) Rationality 
Rational and effective problem-solving is dependent upon a 
'\::lear formulation of the issues in conflict." It is further 
dependent on information having the same meaning for both 
parties. Bercovitch (1984:125-126), comments succinctly: 
11 ••• The success of process intervention will depend 
on the parties' willingness and ability to expend 
high levels of energy to define the problem clearly, 
gather facts, identify alternatives, give information 
without accusations or judgements, and generally 
i11teract in a more rational way". 
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(iii) Attitudinal variables 
The prospect for successful process intervention improves 
considerably when warring parties accept basic 'inter-
dependence' and display some positive feelings and emotions 
towards each other. Thus, it is very important that the 
feelings and attitudes of the parties be identified, 
analysed and (if need be) changed, '~or feelings of anger 
or fear may enter the process and influence attempts at 
conflict resolution detrimentally." 
(iv) Perceptual variables 
Conflict resolution or termination is often unsuccessful 
because it is undermined by the view that in each <;onflict 
there must be a 'winner' and a 'loser' and each party is 
determined not to be the 'loser'. This perceptual pattern of 
'us versus them' is largely the product of socialization. 
Such a pattern of necessity exerts pressures towards zero-
sum outcomes and competitive relationships. If process 
intervention is to be successful, it would require a situa-
tion wherein the biased perceptions of the parties can be 
changed. This seems more likely to be the case at the 
personal rather than at other levels of analysis. 
Bercovitch (1984:126) illustrates these four sets of 
variables that influence both the possibilities and limita-
tions of process intervention. 
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CONDITIONS AND VARIABLES AFFECTING PROCESS INTERVENTION 
SITUATIONAL ATTITUDINAL 
PROBLEM-SOLVING 
"Finally, it needs to be emphasized that the decision,to 
resort to process intervention cannot be made in the ab-
stract. Whether systematically or intuitively, cognizance 
has to be taken of situational, attitudinal, perceptual and 
rational variables, as all of these have an effect on the 
process of third party intervention" (Bercovitch,1984:passim). 
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7.6 The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group - an unsuccessful 
attempt at third party intermediation 
Against this theoretical background, the unsuccessful attempt of 
the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group in May 1986, to act as a 
third party intermediary with a view towards assisting the process 
of dialogue and negotiations between the ruling National Party and 
the majority Black population of South Africa, will be critically 
assessed. 
The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was appointed 
under the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa, accepted by Heads 
of Government in Nassau in the Bahamas in October 1985 as a "united 
Commonwealth response to the challenge of apartheid" (Mission to 
South Africa, 1986:19)."The Accord in its entirety provided the 
political and diplomatic framework for their intermediation; it 
contained both a specific injunction to the Group and called upon 
the South African Government to undertake five particular steps so 
as to create the conditions conducive to meaningful negotiations'; 
These five steps entailed the following : 
"(a) A public declaration by the South African Government that 
the system of apartheid would be dismantled, followed by 
specific and meaningful action taken in fulfilment of that 
end; 
(b) The termination of the national state of emergency; 
(c) The immediate and unconditional release of Nelson Mandela 
~nd all others imprisoned or detained for their oppositio~ 
to apartheid; 
(d) The restoration of political freedom, which would include 
the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and 
other political parties; and 
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(e) The initiation by Pretoria, in the context of a suspension 
of violence on all sides, of a process of dialogue with a 
view to establishing a non-racial and representative 
government" (Mission to South Africa, 1986:p.142). 
The last step, namely, the facilitating of dialogue and negotia-
tions between the South African Government and the majority Black 
population of South Africa, was of direct concern to the EPG 
Mission. 
The EPG Mission operated on the premise that although the 
first four steps'~ere formally distinct from the overriding objec-
tive to facilitate a meaningful process of dialogue and negotia-
tions, their implementation would create the conditions, and gene-
rate the confidence, within which meaningful negotiations could 
take place J' 
The nature of the task set by the Heads of Government Meet-
ing in Nassau, and the definition of their own role, namely, to act 
as a 'facilitator'in a process of negotiations involving all the 
relevant political formations, were typical of process interven-
tion. Not only was the intervention seen as of ~hort duration, but 
the EPG Mission made it clear that it was never its intention to be 
prescriptive about the kind of political system that ought to be 
established in post-apartheid South Africa. That remained the 
'~rerogative and responsibility of the representatives of all the 
people of South Africa~' Moreover, the nature of their intervention 
was seen to be voluntary, while they attempted to influence, and to 
some extent, regulate the interactions of the different parties. 
The EPG Mission was also requested by the Heads of Government Meet-
ing in Nassau to intervene in the conflict. 
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Aware that their task and role was limited to that of a 
'facilitator', the EPG Mission agreed upon a number of operational 
principles at the outset. These were : 
(i) First, it was decided that despite the considerable media 
interest in their mission, they would work "quietly and in 
non-public ways" (Mission to South Africa, 1986:21). This 
meant that, while their mission was in progress, they would 
make no public statements or respond publicly to what others 
might say about their work. 
(ii) Secondly, it was decided that their approach to all parties 
would be "non-confrontational". 
(iii) Thirdly, it was decided to allow for a "low-keyed prelimi-
nary visit" to South Africa by the two co-Chairmen, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo and Mr .Malcolm Fraser, accompanied by Dame 
Nita Barrow. This visit was intended to make contact and to 
allay suspicions about the full _Group and thus paving the 
way for the arrival of the other members of the EPG Mission. 
(iv) Finally, in gaining access to all the principal parties, the 
Group deliberately tried to"demonstrate its independence!' 
Therefore, the Group travelled alone, without any government 
security personnel, and accompanied only by their own small 
secretariat. 
The EPG Mission travelled extensively in the country and 
visited the Frontline States as well. Their various meetings 
included twenty-one meetings with Ministers of the South African 
Government, with leaders of political and other organizations, as 
well as with prominent academic, political, religious and community 
figures. Thus, ostensibly, the EPG Mission adhered to some of the 
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essential requirements for successful process intervention, such 
as, independence, a non-condemnatory disposition, fairness and 
acceptance that the eventual process of negotiations will be the 
responsibility of the parties most intimately involved in the 
conflict. 
Yet, the EPG Mission failed in its attempts to facilitate 
dialogue and negotiations between the South African Government and 
the majority Black population of South Africa. Why was this the 
case? To this question some answers will be attempted in the 
following few pages. 
By their own admission, suspicion among most of the "prin-
cipal parties added to the difficulty and sensitivity" of their 
mission (Mission to South Africa, 1986:20). Among Blacks, for exam-
ple, there was intense distrust of the policies of the Thatcher 
Government and of her own intentions."This resulted in the percep-
tion that the Group was a product of the Thatcher Government's wish 
to oppose sanctions against South Africa and a mechanism to post-
pone effective international action against the South African 
regime~ Thus, from the outset, the EPG Mission had a major task to 
establish its independence and credibility. Suspicion was not 
limited to the Black community. The South African Government itself 
questioned the impartiality of the Group and expressed some mis-
givings about the composition of the EPG Mission. In this respect, 
the position and role of the two co-Chairmen, Mr Malcolm Fraser and 
General Olusegun Obasanjo, was questioned. 
However, there were other more fundamental reasons which 
accounted for the failure of the EPG Mission. First· , the launch-
ing of military strikes by the South African Defence Force (SADF) 
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into three neighbouring countries, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana, 
while the EPG Mission was in the country, did much to undermine the 
credibility of the entire exercise. As such these military opera-
tions, whether deliberately planned to coincide with the EPG 
Mission or not, left little doubt about the South African Govern-
ment's attitude when it was brought face to face with the prospect 
of real negotiations between itself and significant political 
formations such as the banned ANC. 
Secondly, the EPG Mission showed that the conditions 
conducive to direct negotiations between the South African Govern-
ment and the ANC were either not present at the time, or were 
perceived by both to be absent. In addition to this, both the 
South African Government and the ANC perceived that they were on 
the ascendancy. This perception militated against negotiations 
between these two principal parties. 
Thirdly, there existed different conceptions on the part of 
the South African Government and the ANC on the nature of negotia-
tions. Both of these parties had essentially a zero-sum perception 
of what negotiations are all about. Both shared the perception that 
negotiations meant persuading the other side to give up something 
or do something they do not want to do. Furthermore, that there 
existed no room for compromise and a mutually satisfactory outcome. 
The gains of one of the parties were seen to be at the expense of 
the other. In contrast to these perceptions, real negotiations 
means investing something in the interests of both parties and 
assisting them to achieve it. The task of a third party inter-
mediary is to help the parties to generat~ better options~ The 
principal parties also perceived negotiations as a single event, 
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rather than as a process of extended bargaining and dialogue. 
Fourthly, the time constraint - six months - imposed by the 
Heads of Government Meeting on the EPG Mission was unrealistic. 
Fifthly, the political constraints on both parties - the 
South African Government and the ANC - prohibited meaningful nego-
tiations. From the perception of the South African Government, 
negotiations with the ANC could entail considerable political 
risks, such as the following: the loss of political support to the 
right-wing parties; affording legitimacy to those forces bent on 
the overthrow of the present governmental system; the risk that the 
government might lose control of the process of reform; the pros-
pect that the government might end up making all the significant 
concessions while getting little in return; the risk that by giving 
in to violence, the government itself might encourage more violence 
and, finally, that the outside world would not necessarily support 
the outcome of such negotiations. 
From the position of the ANC, negotiations at that point in 
time would have carried risks that the movement could have done 
without. These might conceivably have included a combination of the 
following: Negotiations might have resulted in the ANC looking 
weak; lead to loss of support; undercut the potential for revolutio-
nary change, and weaked the legitimacy of the organization. 
Thus, on balance, both parties gained more from not negotia-
ting, at least not at that point in time. This is not to say that 
the position will not change in future, but merely that the reasons 
for not negotiating outweighed those for negotiating, at that 
particular point in time. 
Finally, the EPG Mission failed because the two principal 
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parties - the ANC and the South African Government - both failed to 
act upon the principle of 'reciprocity'. Significantly, both 
parties failed to respond positively to the notion of the suspen-
sion of violence on all sides. 
In a more general sense, the EPG Mission failed because it 
took place in a climate of sanctions and other punitive measures 
being introduced against the South African Government. Not only did 
these developments affect the credibility of the Mission, but they 
also hardened the attitudes of the South African Government against 
foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the country. 
The general conclusion thus, is that the EPG Mission, for 
some of the reasons previously discussed, failed to focus the 
interest of all the parties on ways of how to resolve the conflict, 
rather than on 'defeating the other side'. Thus, the principal 
parties did not experience the conflict as a 'shared dilemm~, but 
rather viewed it in mutually-exclusive terms. However, having said 
that, the EPG Mission was significant from a theoretical point of 
view, for it highlighted the real limitations associated with this 
mode of third party intervention in a context of basic cleavage 
conflict. 
Having concerned ourselves wih the process of third party 
intervention and the variables that have a bearing upon such 
intervention, the focus now moves to a discussion of the complex 
problem of the most appropriate time for intervention. 
7.7 Time sequence 
Process intervention by a Third Party can only be successful if -
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at the very least - some of the following conditions prevail : 
(i) All the parties are more interested in resolving their 
conflict than in 'winning' or defeating the other side;, 
(ii) Both parties have "a sense of communality and complemen-
tarity of interests"; 
(iii) Both parties are able to exercise'~ome control over the 
outcome of the negotiationsJ' and 
(iv) Both parties'accept the legitimacy of the intermediary and 
are prepared to allow it to mediate in the conflict" 
(Bercovitch, 1984:94). 
In addition to these conditions, it is widely accepted that 
the time of intervention may exercise a considerable influence over 
the success or otherwise of conflict resolution. Basically there 
are two positions on the question of the appropriate time for 
intervention. Some scholars argue for early intervention with a 
view to prevent the emergence of violent behaviour. Other scholars 
are in favour of intervention at a later stage in a conflict, 
arguing that this will enhance the prospects for resolution. 
In either case, the stage at which intervention is initiated 
can affect the pattern and outcome of such intervention. While 
there is no general consensus on this issue, Douglas (1962) 
proposed that "a third party should not intervene too early before 
the conflict relationship has been properly clarified and under-
stood." Edmund (1971) takes a different view, arguing that inter-
vention is more' likely to be effective if initiated at an early 
stage before the parties commit too many resources to their 
particular conflict .11 
Based on various case studies of actual intervention, it 
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seems that one can generalise by saying that intervention should 
not be premature before the issues in conflict have been adequately 
identified, clarified, and discussed by the parties themselves. If 
intervention takes place too early, the parties can hardly be ex-
pected to articulate a perception of the possible room for compro-
mise, nor can they be sufficiently aware of the escalating costs 
associated with the conflict. As a general proposition, Bercovitch 
(1984:108), argues that once the parties become aware of their own 
ability to do something about the conflict, as well as of its in-
creased costs, "signals the most propitious timing for interven-
tion". 
Timing defines to a considerable extent the circumstances of 
intervention. The latter are arguably most conducive to interven-
tion when,",(a) the parties themselves experience problems with 
their own attempts at conflict resolution; (b) the warring parties 
come to the realization that they face an inescapable situation of 
escalation and increased costs; and (c) they are aware of the 
limitations associated with resorting to violent behaviour" (Bercovitch,passi 
The above conditions emphasize the central importance of the 
development of a perception on the part of the warring parties that 
they are in need of assistance to help them to resolve their con-
flict relationship. However, such a perception is not a sufficient 
condition for third party intervention, it has to be complemented 
by a realization that the costs of the conflict have become intole-
rably high to both parties. Unless such a realization is present, 
and the warring parties share a perception that the continuation of 
conflict would undermine their own interests, third party interven-
tion would both be unlikely and unsuccessful. This is a further 
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reason accounting for the failure of the EPG Mission and their 
attempts at third party intervention, because both the South 
African Government and the African National Congress (ANC) did not 
share such a perception at the time when the attempts at interven-
tion were made. Both parties operated on the perception that they 
were on the ascendancy, a perception that militated against effec-
tive third party intervention and against negotiations. 
In her controversial study of Conflict in Africa, Adda 
Bozeman emphasizes the importance of the African concept of "non-
differentiated time" and its relevance to conflict resolution. She 
argues that in the African mind there exists no clear distinction 
between present, past and future. This "non-differentiated" concep-
tion of time complicates attempts at conflict resolution in the 
sense that it impacts not only on present circumstances, but on 
both the past and future developments. 
7.8 Composition of the discussion format 
There is no general agreement amongst scholars as to the 
composition and format of the 'ideal' discussion format. Kelman 
(1972:168:204), for example, argues that the 'ideal participant' 
should be someone outside the policy process, but 'highly 
influential
1
to it. Anthony de Reuck (1974:64-80), on the other 
hand, argues that in intensely destructive conflicts such as 
Northern Ireland and the Middle East, the 'ideal' participant is 
someone 'directly involved in the policy process'. Each of these 
two scholars arrives at his conclusion based on different 
hypotheses regarding the relationship of flexibility and 
adaptability to the policy process. 
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The entire issue of the composition of the discussion format 
needs to be further explored. In this respect, some possible areas 
for further research might include : 
(1) Does the type of representative make a difference to the 
process of conflict resolution? 
Special emphasis might be placed on an analysis of the 
potential influence and importance of variables such as 
age, sex, educational background, socio-economic status, 
and ability to impact on the policy process. The various 
Problem-Solving Workshops examined in this study do not 
adequately deal with this problem. 
(2) Does the type of third party make a difference? 
Here one ~ight want to assess and contrast 'conflict ana-
lysts' in the Burtonian sense with 'case specialists' as 
suggested by Mitchell (1981:76-77), and 'coercive' with 
'non-coercive' third parties, a distinction introduced by 
Bercovitch (1984). 
(3) What effect (if any) do numbers have on the process of 
conflict termination? 
A useful avenue for further research might be to investi-
gate if different ratios of third parties to conflict 
representatives would have an effect on the process of 
conflict resolution. Equally useful, might be to investigate 
situations where there are different ratios of one party's 
representatives to the other's. 
The workshops examined in this study differ in terms of 
the nature and number of third party intermediation. In some 
workshops the number of consultants exceeds the number of 
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party representatives. In others the number of third party 
intermediaries is equal to the number of party representa-
tives. Still others have the party representatives vastly 
outnumbering the third party. 
(4) What influence does time have on the discussion format? 
Regarding this issue, useful avenues for further research 
might conceivably include the following: When is it more 
useful and constructive to have a single lengthy session as 
opposed to a series of short, intensive sessions? 
(5) How important is the setting? 
Here, one would like to contrast public with private 
settings, and academic with non-academic settings. All the 
Problem-Solving Workshops examined in this study, agree that 
to enhance treative problem-solving; it is vital to esta-
blish an alternative set of behavioural norms to those held 
by the parties to a conflict. The academic setting appears 
to be the most appropiate for this, with relatively unstruc-
tured discussions and a supportive' third party. 
(6) How important is the level of internal cohesion of the war-
ring parties? 
(7) What role does structure of the discussion format play? 
In this respect, it might be useful to contrast face-to-face 
interaction with those through a third party, fixed agendas 
with the absence of agendas, task-orientation with training 
orientation. 
While there are other possible areas for further research, 
these would provide a useful starting point. In each of these seven 
areas, analysts have concluded that these variables affect the 
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process of conflict resolution, but the exact nature of the rela-
tionship is obscure. Thus, it would seem that the next logical step 
would be to ~nalyse the nature of these relationships. 
7.9 The relationship between the type of conflict and the 
relevance of techniques 
An important question that deserves to be further explored, is 
whether the type of conflict has a bearing on the selection of 
techniques for its resolution? As a first step, it might be useful 
to consider conflict intensity'as an important variable that has an 
effect on resolution. The more important question, however, is 
whether the type of conflict has implications for the selection of 
techniques aimed at its resolution. For example, would ideological 
conflict demand different techniques for resolution than, say, a 
conflict of interest? Unfortunately, the different problem-solving 
workshops examined here,do not offer much guidance on this impor-
tant question. 
Not only is the empirical data from the various attempts at 
conflict resolution limited, but the analysts themselves have not 
adequately addressed this question. Moreover, this question is 
further complicated by the reality that not all conflicts are open 
to resolution, some may indeed become more destructive and escalate 
as a result of intervention. As argued elsewhere, the distinction 
between conflicts of value and conflicts of interests, is an 
important one that needs to be considered by a third party inter-
mediary. 
Based on the works of a variety of scholars, notably Rubin 
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(1983:135-147); Raiffa (1983:195-210); Deutsch (1982), and Fisher & 
Ury (1981), to name but a few, it·seems that conflicts of value or 
ideological conflict, pose more complex problems of resolution than 
conflicts of interest. Moreover, conflict intensity (expressed in 
terms of the positions of parties on issues) complicates prospects 
for resolution. Under conditions of intense conflict, such as in 
the case of Northern Ireland, research has shown that third party 
intermediation and resolution are much more complex (Deutsch & 
Krauss, 1960; Krauss & Deutsch, 1966, and Rubin, 1983:143). 
Thus, while Roger Fisher and William Ury's (1983) four 
maxims on conflict resolution, namely, "separate the people from 
the problem; focus on interests not positions; invent options for 
mutual gain; and insist on objective criteria" are useful, their 
approach is deficient in several respects. Firs4 it does not 
deal with the problem that objectives and conflic'ting interests and 
values are pursued with different intensity by parties. Secondly, 
it fails to recognise that in some conflict situations, certain 
outcomes or advantages clearly dominate all other possible outcomes 
or advantages, and likewise with disadvantages. Hence, there should 
be provision for two additional outcomes, namely, (++) "an over-
whelmingly significant advantage" and(--) "an overwhelmingly 
significant disadvantage" (Isard & Smith, 1982:364). 
By definition, ideological or value conflict revolves around 
different conceptions of the desirable over prescriptive norms and 
beliefs which do or should govern behavioural patterns. Returning 
to South Africa, it is important to emphasize at the outset that 
the South African negotiation context is to some extent unique in 
itself, making analogies to previous African experience highly 
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dubious. To begin with, the proportion of whites to blacks is 
markedly higher in South Africa than elsewhere in Africa (with the 
notable exception of former French-ruled Algeria). Not only are the 
whites more securely entrenched with a higher stake in the system 
and more directly related to state power, but South Africa is a 
much more industrialised society than any other on the African 
continent. The growing middle class is dependent upon the state for 
access, benefits and security. Thus, until the costs of maintaining 
the status quo rise considerably (to the point where dominant 
elements within the ruling class perceive their interests to be 
threatened), bargaining seems unlikely to alter the basic rules of 
the political game as was the case in Zimbabwe (and then, only 
after a bitter and protracted civil war). To quote Heribert Adam 
(1983:132-133) irt support : 
"the costs of racial privilege maintenance are also 
increasing through heightened internal unrest, escalating 
guerrilla incursions and international ostracism. However, 
unlike the Zimbabwe situation, since blacks cannot force 
whites to negotiate their capitulation, the conflict remains 
an uneasy stalemate". 
Therefore, because the South _African context is different from that 
of the states to the north during their phase of decolonization, 
the process of conflict resolution and negotiation are likely to be 
an even more complex one. 
Writing on the major constraints facing negotiations in 
South Africa, Rothchild (1987:9), mentions the reality that there 
is "a divergence on principles, not interests in South Africa". 
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"What is perceived to be at stake in South African conflict is not 
distributive interests, which are negotiable, but matters of prin-
ciple". For many whites·, the maintenance of group rights, 
separate schools and racially distinct residential areas, and the 
furtherance of capitalist economic relations are matters of 
principle over which compromise will be very difficult. Conflict 
resolution in the South African context clearly demands some 
formula which reconciles the legitimate demand for one person one 
vote and the right of all citizens to form political parties and 
compete for political power. However, this is easier said than 
done, especially given the perceptions of the opposing forces noted 
above. 
7.10 Composition of the warring parties 
Meaningful third-party intervention and negotiations require 
acceptable legitimate representatives who can speak for, and if 
necessary, exercise a degree of control over their constituents. 
Lack of legitimacy on the part of these representatives leads to a 
declining capacity for effective negotiations. The leaders of the 
respective parties may, under such conditions, find it virtually 
impossible to uphold their end of the bargain, resulting in 
disappointment and frustration about the negotiation process. Hence 
conflicts of value or interests within the ranks of the respective 
parties, are likely to complicate the process of arriving at 
decisions as well as implementing them. Moreover, in some cases, 
the longer the process of negotiations are put off, the more 
fragmentation is likely to occur, resulting over time in an even 
more complex negotiating context. 
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In present-day South Africa, there are clear signs of 
fragmentation within the major political formations. Not only are 
the whites divided linguistically and ethnically among the 
Afrikaners, English, Jews and others but, significant ideological 
divisions are apparent between the 'pragmatists', the small, but 
vociferous, 'radical left', the conservatives and the far-right. 
On the black side divisions of an interest and ideological 
nature are also apparent, not only among the homeland leaders 
(witness the feud between the Republic of Transkei and Ciskei), 
Inkatha and the United Democratic Front (UDF) and its affiliates, 
notably the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), but also between the 
'Charterists' (especially the African National Congress (ANC)) and 
the Black Consciousness Movements, such as AZAPO and the Pan-
Afrie; anist Congress (PAC). 
At the minimum, such potential cleavages will have to be 
papered over by leaders in both the white and black groupings if 
each side is to know whom it is bargaining with and is to be 
assured that its rival will be in a position to deliver on its 
promises. Alternatively, one major faction or political formation 
could strike a deal in the hope that the other groupings would 
eventually join with them, but it is a tactic fraught with uncer-
tainty, especially in a deeply divided society such as South 
Africa. 
As shown by the fate of the Commonwealth Mission to facili-
tate a dialogue between the major political formations in South 
Africa, external mediators are not, for the time being, in a strong 
position to influence outcomes in the South African political 
equation. The general weakness of third party intermediation in 
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this conflict stems from various factors. First , South Africa is 
not a colony in the sense normally understood by this term, ruling 
out external third party intervention of the type seen in Zimbabwe. 
Secondly, there seems to be few candidates left who have credibi-
lity and legitimacy with all sides in the current conflict. By 
their very nature, highly polarised situations leave little room 
for compromise, either for the parties themselves or for their 
possible external mediators."As the third party intermediary 
identifies strongly with either gradual reform or with liberation, 
it inevitably becomes unacceptable to some of the other political 
groupings, thereby forfeiting the high ground from which successful 
intervention might be launche~'(Burton, 1986:105). Thirdly, the 
third party intermediary, if one could be found, would have limited 
inducements to offer to both extremes - the ruling National Party 
and the African National Congress - because both operate on a 
perception of total victory. Finally, few third party mediators 
would want to become so deeply involved in the highly polarised 
South African conflict to offer such incentives, and there is no 
certainty that even such an extensive involvement would be 
sufficient to bring about the desired outcome. However, third 
parties can facilitate change to some extent, but there are clear 
limits to what such a party can reasonably be expected to achieve. 
7.11 Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that, despite a growing body of literature on 
conflict resolution and third party intervention, the practice of 
the latter process and the problems associated with it has only 
been very recently studied systematically. 
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The most importantconclusions reached with reference to 
third party intervention are the following: 
(a) The third party's theoretical understanding of conflict has 
implications for the mode of conflict resolution. For 
example, a subjective understanding of conflict will focus 
on changing social conditions rather than perceptions. 
(b) Successful third party intermediation demands some under-
standing of the causes of a conflict relationship. In some 
cases this might involve an understanding of the history of 
a particular conflict. 
(c) The basis of third party intermediation displays certain 
features of which the following are especially important 
Such intervention is voluntary; designed to influence and 
regulate the interaction between conflicting parties; 
I 1 • I d I 1 • 11 ( • • h temporary; non-eva uative an ana ytica assisting t e 
parties to discover the sources of their conflict). 
(d) Third party intermediation must be seen as part of a more 
comprehensive process of conflict resolution. 
(e) Successful third party intermediation demands certain attri-
butes from third parties, such as fairness; flexibility; 
legitimacy and independence. 
(f) There are two basic modes of third party intervention, 
namely, instrumental and process intervention. 
(g) Process intervention is affected by various variables of a 
situational, attitudinal, perceptual and rational nature. 
(h) A brief analysis of an unsuccessful attempt at third party 
intermediation in South Africa showed that there were funda-
mental reasons why the EPG Mission failed. These reasons 
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related to factors such as : the time factor; the composi-
tion of the warring parties; mutually exclusive perceptions 
that both principal parties were on the ascendancy and the 
fact that both parties could not be induced by the third 
party to negotiate. 
(i) The chapter concluded with a discussion of some theoretical 
avenues for further research. These included : the relevance 
of time sequence; the composition of the discussion format; 
the relationship between the type of conflict and the rele-
vance of specific techniques, and the composition of the 
warring parties. 
In the final chapter, an attempt will be made to summarize 
the major conclusions reached in this study. 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study an attempt was made to analyse the various problem-
solving workshops associated with the work of John Burton and 
Leonard Doob and their associates. The study has shown that these 
workshops, devised to analyse and resolve cvonflict, are based on 
remarkably similar assumptions. The most important of these, are : 
(a) That individuals and nations act in their own interests, and 
that these interests are calculated on both rational and 
subjective grounds. 
(b) That in any conflict, the basic unit to be considered is the 
individual human being. Thus, these workshops are informed! 
by the precepts of methodological individualism and aim to 
change individual values and (mis)perceptions. 
(c) Human nature is inherently open to adaptation, change and 
learning. Therefore conflict contains alterable components 
such as perceptions and costs. 
(d) In any situation of conflict, political constraints of some 
kind or another are needed to ensure the maintenance of 
social principles such as reason and justice. 
(e) Mediation is a learned technique as opposed to the tradi-
tional view that views it as 'an art.' 
(f) While conflicts differ in terms of their underlying sources 
and implications there are, nonetheless, common patterns in 
most conflicts. 
(g) Conditions in which conflicts can or cannot be resolved can 
be determined by the analyst. 
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(h) Only the parties most directly involved can arrive at accep-
table outcomes. The mediator only facilitates resolution. 
Resolution can and should not be imposed. 
(i) Despite objective conditions, conflicts are essentially 
subjective. The two most pervasive objective sources of 
conflict are position scarcity and resource scarcity. 
(j) Conflict is a relational phenomenon that manifests itself at 
different levels of interaction. Thus, it has to be resolved 
or terminated at different levels as well. 
The study found that the workshops have been designed to 
fulfil two essential theoretical purposes : conflict analysis and 
conflict resolution. Therefore, the theoretical utility of the 
workshop approach has to be assessed on both of these counts. In a 
more general sense, this study concluded' that the workshops show 
more strengths as tools for conflict analysis. Their utility to 
resolve social conflict is inherently limited. 
This analysis has shown that the various conflict workshops 
have both strengths and serious weaknesses. The more impor.tant 
strengths include the following 
(1) The workshops provide a useful setting for conflict analysis 
and learning about conflict and its dynamic. 
(2) The workshop setting lends itself to the preparation of more 
comprehensive negotiations and establishing some of the 
preconditions for agreement~ 
(3) The informal setting associated with the workshop approach 
is conducive to improving communication between the conflic-
ting parties, especially because of its non-commital nature. 
(4) Communication can take place with minimum commitment and 
risk to the participants. 
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(S) The experience of the various workshops has shown that they 
are most useful in affecting changes in individual percep-
tions and values. 
(6) Workshops offer a novel and useful setting for a theoretical 
understanding of conflict. 
However, this study has emphasized various limitations 
associated with the workshops of Burton and Doob. The following can 
be regarded as the most serious :-
(i) Despite attempts to integrare the workshops with the broader 
policy process, these have remained remarkably distant from 
actual policy-makers. 
(ii) The success of the various workshops to transfer insights 
obtained in the workshop setting to the plicy process has 
been-at best - mixed. In most cases no such transfer took 
place. 
(iii) In a more general sense, the various workshops have failed 
to integrate their respective approaches with more compre-
hensive understanding of conflict and its termination. 
(iv) The various workshops analysed in this study have shown 
great difficulty in changing group, communal or collective 
perceptions and values. Clearly, the strength of the work-
shop approach is at the individual - rather than at the 
group - or national level. 
(v) Whatever their individual merits, workshops do not serve as 
substitutes for more traditional modes of negotiation and 
conflict resolution. They can, however, provide the ground-
work for broader negotiations. 
(vi) The absence of any reliable merchanism to ensure that the 
insights gained during the workshop are retained when the 
representatives return to their respective environments, 
remains a significant limitation. 
(vii) Some of the workshops - notably those of Doob and his 
associates - have shown a preoccupation with techniques and 
experimentation almost at the expense of serious analysis of 
the substantive issues in conflict. 
(viii) The absence of adequate follow-up research, makes the 
individual results and impact of the various workshops 
uncertain and problematic to determine. 
(ix) Failure of the various workshops to adequately explore 
specific issues relevant to the practice of conflict 
intervention is a major limitation. 
On this point, the following factors are of special 
importance : the variables that influence the success or failure of 
such intervention; the kinds of conflict intervention (process and 
instrumental) and their implications for resolution; the 
composition and cohesion of the warring parties; the symbolic 
importance attached by parties to a conflict; and the time 
sequence. 
This study has come to the conclusion that conflict work-
shops need to be integrated with a broader body of literature on 
bargaining theories and third party intervention so as to enhance 
their theoretical and operational utility. Therefore,some avenues 
for further investigation and research should explore both the 
practice and process of third party intervention. The major 
conclusions reached in this respect are : 
(A) The ~nderstanding of conflictby a third party has 
implications for the mode of conflict resolution. For 
example, a 'subjective' understanding of conflict will 
demand attempts at changing the perceptions of the warring 
parties. In contrast, an 'objective' understanding of 
conflict will focus on changing social conditions, rather 
than perceptions. 
(B) Successful third party intermediation requires an 
understanding of the causes or sources of a conflict 
relationship. In most cases this might involve an under-
standing of the history of a particular conflict. 
(C) The process and basis of third party intermediation ·display 
certain features, of which the following are especially 
important (such intervention is voluntary, designed to 
influence and regulate the interaction between conflicting 
parties) : temporary; 'non-evaluative' and 'analytical'. 
(D) Third party intermediation must be seen as part of a more 
comprehensive process of conflict settlement and resolution, 
rather than as a single event. 
(E) Successful third party intermediation seems to require 
certain attributes from third parties, such as fairness, 
basic'analytical ability; flexibility, legitimacy and 
independence. 
(F) Following Bercovitch, a distinction between. 'instrumental' and 
'process' intervention needs to be drawn, for the mode of 
intervention has implications for the nature and duration of 
such intervention. 
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(G) Process intervention is influenced by a diversity of varia-
bles of a 'situationa:f, 'attitudinal', 'perceptual' and '.rational' 
nature. 
Finally, this study has shown that despite an extensive and 
growing body of literature on conflict, the practice of third party 
intervention - especially within the workshop setting - and the 
problems associated with it, has only recently been studied syste-
matically. It is in this respect that this study endeavours to be 
of some practical value, for the phenomenon of conflict and its 
termination - also in South Africa - will continue to pose a chal-
lenge to mankind. 
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